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Investigating compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy 
Anthony Flynn 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates compliance with SME-friendly policy in public procurement. 
Two research questions guide the investigation. The first is the extent to which 
policy is being complied with. The results, which are based on 349 public buyer 
survey responses, reveal compliance to be moderate; indicated by a mean score of 
14.54 out of 22 on the compliance index. The second question concerns the impact 
of institutional forces on policy compliance. A predictive model informed by 
institutional theory is used to test these impacts. The model is significant and 
accounts for 27 per cent of the variance in policy compliance. Perceived consistency 
of institutional rules in public procurement, compatibility of SME-friendly policy 
with organisational goals, and organisational dependence on the state positively 
impact compliance. The constraining effect of SME-friendly policy on professional 
discretion has a negative effect. While not directly significant, social legitimacy, 
perceived diffusion of SME-friendly practices and coercion do indirectly influence 
policy compliance in interaction with procurement experience, procurement 
involvement and organisation size respectively.   
A number of contributions arise from this study. Empirically, it provides among the 
first survey-based insights into what public buyers are doing to facilitate SMEs and 
the institutional factors that support or inhibit them in doing so. This is important as 
academic interest in SME-friendly procurement policies has not been matched by 
evidence on their implementation. Theoretically, it is novel in its application and 
operationalisation of institutional theory to explicate compliance behaviour in public 
procurement. Research on this topic has been largely a-theoretical to date. 
Methodologically, it is responsible for creating the first index of SME-friendly 
procurement practices. The study contributes to policy-practice by identifying 
several areas that can act as levers for the more effective translation of SME-friendly 
policy, including: policy monitoring and the professionalisation of public sector 
purchasing. The study alights on recommendations to take this line of inquiry 
forward. Relevant here is examining the effects of policy compliance on SMEs’ 
participation and success rates in contract competitions, undertaking cross-
comparative research and triangulating research methods.   
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Research topic  
Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) involvement in the marketplace for public 
sector contracts is an area which pre-occupies elected representatives. The reason for 
this is simple. All the available evidence indicates that SMEs struggle to compete in 
public tendering competitions and are under-represented as public sector suppliers 
(Cabinet Office, 2013; GHK, 2010; Kidalov, 2015; Pickernell et al., 2013). Without 
doubt something akin to market failure exists. This is neither desirable nor tenable if 
governments are serious about fostering dynamic economies with SMEs as the 
engines of innovation and employment creation (Bannock and Peacock, 1989; 
Storey, 1994, 2003). Accounting for, on average, 12.8 per cent of GDP and 29 per 
cent of total government expenditure across developed economies, the public 
procurement market is too commercially important for SMEs to miss out on (OECD, 
2013). Not only does SMEs’ under-representation limit their growth prospects, it 
also means that the supply marketplace is not as competitive or as diverse as is 
optimal. Public sector organisations lose out as a result. There is no single cause of 
SMEs’ experienced difficulties in public sector tendering. Myriad environmental and 
organisational factors act together to stymie their chances of success (Loader, 2013). 
Many of the problems are systemic, which is why governments feel impelled to take 
corrective action (Anglund, 1999). This has resulted in the introduction of so-called 
SME-friendly purchasing policies and initiatives (see Box 1).    
 
Not surprisingly, the increased attention accorded to SME-friendly procurement at 
political level has come to inflect academic research. For the last two decades 
scholars have sought to identify barriers to SME participation in public contract 
competitions (Bovis, 1996; Erridge, Fee and McIllroy, 1999; Greer, 1999; 
MacManus, 1991; Michaelis, McGuire and Ferguson, 2003; Ringwald et al., 2009). 
3 
 
By the same token they have assessed and debated the various policy initiatives 
designed to palliate these barriers (Clarke and Moutray, 2004; Kidalov and Snider, 
2011, 2013; Loader, 2013; Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014). To be sure, there has 
been plenty of engagement with both the causes of SMEs’ problems in public 
procurement and the policies formulated by government to address them. There has 
been considerably less engagement with the translation of these policies into 
everyday procurement practice (Blount and Hill, 2015). Stated succinctly, interest in 
SME-friendly procurement policies has not been matched by evidence on their 
implementation. This represents a significant omission; one that limits our ability to 
understand SME-friendly procurement. Consistent with opinions expressed 
elsewhere, it cannot be assumed that government pronouncements on a more SME-
friendly procurement system will be complied with at organisational level and 
realised in practice (Hasselbalch, Costa and Blecken, 2015; Murray, 2012). Saying 
SMEs should be better supported is easy, but making it a reality is an altogether 
different proposition (Bennett, 2008).  
 
Box 1 SME-friendly public procurement in Ireland
1
 
On the 8th of November, 2012 the New Park Hotel in Kilkenny played host to the 
third in a series of Meet the Buyer events. Organised by Inter Trade Ireland, the 
event attracted almost 500 supplier representatives as well as buyers and category 
managers from over 40 public sector organisations. Opening the proceedings, 
Minister of State for Small Business, John Perry T.D. spoke passionately about 
entrepreneurship rejuvenating the Irish economy. Turning to public procurement, he 
remarked on its enormous potential to support this process of economic rejuvenation 
by ensuring that SME suppliers have the opportunity and the incentive to compete in 
the public sector marketplace. Implementing this ‘broader agenda’ for public 
procurement, as he called it, was critical not only to growth and employment 
creation across the SME sector. It also helped the state to achieve better value for 
                                                            
1 The candidate was in attendance at the events referred to in Box 1.  
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money. Reiterating this theme, delegates heard Vincent Campbell, Director of the 
National Procurement Service describe the steps being taken to make tendering for 
public contracts less onerous and bureaucratic. Bringing proceedings to a close, Des 
Armstrong, Director of the Central Procurement Directorate of Northern Ireland, 
outlined the importance of integrating public procurement with the agenda for SME 
competitiveness. Like the assembled public buyers and suppliers in the New Park 
Hotel, public procurement and enterprise policy were also being brought under the 
one roof.      
 
The sentiments expressed in the New Park Hotel were to be heard again at 
subsequent Meet the Buyer events in Belfast (Sept, 2013) and Dublin (November, 
2013). Minister of State at the Department of Finance, Brian Hayes T.D. and Paul 
Quinn, Director of the newly established Office of Government Procurement, Ireland 
were there to tell attendees of policy initiatives under way to make public sector 
tendering more accessible to small suppliers. A more business-friendly public 
procurement system that was open to all firms, irrespective of size, profile or 
experience was what was promised. As the Minister noted: ‘the public sector is a 
significant market for small businesses, so improving our public procurement 
practices by removing obstacles and encouraging the involvement of SMEs is a key 
priority’. Plans for further aggregating the purchasing requirements were also 
mentioned as part of a more strategic and efficiency-driven approach. Quite how 
aggregated purchasing and centralised framework agreements could be reconciled 
with the SME inclusion agenda was not made clear. Even so, the message that public 
procurement was in need of reform and that the government was committed to taking 
the necessary action was unmistakable. If this message was targeted at encouraging 
SMEs, it was equally targeted at soliciting the co-operation and goodwill of public 
buyers – the actors ultimately responsible for translating policy aspiration into 
everyday procurement practice. How would they interpret and respond to these 
institutional pressures for SME-friendly procurement?  
 
Research rationale  
This study is a response to the paucity of research on compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy. Its overriding objective is to determine how SME-friendly 
5 
 
procurement policy is working out in practice, using Ireland as the research context 
and public buyers as the research informants. This means providing evidence on the 
extent of Irish public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly policy and the factors 
that promote or inhibit compliance. As such, there is a descriptive and an 
explanatory dimension to the study. Compliance is examined through the lens of 
institutional theory (see Fig. 1, pg. 7). Why is compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy worth investigating? In an academic sense, having answers to 
what public buyers are doing in respect of SME-friendly policy and why they are 
doing it addresses a significant gap in the literature. At a more overarching level, 
pursuing this line of inquiry helps to strengthen the scientific basis of SME-friendly 
procurement through its empirical observations, theoretical grounding, explanatory 
depth and methodological sophistication. For example, it stands as among the first 
nationally representative surveys of a public buyer population. It also breaks new 
ground through its application of institutional theory for explaining and predicting 
compliance behaviour. As will be demonstrated in chapter two, the use of 
institutional theory, or any theory for that matter, has been noticeable by its absence 
in discussion and empirical testing of SME-friendly procurement policy.       
 
Questions around SME-friendly policy compliance are also pertinent outside the 
academic domain. For a start, they help to reveal what progress is being made 
towards effecting SME-friendly procurement – something that is of direct relevance 
and consequence to the main public procurement stakeholder groups: elected 
representatives, policy makers, public sector organisations, the business community 
and their representative associations. Making a determination around policy 
compliance also prefigures any assessment of the impacts of SME-friendly policy. 
The policy literature is clear in stating that we must first ascertain whether a policy 
6 
 
has translated into practice before we can begin to evaluate its effects (Beyer, 
Stevens and Harrison, 1983). Investigating policy compliance is important because it 
is what happens in practice that ultimately affects SMEs’ chances of competing for 
and winning public sector contracts, not what is contained in policy statements. 
Tellingly, other scholars have discovered that SMEs tend to be less critical of policy 
support initiatives than public buyers’ adherence to them (Fee, Erridge and 
Hennigan, 2002). Finally, it is only through scholarly inquiry that we can begin to 
understand the mechanisms that support policy compliance and, subsequently, be in 
a position to relay this information to policy makers and other interested parties. 
Summarising, we can say that investigating compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy recommends itself not only for its academic value but also for its 
real world relevance. This pursuit of rigour and relevance is in keeping with the 
critical realist underpinnings of the study (Hammersley, 1992).  
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Fig.1 Organising framework for the study 
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Research findings 
Prier and McCue (2009) have previously argued that institutional expectations 
around what public procurement should deliver are not always mirrored in public 
buyers’ actions. This is certainly the case here where there is evidence of a policy-
practice divide. Public buyers are adhering to some but not all of the SME-friendly 
policy recommendations first made by the Irish government in 2010 and 
subsequently reiterated in 2014. The average score on the compliance index, which 
was created for the purposes of this study, is 14.54 out of 22. Few public buyers are 
fully acquiescing with policy expectations - less than one per cent exhibit perfect 
compliance. Equally, few public buyers are acting in outright defiance of policy 
expectations, and all are conforming to some of the prescribed measures. 
Compliance rates vary significantly depending on the individual policy 
recommendation. Measures including the online advertising of contracts and the use 
of proportionate insurance cover criteria evince high levels of compliance. The same 
cannot be said of conducting pre-tender market analysis or publishing prior 
information notices (PINs), among other measures. SME-friendly policy is 
translating into practice, albeit in an imperfect and incomplete way. Thus far, public 
buyers appear to have assumed a compromise response to institutional pressures for 
SME-friendly procurement (Oliver, 1991). It is worth seeing this in the context of 
recent typifications of public buyers as ‘practical idealists’ and ‘adapted realists’ 
(Roman, 2015).   
 
The findings are also clear in demonstrating that the institutional environment 
influences public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly policy. The predictive 
model derived from institutional theory accounts for over 27 per cent of the variance 
in policy compliance. This is consistent with theoretical predictions on the powerful 
9 
 
role that institutional forces play in shaping actors’ behaviour, particularly within 
public sector contexts. The factors that directly affect compliance are: consistency of 
public procurement policies; compatibility between SME-friendly policy and 
organisational goals; dependence on the institutional rule setters - government; and 
the constraining effect of SME-friendly policy on public buyers’ professional 
discretion. As hypothesised, the first of these three factors promote policy 
compliance. The fourth factor inhibits it. The findings provide among the first 
insights into how institutional dynamics act to encourage or inhibit compliance 
behaviour, as the case may be. Moreover, they lend credence to what others have 
previously speculated: the realisation of SME-friendly policy is contingent on how 
public buyers manage the multiple institutional and organisational demands made of 
them (Erridge, 2007; Kidalov and Snider, 2011). Interestingly, neither social 
legitimacy concerns nor the perceived diffusion of SME-friendly practices directly 
influence policy compliance. Yet significant and positive effects are observed when 
these same institutional factors are moderated by public buyers’ experience and 
involvement in procurement respectively. The same situation obtains with the 
coerciveness of SME-friendly policy, except that it is negatively moderated by 
organisation size.  
Research contribution  
Research at the intersection of SMEs and public procurement is still at a nascent 
state of development and much remains to be discovered. The contributions of this 
study go some way towards advancing the research agenda. In an empirical sense the 
study offers among the first systematic assessments of how a national population of 
public buyers is responding to institutional pressures for SME-friendly procurement. 
Heretofore we could only speculate on how SME-friendly procurement policy was 
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being received. What figures did exist on compliance rates were either not 
representative or else derived from unreliable estimates. The study also unpicks the 
antecedents of SME-friendly policy compliance - something that has little precedent 
and of which there is a dearth of knowledge. These findings can now be added to 
what has already been established on the predictors of procurement rule compliance 
(Blount and Hill, 2015; Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006; Gelderman, 
Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013) and the adoption of 
environmentally sustainable supply chain management practices (Hoejmose, 
Grosvold and Millington, 2013; Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 2015; Zhu, Sarkis 
and Lai, 2013). In essence, the study is significant because its reveals what public 
buyers are doing to facilitate SME participation in contact competitions and 
empirically tests reasons for their behaviour.  
Theoretically, the study contributes in a novel way through its application of 
institutional theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1987). No other study has taken an institutional view of SME-friendly policy 
compliance in public procurement. In fact, no other study has operationalised a 
theory in survey-based research on SME-friendly procurement. The benefit of a 
theoretically-informed approach is that debate on SME-friendly procurement is 
elevated from ‘what’ questions that produce descriptive answers to ‘why’ questions 
that produce explanatory answers. Employing an institutional theory perspective also 
benefits the wider public procurement field, which has under-utilized institutional 
perspectives. This is in spite of the heavily regulated, legalistic and normatively 
governed character of public purchasing (Lian and Laing, 2004). The study also 
brings public procurement to the attention of institutional theorists, who have so far 
neglected it. Methodologically, the study is notable for a creating a compliance index 
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for SME-friendly procurement as well as devising a predictive model of same, 
neither of which previously existed. The way in which Ireland’s national e-
procurement site was exploited to identify and make contact with public buyers also 
represents a breakthrough in this field. Apart from its academic contributions, the 
study yields insights for public administrators on how to better manage the policy 
implementation process. These include the on-going monitoring of policy, 
introducing sector-specific SME-friendly policies, fostering a cadre of full-time and 
accredited public buyers, and enhancing the status of the procurement function.  
Future research  
This study is part of a conversation on SME involvement in public procurement. It 
does not have the last word on it by any means. There are many questions still to be 
answered, many debates still to be had over the coming years. What is earnestly 
hoped for is that the findings presented here will stimulate further engagement with 
issues around promoting SME involvement in the public sector marketplace. To this 
end several promising lines for future inquiry are highlighted. These constitute 
aspects deserving of investigation in their own right, but they also represent ways to 
improve on the empirical, theoretical and methodological content of this study. 
Among these is the recommendation to test the relationship between policy 
compliance and the participation of SMEs in contract competitions. While this is 
what policy makers and elected representatives envisage will happen, empirical 
confirmation is still required. The use of alternative theoretical perspectives is also 
something that researchers should contemplate. Possibilities here include principal-
agency theory, which readily lends itself to any study of compliance behaviour, and 
expectancy theory of motivation. The latter is of special interest as, barring a few 
exceptions (Maser and Thompson, 2013; Ntayi, Ahiauzu and Eyaa, 2011; Preuss and 
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Walker, 2011), psychological theory has been overlooked in discussions on public 
buyer behaviour. There is also tremendous scope for methodological innovations, 
whether in relation to the carrying out of cross-national investigations of SME-
friendly policy compliance or using more qualitative and mixed-method research 
designs.      
Preview of chapters  
There are five chapters in this study (see Fig. 2, pg. 15). The first chapter is a 
comprehensive review of the literature at the intersection of SMEs, public 
procurement and government policy. The chapter explains why SMEs have become 
central to academic and political discourse on public procurement, what we know of 
their involvement and experiences to date, and what we don’t know. Included among 
the areas we know little about is compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policies. This is the research gap or puzzle that motivates the study. The second 
chapter leads on from the first. It takes an institutional perspective on policy 
compliance. The result is a theoretically-informed account of how and why a 
government initiative such as SME-friendly procurement policy is understood to 
influence behaviour within the organisation. In turn, this provides the basis for a 
predictive model of SME-friendly policy compliance. The model hypothesises a 
series of relationships between institutional factors and the compliance behaviour of 
public buyers. Taken together, chapters one and two clarify the object of 
investigation, which is compliance with SME-friendly policy in public procurement, 
put forward institutional theory as a lens to rationalise and explain policy 
compliance, and construct a predictive model to test policy compliance.   
The third chapter covers methodology. There are two main parts to this chapter. The 
first concerns the philosophical assumptions that are made throughout the study. 
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These assumptions go to the heart of questions on what constitutes knowledge, what 
is the purpose of social inquiry and how social inquiry can and should be carried out. 
While there has been a backlash against philosophical dogmatism in social inquiry in 
recent years, it is still important that researchers evince awareness of the 
philosophical assumptions of their inquiries. Seale (1999a) has likened this to 
working out in a ‘mental gymnasium’. The philosophical assumptions made here are 
consistent with a critical realist outlook: an external reality is said to exist; it is 
possible to obtain reasonably objective knowledge about this reality; and research 
methods originating in the physical sciences are appropriate for this task. The second 
part of the chapter delves into the design and implementation research aspects of the 
study. Relevant here is use of the survey-based approach to systematically gather 
data on policy compliance, the steps taken to ensure the integrity of the survey 
instrument, the operationalisation and measurement of the research variables and the 
process of data collection. The preliminary stages of survey data analysis, including 
response rate and respondent representativeness, conclude the chapter.    
Chapter four reports the empirical findings of the study. The first section of the 
chapter is descriptive in form. It reveals the extent to which SME-friendly policy is 
being complied with. This answers the first research question. All relevant statistical 
descriptors are contained in this section. The second section is more explanatory. It 
involves testing the predictive model of compliance using a three-step hierarchical 
regression technique and subsequently interpreting its results. Acceptance or 
rejection of the hypothesised relationships between institutional pressures and policy 
compliance is made on this basis. This addresses the second research question 
regarding the impact of the institutional environment on policy compliance. Chapter 
five discusses the empirical findings in greater depth and interrogates what they 
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mean for SME-friendly public procurement. How the findings compare with, and 
add to, the existing body of work in this area and in public procurement generally is 
also assessed. The empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions that the 
study makes are then articulated. Attention is also drawn to the relevance of the 
study and its findings to policy-practice. The final sections in chapter five concede 
the limitations of the study, but also highlight ways in which researchers can 
improve on them with a view to strengthening the rigour and relevance of 
scholarship on SME-friendly procurement. The chapter and the study conclude with 
a reprise of its key findings and their value in advancing knowledge in the public 
procurement field.    
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Fig. 2 Preview of chapters 
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Chapter 1:  
SME-friendly 
procurement 
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1.0 Overview of chapter one 
The purpose of a literature review is to summarise what is known on a particular 
topic and to point out gaps or problems that are deserving of scholarly attention 
(Hart, 2008; Jesson, Matheson and Lacey, 2011). The literature review for this study 
examines the existing body of research on SMEs, public procurement and 
government policy. The intersection of these three areas constitutes the boundaries of 
the study (see Fig. 3, pg. 19). The gap the literature review identifies is compliance 
with government policies aimed at making procurement more SME-friendly. The 
layout of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.1 describes how the literature review 
process was carried out using both traditional and systematic search methods. 
Section 1.2 interrogates and defines SMEs, public procurement and government 
policy. Clarification over how these three concepts are understood and used 
throughout this study is important as their meanings are not necessarily self-evident 
or even agreed-on. Section 1.3 then relates the three concepts to each other. It 
explains why the SME agenda has come to be fused with public procurement and 
what governments are doing to leverage public procurement for the benefit of SMEs.  
Having established the connection between SMEs, public procurement and policy 
section 1.4 goes into greater detail on why public sector contracts are attractive to 
SMEs. Equally, it makes the case for why having more SME suppliers benefits not 
only public sector organisations but also national economic competitiveness and 
societal wellbeing. Going from the positive to the negative, section 1.5 discusses 
market failure in public procurement. Featured here is SMEs’ longstanding 
frustrations with public sector tendering as well as their disproportionately low 
participation and success rates in contract competitions. The manifold reasons why 
SMEs struggle in the marketplace for public sector contracts are documented in 
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section 1.6. These cover the public sector environment, the peculiarities of the public 
tendering system, and the resource and capacity limitations inherent to small firms. It 
is this area more than any other that has garnered most attention in studies on SMEs 
and public procurement. Government policy initiatives to address these barriers and 
increase SME participation in public procurement is the subject of discussion in 
section 1.7. In recent years SME-friendly policies have become a standard feature of 
the international public procurement landscape. The intent of these policies varies 
across jurisdictions. In the European Union (EU) the emphasis is on creating a ‘level 
playing field’ on which all firms can compete while the United States (US) utilises 
preference schemes for small and ethnic minority-owned firms.  
Sections 1.3-1.7 cover what is known at the intersection of SMEs, public 
procurement and government policy, namely that the agenda to foster a dynamic 
business environment is increasingly linked to opportunities in the public sector 
marketplace; that the relationship between SME suppliers and the public sector 
should be mutually beneficial; that public procurement is characterised by a degree 
of market failure as far as SME involvement is concerned; that barriers to SME 
involvement are both external and internal; and that governments have enacted 
policies to alleviate these barriers. Section 1.8 explores a part of the debate we know 
relatively little about – compliance with SME-friendly procurement policies. Put 
simply, it remains to be seen if the much vaunted SME-friendly policies are actually 
translating into practice. The limited evidence that is available indicates that 
procurement policies do not always materialise and that policy-practice divides are 
by no means unusual. Leading on, section 1.9 brings together empirical research and 
commentary on the factors that explain policy compliance in public procurement. 
While individual, organisational and environmental-political factors have all been 
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put forward, and in some cases tested, the area is still under-theorised and under-
researched. Identification of these gaps leads the study towards an institutional 
theory perspective on SME-friendly policy compliance, which is the focus of chapter 
two.   
Fig. 3 Literature 
boundaries
 
 
1.1 Literature review   
Literature reviews can be performed in a number of ways. Traditionally, a ‘narrative’ 
approach predominated in the management science. In more recent years the 
systematic review processes synonymous with the human sciences has started to gain 
traction (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003). A two-stage review process was 
employed for the purposes of this inquiry, which combined the flexibility of the 
traditional review technique with the rigour and precision of the systematic method. 
A traditional scoping review was carried out first and served as the primary means of 
Area of 
research 
interest 
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sourcing literature. It captured peer-reviewed research and government publications 
at the intersection of SMEs, public procurement and government policy. Accessing 
the second of these was crucial as much of what has been written and researched in 
this area is contained in government or government-sponsored reports and policy 
documents. A systematic review would not have been capable of sourcing this ‘grey 
literature’, which is one of its main deficiencies (Curran et al., 2007). Where 
systematic reviews are strong is in pinpointing relevant content published in 
scholarly journals (Gough and Elbourne, 2002). On this basis a systematic search of 
academic databases was carried out after the traditional scoping review. This helped 
to identify any studies that the initial search missed. The two stages of the literature 
review are described in more detail below.   
1.1.1 Traditional review 
In 2012 the research process commenced with a traditional review of literature on 
SMEs, public procurement and related government policies. Traditional scoping 
reviews are useful at the start of a major research project where the precise line of 
inquiry has yet to be determined (Jesson, Matheson and Lacey, 2011). The review 
was guided by the candidate’s knowledge of the topic at the time2 and by the 
recommendations of the principal supervisor. Mainly, it involved identifying work 
published by prominent scholars in the public procurement field and scanning article 
titles in specialist academic journals, including Journal of Public Procurement, 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management and Public Procurement Law 
Review. Published output on public procurement from national governments, the 
European Commission and international organisations such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was also searched. The volume 
                                                            
2 The candidate was previously employed as a research assistant on a project concerning public 
procurement and SME suppliers.    
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of material grew exponentially as one scholarly article, policy document or 
government report lead to the identification of contemporaneous or earlier 
publications. At the completion of the traditional review a substantial body of 
literature had been amassed. This was added to over the course of 2013-15 as new 
studies and reports were published and became publicly available.    
1.1.2 Systematic review  
In addition to the traditional review a systematic literature review was performed. 
Loader (2013) and Zheng, Walker and Harland (2006) have previously used the 
systematic review, or a variant thereof, to good effect in compiling existing 
scholarship on SMEs and public procurement. Here it was used to supplement the 
traditional review. The strength of a systematic search strategy is its rigour and 
comprehensiveness when compared to the traditional review approach (Booth, 
Sutton and Papaioannou, 2012; Cooper, 2010; Fink, 2010; Gough and Elbourne, 
2002; Jesson, Matheson and Lacey, 2011). Systematic searching brings a degree of 
transparency and accountability to the review process that the traditional approach 
lacks. The systematic review protocol used here entailed searching combinations of 
keywords relating to SMEs, public procurement and government policy across five 
different databases (see Table 1). The limiting fields of ‘Title’, ‘Author-Supplied 
Keywords’ and ‘Abstract’ were used during the search process. The search was 
confined to Scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals. Forty-four articles were sourced in 
this way. Some of these articles had already been located during the first review 
phase and some were new. The systematic search thereby acted to strengthen the 
quality of the review, affirming the results of the traditional review while adding new 
material. The chapter now proceeds to clarifying what is meant by SMEs, public 
procurement and policy.  
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Table 1 Systematic review protocol 
SME 
terminology 
Public procurement 
terminology 
Policy 
terminology 
Academic 
databases 
SME 
Small firm 
Small supplier 
Small business 
Small 
enterprise 
Public procurement 
Government purchasing 
Government contracts 
Public sector tendering 
Public sector purchasing 
Policy Business Source 
Complete 
Academic Search 
Complete  
Emerald Insight 
Sage 
Westlaw 
    
1.2 Definition of concepts  
Definitional clarity over the concept or concepts in use is critical in any scholarly 
inquiry (Curran et al., 2007). On the one hand it forces the researcher to think 
through and then articulate what it is they are investigating. On the other hand it 
ensures that the reader is clear on how the key concepts are understood and used 
throughout the study. Three concepts are central to this study: SMEs, public 
procurement and policy. Definitions for each of these are given in sections 1.2.1-
1.2.3. Some concepts are more readily definable than others. This is the situation 
here. In the EU, as in many other jurisdictions, SMEs are defined in law
3
. As a 
result, there is a single and officially approved definition of what constitutes a SME. 
The same cannot be said of the other two concepts. Public procurement is a 
relatively new academic field still in search of a unifying, authoritative definition 
(Prier and McCue, 2009). Similarly, the meaning of policy can vary depending on 
the context in which it is used (Heclo, 1972). Definitional clarity becomes all the 
more important in their case.        
                                                            
3 On 6 May 2003 the European Commission adopted Recommendation 2003/361/EC for a 
definition of SMEs, which replaced Recommendation 96/280/EC.  
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1.2.1 Defining SME 
The SME acronym is part of the everyday language of business and is widely 
recognised throughout the world (Storey, 1994). Governments in nearly all 
developed economies define SMEs for policy and legislative purposes. Typically, 
this is done by reference to the number of full-time employees and one or more 
measures of revenue or balance sheet total (OECD, 2005). For instance, in the US 
and Canada any manufacturing and non-exporting firm with less than 500 employees 
is defined as a SME (United States International Trade Commission, 2010). The 
same criterion of number of employees is used in the EU, Australia and Japan to 
define SMEs, albeit with lower thresholds: 250 in the EU, 200 in Australia and 300 
in Japan. The exact threshold used by countries or regions to define SMEs generally 
reflects the profile of their enterprise population and the structure of their economy 
(OECD, 2005). For the purposes of this study a SME is defined in accordance with 
EU law. Since January 1
st
 2005 a business entity is classed as an SME if it employs 
less than 250 persons and has a turnover not exceeding €50,000,000 or a balance 
sheet total not exceeding €43,000,000 (European Commission, 2003). As a 
corollary, any firm that has more than 250 employees and revenues in excess of 
€50,000,000 is a large enterprise.  
The same European Commission definition makes allowance for three SME sub-
categories: micro-enterprises, small enterprises and medium enterprises (see Table 
2). The reason for this disaggregation is because SMEs comprise over 99 per cent of 
all firms in the EU. The division of SMEs into sub-categories is based on the criteria 
of number of employees and revenue or balance sheet total. As the name suggests, 
micro-enterprises are the smallest SME sub-category in employment and revenue 
terms. Any firm that employs between 1-9 employees and has revenues not 
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exceeding €2 million is a micro-enterprise. Above micro-enterprises are small firms. 
They employ between 10-49 employees and have revenues of between €2-10 
million. The biggest SME sub-category is the medium-sized enterprise. They have 
between 50-249 employees and revenues of between €10-50 million. Throughout the 
EU micro-enterprises are numerically dominant, making up 92 per cent of the SME 
population (European Commission, 2009). Small enterprises account for 7 per cent 
and medium enterprises 1 per cent. The typical SME in Europe is, therefore, a micro-
enterprise employing between 1-9 staff and revenues of less than €2 million. Other 
jurisdictions have their own sub-categories of SMEs and define them by reference to 
number of employees and financial measures. Further detail on SMEs and their role 
in the economy is given in section 1.3.1. 
Table 2 SME sub-categories in the EU 
SME sub-
category 
No. of 
employees 
Revenue € Balance sheet 
total € 
% of SME 
population  
Micro 
enterprise 
1-9 < 2 million < 2 million 92  
Small 
enterprise 
10-49 2-10 
million 
2-10 million 7 
Medium 
enterprise 
50-249 10-50 
million 
10-43 million 1 
 
1.2.2 Defining public procurement 
Defining public procurement is more challenging than defining SMEs. For a start, it 
does not come with the advantage of being articulated in law. There is also a degree 
of uncertainty over its precise meaning and span of control, something which Prier 
and McCue (2009) discuss at length. Perhaps this is to be expected given the relative 
newness of public procurement both as an academic field (Snider and Rendon, 2008; 
Rendon and Snider, 2010) and as a profession (Matthews, 2005; Prier, McCue and 
Behara, 2010). The European Commission, national governments, professional 
bodies and scholars offer their own interpretations and definitions of public 
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procurement (see Table 3, pg. 28). These are similar to the extent that public 
procurement is understood to involve public sector organisations acquiring goods 
and services from external providers. The definition used in this study goes beyond a 
generic statement of what the procurement process involves. It sees public 
procurement as ‘the designated legal authority to advise, plan, obtain, deliver, and 
evaluate a government’s expenditures on goods and services that are used to fulfil 
stated objectives, obligations, and activities in pursuit of desired policy outcomes’ 
(National Institute of Government Purchasing, undated; Prier and McCue, 
2009:361). There are two main aspects to this definition. The first relates to the 
activities that comprise the procurement function
4
 in organisations. The second 
concerns what is unique about procurement in a public sector context. These are 
dealt with in turn. 
As indicated in the above definition, the procurement function is expansive and 
consists of several activities or stages. These include not only obtaining and 
receiving delivery of goods and services but also engaging in pre-procurement 
activities like advising and planning and post-procurement activities like monitoring 
and evaluation. This stance finds confirmation in the wider literature on supply chain 
management (see Table 4, pg. 30). Throughout it procurement is understood to 
extend beyond contract administration to encompass supply market analysis, supplier 
negotiations, supplier relationship management, information management, 
collaboration with internal customers and product or service end users, post-contract 
management (incl. salvage and disposal considerations) and contribution to business 
goals and overall organisational competitiveness. To illustrate, Carter (1993) lists 
                                                            
4 The acquisition of goods and services by public sector organisations is typically referred to as 
procurement. Outside the public sector acquisition is known by numerous descriptors: purchasing, 
buying and supply management. These terms tend to be used interchangeably in referring to the 
acquisition of goods and services (Bowersox, Closs and Cooper, 2002; Monczka et al., 2010).  
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among the activities that comprise procurement the identification of supply sources, 
the development of suppliers, negotiating contracts, collaborating with internal 
customers and managing purchase orders. Likewise, Trim (1994) refers to records 
maintenance, researching the supply market, developing supply sources, negotiating 
contracts and overseeing the delivery of goods and services. Van Weele (1995, 2005) 
sees the remit of procurement activity as stretching from the initial identification of 
suppliers through to post-contract oversight and evaluation. In sum, procurement is 
taken to encompass all the activities that are needed to acquire supplies and services 
as well as their subsequent management (Monczka et al., 2010; Zenz and Thompson, 
1994).   
The second aspect of the definition emphasises what is distinct about procurement in 
a public sector context, namely: the role that government plays in determining its 
practices and guiding its objectives. As the definition states, procurement is ‘used to 
fulfil stated objectives, obligations, and activities in pursuit of desired policy 
outcomes’ (NIGP, undated; Prier and McCue, 2009:361, emphasis added). While 
private sector firms exercise discretion over how they purchase goods and services, 
public sector organisations do not. Instead, they must comply with legally-binding 
regulations, policies and norms governing their purchasing activity (Murray, 2007; 
Rainey and Bozeman, 2000; Thai, 2001). These regulations, policies and norms are 
rooted in the need for accountability and transparency over how public money is 
spent (Baily, 1978). They are also, as will be discussed in section 1.3.3, increasingly 
aimed at harnessing public spending for economic, social and environmental policy 
goals (Arrowsmith, 1995, 2010; Bolton, 2006; Erridge, 2009; Harland, Telgen and 
Callender, 2013; McCrudden, 2007). The essential point is that public procurement, 
as with public management generally, is determined by political actors and its ethos 
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is based on fairness, equality, democracy and the public interest (Boyne, 2002; 
Murray, 2001a, 2007; Telgen, Harland and Knight, 2007). In contrast, procurement 
in a private sector context is determined by managerial prerogative and is driven by 
the overriding goal of profit maximisation.    
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Table 3 Definitions of public procurement, procurement and purchasing  
Author(s) Definitions of public procurement  
National Institute of 
Governmental Purchasing 
(undated)
5
/ 
Prier and McCue 
(2009:361) 
The designated legal authority to advise, plan, obtain, deliver, and evaluate a government’s expenditures on goods 
and services that are used to fulfil stated objectives, obligations, and activities in pursuit of desired policy 
outcomes 
National Public 
Procurement Policy Unit
6
 
(2005:4) 
Procurement is the acquisition, whether under formal contract or not, of works, supplies and services by public 
bodies. It ranges from the purchase of routine supplies or services to formal tendering and placing contracts for 
large infrastructural projects 
European Commission 
(2014a) 
Public procurement is the process whereby public authorities – including all levels of government and public 
agencies – buy goods and services and commission work  
Chartered Institute of 
Procurement and Supply
7
 
(undated1) 
Procurement and supply management involves buying the goods and services that enable an organisation to 
operate 
Kidalov and Snider 
(2011:1)  
Public procurement is the means by which government agencies and organizations acquire supplies and services 
from outside sources  
 Definitions of procurement 
Van Weele (2005:14) Procurement relates to the function of purchasing inputs used in the firm’s value chain 
Monczka et al., (2010:11) Procurement (or purchasing) refers to all the activities needed to acquire materials  
Zenz and Thompson 
(1994:4) 
Procurement is a professional activity that includes all the activities involved in obtaining materials at minimum 
cost, transporting them, storing them, and moving them toward the production process  
Bowersox, Closs and 
Cooper (2002:45)  
Procurement is concerned with purchasing and arranging inbound movement of materials, parts and/or finished 
inventory from suppliers to manufacturing or assembly plants, warehouses or retail stores 
 Definitions of purchasing 
                                                            
5 The National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) represents public procurement professionals in the US and Canada.  
6 The National Public Procurement Policy Unit (NPPPU) was subsumed into the Office of Government Procurement (OGP), Ireland in 2013. 
7 The Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) is an international body representing purchasing and supply professionals. 
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Baily (1978:1) Organizational purchasing is the process by which organizations define their needs for goods and services, 
identify and compare suppliers and supplies available to them, negotiate with sources of supply or in some way 
arrive at agreed terms of trading, make contracts and place orders, and finally receive the goods and services and 
pay for them  
Van Weele (2005:14) Purchasing is defined as obtaining from external sources all goods and services which are necessary for running, 
maintaining and managing the company’s primary and support activities at the most favourable conditions  
Lysons (1993:1) Organizational purchasing may be defined as that function responsible for obtaining by purchase, lease or other 
legal means, equipment, materials, supplies and services required by an undertaking for use in production 
Carter (1993:3) Purchasing refers to the activities required for obtaining the material resources and services that are needed by the 
manufacturing system 
Gadde and Hakansson 
(1993:13) 
Purchasing comprises a company’s behaviour in relation to its suppliers  
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Table 4 Remit of procurement 
 Author(s) Activities that comprise procurement  
Heywood, Heywood and 
Barton 
(2002); Barrat (2004) 
Developing supplier relationships; developing, negotiating and maintain supplier contracts; servicing requests for 
quotations; composing and placing purchase orders; expediting deliveries; identifying alternative sources of supply 
Van Weele (1995, 2005) Determining the required quality and quantity of goods and services that need to be bought; selecting suppliers; 
negotiating with suppliers; placing orders; monitoring orders (incl. expediting orders); post-contract management 
Saunders (1994) and 
Lysons (1993) 
Contribute to formulation, communication and implementation of policies and strategies; contribute to 
establishment of purchasing supply systems; create and  maintain a database of purchasing and supply 
information; establish and improve sources of supply; acquire suppliers; provide goods and services to internal and 
external customers; monitor and control supply chain; contribute to effective working  
Carter (1993) Identifying and selecting supply sources; developing suppliers; negotiating contracts; developing quality 
specifications; working with process engineering and product development; maintaining corporate material 
database; releasing purchase orders; tracking orders; paying for goods; strategic planning  
Trim (1994) Maintaining records on prices, purchases, stock, supplies and catalogues; researching the supply marketplace; 
investigating supply sources; developing supply sources; managing requisitions for goods and services; securing 
and analysing quotations; scheduling deliveries; negotiating contracts; issuing purchase orders; checking receipt of 
materials; maintaining stocks  
Erridge (1995) Supply market analysis; vendor appraisal; supply-base optimisation; improving supplier performance; establishing 
and evaluation of supply requirements; supplier selection; and contracting  
Monczka et al., (2010) Evaluating and selecting suppliers; acting as a primary contact point with suppliers; deciding how to make a 
purchase; reviewing goods and services purchased 
Dobler, Burt and Lee 
(1990) 
Participation in the development of requirements and their specifications; managing value analysis; researching 
supply market; managing supplier negotiations; buying; administering purchase contracts; managing supplier 
quality   
National Institute of 
Governmental Purchasing 
(undated) 
Includes all functions that pertain to the acquisition, including description of requirements, selection and 
solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contract, and all phases of contract administration; also includes 
the combined functions of purchasing, inventory control, traffic and transportation, receiving, inspection, 
storekeeping, salvage and disposal operations  
31 
 
1.2.3 Defining policy 
As with public procurement, there is no singular or agreed-on definition of policy. 
Depending on the context in which it is used policy can denote a broad orientation 
e.g. ‘we have a policy of openness in this organisation’; an indication of standard 
practice e.g. ‘we recruit from within the local community’; a specific commitment on 
the part of government e.g. ‘we will create 100,000 new jobs by a given date’; or a 
descriptive label e.g. ‘economic policy’ (Colebatch, 2002; Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984). In this study policy is understood in the context of government behaviours 
and intentions – also known as public policy - and is defined succinctly as ‘a course 
of action intended to accomplish some end’ (Heclo, 1972:84). The fact that policy is 
a ‘course of action’ is suggestive of it being a continuous process involving multiple 
actors, including the individuals responsible for implementing it (Hill, 1997; 
Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Furthermore, this ‘course of 
action’ imposes order to the extent that it prescribes how public officials should 
behave, is based on the legitimate authority of the state, and implies a degree of 
expertise on the part of those who formulate it (Colebatch, 2002). The emphasis in 
this study is on policies to facilitate greater SME participation in public contract 
competitions. The chapter now moves to discussing why these policies have come 
about.    
1.3 The SME-public procurement nexus  
SMEs and public procurement are increasingly spoken of in the same context. The 
myriad advantages of having more SMEs participate in the public sector marketplace 
feature regularly in political discourse. So too do the initiatives promised to make 
this more of a reality. These developments have worked their way into the academic 
domain so that issues surrounding SME involvement in public procurement 
constitutes a burgeoning line of inquiry (Loader, 2010, 2013). Addressing the 
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question of why exactly this inter-relationship has come about is the focus of this 
section. Its point of departure is the centrality of SMEs to the modern economy. 
SMEs’ contribution to employment generation, innovative activity and economic 
growth is indisputable. As an enterprise cohort they are frequently referred to as the 
engine of the modern economy
8
. Their economic importance has crossed into the 
public policy arena, and this is discussed in section 1.3.2. Nation states and regions 
are becoming more proactive in seeking to maximise the economic potential of small 
firms. Proof of this, the guiding principle of EU enterprise policy is to ‘think small 
first’ (European Commission, 2008a). The same principle has come to influence how 
elected representatives and policy makers think about and frame public procurement. 
Traditionally a challenging environment for SMEs, significant efforts have been 
made in recent years to reverse this situation and harness the financial weight of 
public procurement so as to benefit the SME sector and spur economic 
competitiveness. Section 1.3.3 goes into more detail on public procurement’s 
potential in this regard.   
1.3.1 SMEs and economic competitiveness 
It is, as Storey (1994:253) has argued, ‘no longer possible to discuss economic 
policy without recognising the role which small firms play in the economy and in the 
rest of society more generally’. Beaver and Prince (2004) reiterate this view in 
asserting that SMEs’ interests cannot be ignored when it comes to drafting public 
policy. The predominance of the SME firm type as well as their contribution to gross 
value added (GVA), employment and innovation make SMEs critical to economic 
growth. As a result, governments have become more sensitive to the needs of SMEs 
and appreciative of how the resources of the state can be deployed to support their 
                                                            
8 This phrase is widely used in government policy. For example, the Glover Report (2008) on 
public procurement and SMEs in the UK is entitled: Accelerating the SME Economic Engine through 
Transparent, Simple and Strategic Procurement. 
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competitiveness. SMEs account for over 99 per cent of enterprises in the world’s 
major economic zones (see Table 5). In actual figures, this translates into 21.6 
million SMEs in the EU (European Commission, 2013, 2014b), 22.7 million in the 
US (Small Business Administration, 2012), 1.11 million in Canada (Industry 
Canada, 2013) and 2.09 million in Australia (Australian Government, 2012). The 
GVA attributed to SMEs is also sizeable across these same countries and regions. In 
Canada and the US it is 39 per cent and 44 per cent respectively. In Australia and the 
EU the comparable figures are higher at 57 per cent and 58 per cent respectively.  
SMEs and employment are invariably linked together by economic commentators. 
The data in Table 5 shows why. SMEs are responsible for employing the majority of 
the workforce in the EU, Canada, Australia and Japan. Two out of every three 
European workers are employed in a SME and nine out of ten Canadian workers are 
SME employees. Only in the US does the SME enterprise cohort not account for a 
majority of workers, and then only by a small margin. Among the main economic 
strengths of SMEs is their ability to generate employment. In the EU SMEs were 
responsible for creating 85 per cent of new jobs between 2002 and 2010, which was 
significantly above their 67 per cent share of total employment (EIM Business & 
Policy Research, 2011). The employment growth rate for SMEs over the same period 
was 1 per cent per annum as compared to 0.5 per cent for large enterprises. SMEs are 
also at the forefront of innovative and entrepreneurial activity. Evidence from the US 
has SMEs outperforming large firms on measures such as patent-to-employee ratio 
(Small Business Administration, 2008). At the macro level, the experience of most 
countries is supportive of the hypothesis that higher rates of new enterprise creation 
and entrepreneurial activity correlate with higher rates of economic growth (Carree 
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and Thurik, 2003; Ovaska, 2014). On these and other dimensions SMEs are critical 
to economic competitiveness and national wellbeing.     
Table 5 SMEs in the enterprise population 
 SME definition 
(No. of 
employees) 
SME 
% 
SME 
number 
(million) 
Employment 
share % 
Value 
added 
%  
EU < 250  99.8 21.6 67 58 
US < 500  99.9  22.7 48.5 44.5 
Canada  < 500  99.9 1.11 89.9 39  
Australia < 200  99.8 2.09 70 57.1  
Japan
9
  Varies by sector. 
Max. 300 
99.7 n/a 69 53 
 
In the decade leading to 2007 SMEs acted as the engine of employment growth and 
increased their contribution to GVA. Thereafter, SMEs, particularly in the EU and 
the US, were buffeted by the international financial crisis and its repercussions in the 
form of reduced customer demand, difficulty in accessing finance, late payment, bad 
debts and depressed economic trading conditions (Kitching et al., 2009). Post the 
financial crisis employment in European SMEs decreased at an annual rate of 2.4 per 
cent compared to 1 per cent in large firms (EIM Business & Policy Research, 2011). 
To contextualise the effects of the financial crisis, between 2007 and 2010 Irish 
SMEs’ contribution to GVA fell from 53 per cent to 48 per cent, employment 
dropped by 15 per cent and final output fell by 18 per cent (European Commission, 
2011a). As of 2014, SMEs in 15 EU Member States still had not returned to their 
pre-crisis employment or final output levels (European Commission, 2014b). Data 
from the US paints a similar picture. There SMEs’ share of GDP went from 46 per 
cent in 2009 to 44.5 per cent in 2010 and, when compared to large corporations, their 
recovery has been slow (Small Business Administration, 2012). Evidently, SMEs are 
more vulnerable during and immediately after periods of financial crisis than large 
                                                            
9 Economist Intelligence Unit (2010).  
35 
 
enterprises. Appreciation of this point has prompted governments to redouble their 
efforts to assist small firms through both supply and demand-side interventions.   
1.3.2 Government policy and SMEs 
Historically, SMEs carried little weight in public policy making and were assumed to 
have only a limited contribution to make to economic growth and competitiveness 
(Bannock and Peacock, 1989; Storey, 1994). The last number of decades has 
witnessed a reversal of this position. Reflective of their economic importance, SMEs 
and the entrepreneurial individuals that create them are now central to policy making 
(Williams, 2013). The Small Business Act envisages SMEs as ‘decisive for the future 
prosperity of the EU’, enunciating ten principles designed to maximise their 
economic contribution (European Commission, 2008a:2). So does the Europe 2020 
Strategy, which includes among its flagship initiatives an ‘industrial policy for the 
globalisation era’ that is SME-centred (European Commission, 2010a:6). Federal 
policy in the US, latterly in the form of the Small Business Act 2013, recognises 
SMEs as critical for maintaining a competitive enterprise environment, underpinning 
economic wellbeing and contributing to national security (Small Business 
Administration, 2013). Since adopting the Bologna Charter on SME Policies the 
OECD has also championed SME competitiveness in its policy advice (OECD, 
2000). Similar policy trajectories can be discerned at national level, such as the 
Britain’s Small Business: GREAT Ambition strategy for fostering SME growth (HM 
Government, 2013) and Ireland’s National Policy Statement on Entrepreneurship 
(Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 2014).   
The above policies exemplify how governments and supranational entities seek to 
enable and empower small enterprises. Carree and Thurik (2003) contend that this 
marks a paradigm shift in the relationship between state and enterprise. Whereas 
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once policy was designed to constrain the power of large firms, the emphasis in the 
current era is on unleashing the entrepreneurial potential of small firms. As the same 
authors assert, this is because the comparative advantage of developed economies 
depends on knowledge-intensive firms that are capable of competing at international 
level. Government proactivity in supporting SMEs connotes that their number, 
employment share and economic contribution are socially suboptimal (Lundstrom et 
al., 2014). This situation is attributed to market imperfections particular to SMEs, 
including: higher costs of compliance for them in the marketplace and information 
asymmetries among putative entrepreneurs as to the benefits of business ownership 
(Storey, 1994, 2003). Policy support for SMEs is designed to correct these market 
imperfections and ensure that their full potential is realised (Aram and Coomes, 
1985; Bannock and Peacock, 1989; Ovaska, 2014). By creating conditions conducive 
to new venture creation, the expectation is that the labour force will benefit from 
employment creation, the marketplace will enjoy greater competition, and other 
positive externalities and spill-over effects associated with a dynamic economic 
environment will accrue to society. It is these social returns from having more and 
better small firms that serves as the rationale for policy support measures.  
The interventions that governments use to support SMEs assume a number of forms. 
Among these Bennett (2008:375) identifies increasing the rate of business start-ups; 
improving the survival or growth rates of existing firms; improving the general 
business environment for all firms; and reducing the burdens, regulations and 
compliance costs for SMEs. Common policy foci are evident across jurisdictions. 
EU policy includes improving access to finance, export support, education and 
training in entrepreneurship, intellectual property and encouraging investment in 
research and development (R&D) as areas through which it can strengthen SMEs 
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(European Commission, 2008b). Access to finance, simplifying employment law, 
intellectual property management and commercialisation, export support, business 
advice and a less regulated environment are also priorities in British and Irish 
enterprise policy (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 2014; HM 
Government, 2013; Small Business Forum, 2006). In the US the Small Business 
Administration aims to assist SMEs by, inter alia, augmenting their ability to export, 
facilitating technology transfers and increasing access to capital (Small Business 
Administration, 2013). As well as high-level actions, more targeted policy 
interventions are also popular. These focus on niche SME cohorts such as high 
potential start-ups (Smallbone, Baldock and Burgess, 2002) and ethnic minority-
owned businesses (Ram and Smallbone, 2003; Worthington et al., 2008). In the 
aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis a public policy domain which has moved centre 
stage in the SME debate is public procurement. It is to this nexus of SMEs and 
public procurement that the chapter now turns. 
1.3.3 Public procurement, government policy and SMEs  
Policies and strategies for the promotion of SMEs now encompass public 
procurement as a matter of course. The EU’s Small Business Act lists access to 
public sector contracts as one of its ten priority areas (European Commission, 
2008a). National enterprise policies and action plans in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom (UK) envisage the market for public sector contracts as pivotal to 
providing growth opportunities for small and newly established firms (Advisory 
Group for Small Business, 2011; HM Government, 2013). To understand why the 
SME agenda has come to be interleaved with public procurement it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the latter. The first and most salient point is that public 
procurement constitutes a significant part of the macro-economy. It approximates to 
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16 per cent of EU GDP (European Commission, 2008a) and 12.8 per cent of GDP 
and 29 per cent of total government expenditure, on average, across OECD countries 
(OECD, 2013). In monetary terms this translates into €16 billion in Ireland, £230 
billion in the UK and €1.7 trillion across the EU. These are substantial figures and 
make government and its estate the single largest purchaser in most economies. The 
situation is replicated at the sub-national level where the procurement budgets of 
public sector organisations constitute a sizeable part of local and regional economies 
and make them among the principal commercial actors (Cabras, 2011; Walker and 
Brammer, 2009).   
The second point is that public procurement is under the control of governments and, 
within legal and regulatory limits, can be harnessed by them to give effect to socio-
economic policy goals (Harland, Telgen and Callender, 2013; Snider and Rendon, 
2008; Thai, 2001). The definition of public procurement operative in this study 
explicitly recognises this to be so. There is a long history of governments bringing 
the financial weight of public procurement to bear on political objectives, as 
documented by McCrudden (2007). This situation has continued up to the present 
day as part of a more overarching trend for ‘joined-up policy’ (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2007; Downe and Martin, 2006) and a more strategic role for procurement 
in the public sector (Quayle, 1998; Quayle and Quayle, 2000). The award of public 
sector contracts has been variously linked to labour standards (Howe and Landau, 
2009), training provision (Austen and Seymour, 2009), redressing discriminatory 
commercial and employment practices (Bolton, 2006), corporate social responsibility 
(Baden, Harwood and Woodward, 2011; Murray, 2000; Snider et al., 2013) and 
economic protectionism (Kono and Rickard, 2014). The EU has been especially 
proactive in attempting to leverage public procurement for political ends. Since 2008 
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it has issued procurement guidelines for social cohesion and ethical sourcing 
(European Commission, 2010b), environmental protection (European Commission, 
2011b) and SME inclusion (European Commission, 2008c). These policies have 
percolated down to EU Member States. Ireland, for example, recently adopted An 
Action Plan on Green Public Procurement (Department of Environment, 
Community & Local Government, 2012) and a guide to Buying Innovation 
(Department of Enterprise, Trade & Employment, 2009).  
As a policy lever public procurement has particular valency for stimulating business 
growth and entrepreneurship (Preuss, 2011). Complementing initiatives by 
governments to increase the supply of small firms, public procurement constitutes an 
important demand-side stimulant, although its potential in this regard has yet to be 
fully exploited (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). In concrete terms public sector 
contracts represent opportunities for small and newly created firms to develop their 
customer base, gain market share, grow and professionalise (see section 1.4.1). 
Because of these possibilities public procurement is seen as integral to improving the 
survival and growth rates of SMEs across developed and developing economies 
(Harland, Telgen and Callender, 2013; Reis and Cabral, 2015). Higher rates of SME 
involvement in public procurement should, in theory at least, contribute to a more 
dynamic and competitive economy. Twenty-five years ago the European 
Commission (1990:13) acknowledged this link, stating that ‘failure to achieve the 
best possible participation of SMEs in public procurement reduces the dynamism of 
the internal market at the same time as holding back regional economic 
development’. In the intervening years achieving the best possible participation of 
SMEs in public procurement has proved arduous in the EU and the US (Kidalov and 
Snider, 2011, 2013). Recent SME-friendly policies aim to succeed where previous 
40 
 
initiatives have fallen short by delivering real and lasting reform of public 
procurement. 
1.4 The case for SME involvement in public procurement  
A consensus runs through political and academic thinking that increased SME 
involvement in public procurement is desirable. Elected representatives talk of 
‘promoting’, ‘facilitating’ and ‘involving’ small firms in the marketplace. The same 
sentiment permeates scholarly research where efforts are directed and identifying the 
barriers that inhibit SME participation and then proposing solutions to tackle them 
(Loader, 2013). Concurrently, scholars are starting to explore the types of 
behaviours, strategic orientations and market positioning strategies that lead to SME 
success in contract competitions (Reijonen, Tammi and Saastamoinen, 2014; Tammi, 
Saastamoinen and Reijonen, 2014). The previous section explained why the agenda 
for SME competitiveness has come to be entwined with public procurement. Now 
this section will take a more fine-grained look at the relationship between the two. 
Section 1.4.1 explains that public sector contracts represent a stable source of 
business demand for SMEs; one that comes with the advantage of guaranteed 
payment and reputational enhancement. Section 1.4.2 inverts this point by showing 
how SME suppliers are valuable to the public sector and that the latter has a vested 
interest in ensuring more SMEs compete for their business. Leading on, sections 
1.4.3-1.4.4 set out the economic and social dividends of SMEs acting as suppliers to 
public sector organisations.  
1.4.1 Value of public sector contracts to SMEs 
Public sector contracts benefit SMEs in multiple ways, both tangible and intangible. 
Firstly, public sector contracts offer stable and predictable sources of demand 
(Bovis, 1996; Erridge, 1998; Fee, Erridge and Hennigan, 2002; Pickernell et al., 
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2011). Stability and predictability afford SMEs a degree of security to plan for the 
future, invest in new technology or capital equipment and hire new staff. The 
reported views of SMEs bear this out. Studies by Loader (2005) and Peck and 
Cabras (2010) on UK SMEs and MacManus (1991) on US SMEs found that long-
term business opportunities, contract security and revenue stability were among the 
main attractions of public sector contracts. Secondly, public sector contracts are 
associated with payment certainty. This factor was cited by over 80 per cent of 
SMEs surveyed by Loader (2005) as an advantage of supplying to the public sector. 
It also emerged as the number one reason why firms in the US were motivated to act 
as suppliers to the public sector (MacManus, 1991). The frequency with which 
contracts are issued in the public sector also tends to be higher than in the private 
sector, which injects fluidity into the market for contracts and opens up more 
opportunities for small and new suppliers (Bovis, 1996). 
Besides predictable sources of demand and guaranteed payment, public sector 
contracts appeal to SMEs in other less tangible ways. Acting as preferred supplier to 
a public sector organisation can burnish the credentials and marketplace reputation 
of a SME (Erridge, 1998). In turn, this can strengthen their position when tendering 
for future contracts in either the public or private sector. Notably, a demonstrable 
record of success is identified by SMEs themselves as a prerequisite to win business 
with public sector organisations (Withey, 2011). Public sector contracts also 
represent a means for SMEs to diversify their customer base and avoid over-
dependence on private sector business, which is more cyclical than public sector 
demand (Bovis, 1996). In a similar way, public contracting allows small firms, 
particularly ethnic-owned firms, to graduate from low value market niches to the 
mainstream commercial environment (Ram and Smallbone, 2003). Public 
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procurement also acts as a demand-side stimulant to SME innovativeness and, at a 
level up from this, industrial development (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Procurement 
Innovation Group, 2009; Rothwell, 1984). Procurement competitions can trigger 
innovation by preferring the most technologically-sophisticated products or 
encouraging firms to develop new service solutions (Georghiou et al., 2014). The 
same authors found that 67 per cent of the 800 SMEs they surveyed agreed that 
public procurement competitions act as an impetus to their innovative activity.   
1.4.2 Value of SME suppliers to public sector organisations 
It is not only SMEs that stand to benefit from supplying the public sector. The public 
sector and, by implication, the delivery of public services also have much to gain 
from contracting with SMEs (BIP Solutions, 2009; Office of Government 
Commerce, 2003). At the most basic level SMEs have the capability to meet the 
supply needs of public sector organisations, even in technologically demanding and 
sensitive sectors such as defence acquisition (Kidalov, 2015). SMEs are also well 
placed to offer competitive pricing arrangements on account of their minimal 
administrative overheads and streamlined operations. Aside from the possibility of 
competitive bid pricing, having SMEs compete for public sector contracts stimulates 
competition and can help attenuate the market power of large, established suppliers. 
Their presence also broadens the supply base from which public buyers can choose 
and gives public buyers more market power (European Commission, 1990). 
Enhanced choice has been cited by purchasing organisations as justification for 
accommodating more SMEs in their supply chains (Ram and Smallbone, 2003). 
Ensuring SMEs have the opportunity to compete for business is, in the final analysis, 
part of public buyers astutely managing their supply base, something which Caldwell 
et al., (2005) have argued is critical to more effective and strategic procurement.  
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Entrepreneurship, niche skills, versatility and customer responsiveness are attributes 
frequently invoked when promoting SMEs as suppliers (BIP Solutions, 2009; Office 
of Government Commerce, 2003). Public buyers have acknowledged these attributes 
as among the main attractions to doing business with SMEs (Loader, 2007; Smith 
and Hobbs, 2001). In terms of entrepreneurial ability, SMEs’ ability to recognise 
opportunities and leverage their capabilities to create innovative products and 
services makes them preferred suppliers for many large public and private sector 
organisations (Woldesenbat, Ram and Jones, 2011). Compared to large 
organisations, SMEs’ flat structures and short chains of command make it possible 
for them to respond quickly to market changes and customer requirements (Office of 
Government Commerce, 2003). Coupled with responsiveness is the oft heard 
compliment that SME suppliers are willing ‘to go the extra mile’ in service standards 
and customer commitment (NERA Economic Consulting, 2005). Another advantage 
from a public sector perspective relates to sustainability targets. As demonstrated 
across several studies, using locally-based SME suppliers in, for example, catering 
and food provisions reduces an organisation’s carbon footprint (Morgan, 2008; 
Nijaki and Worrell, 2012; Walker and Preuss, 2008). Moreover, contracting with 
SMEs is consistent with the mandate of public sector organisations, particularly local 
authorities, to contribute to the economic, social and environmental development of 
the local community (Murray, 1999, 2000, 2001b; Preuss, 2009). Like SMEs, public 
sector organisations stand to gain in both tangible and intangible ways from the 
relationship.  
1.4.3 Value of SME suppliers to economic competitiveness  
The benefits of contracting with SME suppliers accrue not only to public sector 
organisations but also to the exchequer and to the wider economy. In the first 
44 
 
instance, SME involvement adds to both the quantity and quality of competition, 
which can lead to lower bid prices and a more efficient public procurement market 
(EIM Business & Policy Research, 2004; European Commission, 1990; Glover, 
2008). Supportive of this position, econometric analysis indicates that more openness 
and transparency in the public procurement system is associated with an increased 
numbers of bidders and better price/quality ratios (Europe Economics, 2004, 2011). 
The obverse also holds true – SMEs’ exclusion leads to a diminution in competition 
(Kidalov, 2015). Positive externalities in the form of employment creation and 
contributions to economic growth are also predicted to result from increased SME 
participation in public procurement markets (Erridge, 1998; Fee, Erridge and 
Hennigan, 2002; O’Brien, 1993). These are particularly welcome in regions that are 
comparatively disadvantaged and that have low levels of private sector investment 
(European Commission, 1989). Greater commercialisation of innovative products 
and services is another positive externality that results from having more 
entrepreneurial start-ups serving as public sector suppliers (Procurement Innovation 
Group, 2009; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). The innovative base of the economy is 
strengthened as a result.          
1.4.4 Value of SME suppliers to societal wellbeing 
The value to society from SME involvement in public procurement flows from their 
economic contribution. SME inclusion underpins the economic, social and 
environmental sustainability of urban centres and regions. Relevant here is the 
known propensity of locally-based SMEs to re-invest public sector revenues back 
into the community, producing a local multiplier effect (Cabras, 2011; Nijaki and 
Worrel, 2012; Preuss, 2011). SMEs, unlike multi-national corporations, will not be 
domiciled overseas for tax liability purposes nor will they typically repatriate profits 
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to an overseas headquarters. Consequently, revenue from public sector contracts 
awarded to SMEs is more likely to be recirculated in the local economy. From the 
perspective of the buyer, awarding contracts to local SMEs helps return revenue to 
the local authority or government department through business taxes and rates. In the 
medium-long term it can even reduce expenditure on social protection programmes 
by virtue of lower unemployment and greater economic activity (Walker and Preuss, 
2008; Preuss, 2011). Social cohesion is also supported when public sector 
organisations contract with atypical SMEs i.e. firms owned or managed by foreign 
nationals, women or disabled individuals (Michaelis, McGuire and Ferguson, 2003; 
Smallbone et al., 2008; Worthington et al., 2008). SME innovativeness can also 
produce a social dividend when it leads to innovative products and services that 
improve public service delivery (European Commission, 2014a; Uyarra and 
Flanagan, 2010).    
1.5 Market failure in public procurement 
Mutually beneficial though it may be for SMEs and public sector organisations to 
interact, the reality of everyday procurement practice paints a less sanguine picture 
of events. The very fact that SME-friendly policies exist in the first place signifies 
that the marketplace is not functioning optimally and is marked by a degree of 
failure. Commenting on recent SME-friendly initiatives in the UK Loader (2013:39) 
made the contention that ‘they reinforce the concern that public procurement is not 
supporting small business as effectively as both the government and small business 
would like’. Kidalov and Snider (2011) arrived at the same conclusion, reasoning 
that there would be no need for the on-going roll out of SME-friendly support 
measures if the public sector market was efficient and competitive. The purpose of 
this section is to present evidence of market failure in public procurement. As a lead-
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in, section 1.5.1 synopsises SMEs’ perceptions and experiences of public sector 
tendering. On the whole SMEs are cynical and view the system as dysfunctional. 
Section 1.5.2 reports what data there is on SMEs’ participation and activity in public 
procurement. Building on this, SMEs’ success rates in the EU marketplace and in the 
British and Irish marketplaces are examined in sections 1.5.3-1.5.4 respectively. The 
figures put the number and value of contracts won by SMEs well below their weight 
in the economy. 
1.5.1 SMEs’ perceptions of public procurement 
The positive sentiments expressed by SMEs over supplying public sector 
organisations belie their reported frustration and dissatisfaction with public 
procurement. In a 2010 survey of its members the Irish Business & Employers’ 
Confederation (2010) found that 56 per cent viewed the public sector tendering 
system as poor. In a larger study involving over 3000 firms in the US less than one in 
three respondents agreed that public procurement practices were either ‘competitive, 
efficient, or equitable’ (MacManus, 1991). Even with the launch of initiatives 
designed to assist SMEs in tendering, negative sentiments persist. Forty-three per 
cent of Irish suppliers surveyed in December, 2011 complained that public 
procurement had become less business-friendly over the preceding three years and a 
further 37 per cent believed that there had been no improvement (Flynn et al., 2013). 
Evidence has also been adduced in British and Australian contexts to show that 
SMEs’ perceive the value proposition of supplying the public sector to be lower than 
the private sector on such criteria as profitability, sales volume, market access and 
even contract stability (BIP Solutions, 2009; Purchase, Goh and Dooley, 2009). 
Relatedly, SMEs see private sector buyers to be more open to innovation (Georghiou 
et al., 2014). Commercially attractive as public sector contracts may be, SMEs are 
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highly critical of how public procurement operates in practice and believe it to be 
something of a double-edged sword.  
1.5.2 SME participation in public procurement 
Perceptions aside, SMEs’ tendering activity offers an objective measure of the 
inclusivity of public procurement. The available data points to relatively low levels 
of SME tendering activity as well as the absence of a sizeable cohort of SMEs from 
the marketplace. In a baseline study by Flynn et al., (2013) 51 per cent of firms 
actively competing for business with the Irish public sector were micro-enterprises, 
well below their 90 per cent presence in the enterprise population. In contrast, 11 per 
cent of competing firms were classified as large, even though they number less than 
1 per cent of the enterprise population. MacManus’s (1991) survey of public 
procurement in the US also reported the under-representation of sole proprietorships 
and the over-representation of corporations relative to their respective numbers in the 
population. In a 2012 survey of almost 5000 UK SMEs only 10 per cent had bid for a 
public sector contract in the previous 12 months, although 26 per cent had worked 
directly or indirectly for public sector organisations over the same period (BMG 
Research, 2013). The proportion of small firms
10
 in the UK using the internet to 
either access public sector tender documents or sell to public sector organisations in 
2011 was half that of large firms: 19.5 per cent versus 38.5 per cent (Office for 
National Statistics, 2012). Altogether, SMEs are shown to be under-represented as 
competitors in the public sector marketplace.   
                                                            
10 Employing fewer than 50 workers. 
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1.5.3 SME success rates: EU  
Another indicator of market failure is SMEs’ success rates. For above-threshold 
contracts
11
 in the EU analyses shows that SMEs under-perform relative to their 
actual number and GDP contribution. Between 2006 and 2008 SMEs won 60 per 
cent of above-threshold contracts as against their 99.8 per cent presence in the 
enterprise population (GHK, 2010). This equated to 33 per cent of the total value of 
above-threshold contracts, which is some 20 per cent lower than their GDP 
contribution. Based on determinations made in earlier reports (EIM Business and 
Policy Research, 2004; GHK and Technopolis, 2007), SMEs’ performance has 
deteriorated in recent years (see Table 6).  The gap becomes even more pronounced 
when SME sub-categories are examined. Micro-enterprises, which comprise nine out 
of ten firms, only secured 18 per cent of all above-threshold contracts and 6 per cent 
of the total value between 2006 and 2008. Medium-sized enterprises, which make up 
only 1 per cent of SMEs, won 20 per cent of all above-threshold contracts and 17 per 
cent of the total value over the same time period. These findings are backed-up by 
evidence from elsewhere, which demonstrates that firm size is a predictor of 
participation and success in public sector tendering (Flynn, McKevitt and Davis, 
2015a; Pickernell et al., 2011). 
Table 6 SMEs’ share of public procurement in the EU  
Year % of contacts 
won by SMEs  
SMEs’ presence 
in EU economy 
% 
Value of 
contracts won by 
SMEs % 
Value of SMEs’ 
GDP contribution 
% 
2001 53-78 99.8 43 53 
2005 64 99.8 42 56 
2006-
2008 
60 99.8 33 56 
 
                                                            
11 Public sector authorities throughout the EU are legally obliged to publish contracts valued 
above certain financial thresholds in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). These above-
threshold contracts account for approximately 16 per cent of public procurement expenditure across 
the EU.     
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1.5.4 SME success rates: Ireland and UK  
National statistics also point to SMEs winning a disproportionately low share of 
public sector contracts. Twenty years ago small firms in the UK and Ireland were 
estimated to have a 15 per cent share of their respective markets (Bovis, 1996). 
Around the same time Greer (1999) put Irish-based SMEs’ share of the domestic 
public procurement market at 11.5 per cent. Extrapolating from a sample of three 
government departments Michaelis, McGuire and Ferguson (2003) surmised that 
small firms made up 71 per cent of suppliers and 30 per cent of the total value of 
procurement spend in the UK. In the same study the corresponding percentages for 
female and ethnically-owned firms were significantly lower. In 2005 NERA 
Economic Consulting (2005) put British SMEs’ share of their domestic public 
procurement market at 5 per cent, albeit with substantial variation across government 
departments. By 2010 the official figure circulated by the British government was 
6.5 per cent or £3.11 billion, not including indirect procurement spend with SMEs 
through sub-contracting (Cabinet Office, 2011). The most recent data, which covers 
the period 2012-2013, calculated that 10.5 per cent of direct spend and 9.4 per cent 
of indirect spend was going to British SMEs (Cabinet Office, 2013). Whether in 
respect of their tendering activity or success rates, the available evidence leaves little 
doubt that SMEs struggle with public procurement.   
1.6 Reasons for market failure in public procurement  
Why small firms are under-represented in public procurement has been the subject of 
extensive investigation. Arguably, it is this topic more than any other that has come 
to define research on SMEs and public procurement (Loader, 2013). Reviewing 
studies undertaken to date, the same author delineated three categories of barriers 
that militate against SME involvement in the marketplace for public sector contracts: 
the public sector environment; the tendering system; and SMEs’ own resource 
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limitations. These are dealt with in turn in the sections below. The focus in section 
1.6.1 is on issues within the public sector environment, including: contradictory 
policy goals, low levels of professionalism and a risk-averse culture. Section 1.6.2 
examines problems associated with the tendering process. It is on this topic that 
SMEs have been most voluble. Interestingly, the same complaints and experienced 
difficulties have surfaced in different jurisdictions and have persisted over time. 
Barriers affecting SMEs are not only found in the external environment, and so 
section 1.6.3 looks at the organisational and resource limitations inherent to small 
firms and how these impact their ability to compete for and win public sector 
contracts. 
1.6.1 Barriers in the public sector environment 
Many of the causes of SMEs’ experienced difficulties in public procurement 
emanate from within the public sector environment. There are several strands to this 
argument. Firstly, public procurement is criticised for the inconsistency and even 
incompatibility of its goals and policies (see section 1.9.2). Among the effects of 
such ‘regularity ambiguity’ (Morgan, 2008) is that public buyers are left confused 
over their priorities. This is said to have repercussions for facilitating SMEs when set 
against obligations to maximise value for money and adhere to national and 
international procurement laws. Public procurement is also attacked for its lack of 
professionalism. Some years back Greer (1999) observed that staff in many Irish 
public sector organisations did not possess the requisite purchasing skills, 
qualifications and experience. In an international context, half of OECD countries 
are said to lack adequate procurement capability as measured by the number of 
public buyers and their levels of professional expertise (OECD, 2013). Inadequate 
technical and market knowledge among public buyers has also been cited as 
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problematic by SMEs, particularly when it comes to selling innovative goods and 
services (Erridge, Fee and McIllroy, 1999; Georghiou et al., 2014). Professionalism 
among public buyers is, according to one report, the ‘primary instrument for 
achieving a better use of smaller firms in public procurement’ (NERA Economic 
Consulting, 2005 vii). 
 
Allied to concerns over professionalism is the long-held belief that a culture of risk 
aversion permeates public sector procurement. The Procurement Innovation Group 
(2009) linked risk aversion on the part of public buyers to a failure to exploit novel 
and innovative products and services. The reported experiences of SMEs add further 
weight to this belief. In Loader’s (2005) study SMEs complained of inertia, risk 
aversion and a reluctance to deviate from tried and tested products and practices 
among public buyers. The effect of risk aversion, as indicated by Walker and Preuss 
(2008) and Loader (2014) is that larger and better-known suppliers are preferred to 
smaller, newer suppliers. Findings by Pickernell et al., (2013) that young firms are 
less able to access public procurement opportunities at either local or national level 
appear to bear this out. The final point on the public sector environment relates to the 
structural configuration of procurement. It is not uncommon for public sector 
organisations to have no designated procurement unit or even procurement officer 
(Thai, 2001). That procurement often lacks a clear organisation identity and/or 
position in the organisation hierarchy has implications for the consistency and 
effectiveness of everyday purchasing practices. In particular, ‘if public procurement 
is being performed by people other than procurement officials, the chain of 
command is diluted and the public policy process will be adversely affected’ (Prier 
and McCue, 2009:361). Policies to promote SME participation in contract 
competitions are not exempt from this issue.      
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1.6.2. Barriers in the tendering process 
At a level beneath the public sector environment are problems specific to the public 
tendering system. The literature is replete with evidence on the procedural hurdles 
that stymie SMEs. Identifying contract competitions is the first obstacle to negotiate 
and small firms often struggle even at this initial stage (Greer, 1999; Loader, 2005; 
Ringwald et al., 2009). The e-advertising of contracts is helping to offset this 
problem to an extent. As of 2010 approximately 60 per cent of small firms 
throughout the EU were using the internet to interact with public sector organisations 
(Eurostat, 2015a), although only 13 per cent had submitted a tender online (Eurostat, 
2015b). In some countries dedicated national e-procurement portals exist, which 
allows prospective suppliers to search for contracts. Other countries have yet to 
institute such arrangements, meaning that contracts are less visible and less easily 
identifiable. The challenge associated with identifying business opportunities is 
compounded by a lack of communication between public buyers and suppliers at 
pre- and post-tendering phases (Cabras, 2011; Erridge, Fee and McIllroy, 1999). 
Consequently, many SMEs operate with an information deficit around what the 
tendering process involves (European Commission, 1992). The fact that SMEs rank 
greater communication with public buyers as among the improvements they would 
most like to see confirms this point (GHK, 2010).  
Public sector tendering involves not insignificant transaction costs, which small 
firms find difficult to absorb. Putting together a standard bid is estimated to cost 
£3200 in the EU and £5800 in the UK (Centre for Economic and Business Research 
and Gatewit, 2013). The cost factor is a recurring theme in SMEs’ criticisms of 
public procurement. Time demands of completing tendering documentation and its 
associated financial costs ranked as two of the top three barriers in a survey of 3000 
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Irish SMEs (Flynn et al., 2013). In a contemporaneous survey undertaken by 
Ireland’s Small Firms Association of its members 70 per cent criticised the length of 
the procurement process and 67 per cent criticised the costs incurred in preparing a 
bid (Small Firms Association, 2013). Tendering costs become even higher when 
SMEs enter into competition in foreign public procurement markets (Bovis, 1996). 
Inconsistent procedures across and even within public sector organisations adds to 
the costs of tendering (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2007). Migration to 
e-procurement has so far failed to eliminate this problem. SMEs still complain of 
complicated e-tendering procedures and having to submit paper copies of tenders 
(Centre for Economic and Business Research and Gatewit, 2013). These criticisms 
can be seen as part of a much wider problem for SMEs of government imposed ‘red 
tape’ and bureaucracy (Small Business Forum, 2006).    
There are several other issues associated with the tendering process that deserve 
mention. Qualification criteria which are disproportionate to the nature and value of 
the contract are a common complaint of SMEs (Ringwald et al., 2009). These 
include financial capacity thresholds too high for small firms to meet, insurance 
cover requirements that do not reflect the risk profile of the contract, or conditions 
pertaining to number of years trading or previous experience that are not materially 
relevant to the contract. An overemphasis on price, as opposed to a broader 
conception of value for money, is another major barrier. Approximately 80 per cent 
of Irish firms identified this as disadvantageous in a recent study (Small Firms 
Association, 2013) and similar criticisms have been picked up in other studies 
(Cabras, 2011; Irish Business & Employers’ Confederation, 2010; Loader and 
Norton, 2015; Michaelis, McGuire and Ferguson, 2003). Price-driven competition is 
a particular obstacle for SMEs competing in the pan-EU public procurement market 
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(GHK and Technopolis 2007; GHK, 2010). Narrow bid specifications and overly 
prescriptive requirements (Loader, 2005, 2014; MacManus, 1991) as well as 
ambiguous specifications (Loader and Norton, 2015) are other impediments. Finally, 
the large size of public sector contracts is known to prove extremely challenging for 
small firms; all the more so when public sector bodies bundle contracts together 
(Erridge, 1998; European Commission, 1992; Kidalov, 2015; Morand, 2003; Smith 
and Hobbs, 2001). 
1.6.3 Limitations in SMEs’ capacities 
The barriers experienced by SMEs in tendering for public sector contracts are not 
confined to the external environment. Some are simply the product of organisational 
and resource limitations. Public buyers have averred to deficiencies in organisational 
capacity and uncertainty over financial health as reasons for why they do not 
consider SMEs as eligible suppliers (GHK and Technopolis, 2007; National Public 
Procurement Policy Unit, 2007). Equally, public buyers have been critical of SMEs 
for failing to grasp the idiosyncratic needs of public sector organisations and what it 
is they expect from suppliers (Greer, 1999; Michaelis, McGuire and Ferguson, 
2003). The empirical evidence confirms that resource limitations do limit SMEs’ 
ability to compete effectively. Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008) demonstrated 
that a lack of legal resources and insufficient administrative capacity hampered 
SMEs’ activity and confidence in the public sector marketplace. The smaller the 
SME the more pronounced the effect of resource limitations. In this vein, Flynn, 
McKevitt and Davis (2015a) found that tendering experience, human resource 
availability for compiling a tender, and participation in procurement training were all 
lower in micro-enterprises than firms with ten or more employees. Resource 
disparities such as these, along with organisational capacity and revenue, can act to 
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determine which SMEs win public sector contracts and which do not (Temponi and 
Cui, 2008). Compounding all the above is the negative preconceptions that many 
SMEs hold about public procurement (Michaelis, McGuire and Ferguson, 2003).   
1.7 SME-friendly procurement policy  
It is in direct response to the barriers discussed in the preceding section, particularly 
those external to the firm that governments have set about introducing SME-friendly 
policies. It is to these policies that the chapter now turns. SME-friendly policies have 
become a standard feature of the international public procurement landscape. In a 
recent OECD assessment, 29 of 32 countries surveyed had some type of support 
mechanism in place for SMEs and 11 of these had enacted policies or made 
legislative provision especially for SMEs (OECD, 2013). Through these policies 
governments are endeavouring to tackle the systemic barriers to SMEs’ participation 
and success in public procurement. As such, they constitute a ‘corrective 
mechanism’ for recognised market failure in public procurement (Anglund, 1999). 
The form and intent of these policies vary by jurisdiction. In the EU the primary 
objective is to create a ‘level playing field’ on which firms of all sizes are able and 
willing to compete. Importantly, supra-national government action stops short of 
positive discrimination in favour of SMEs. By contrast, the US favours a more 
interventionist approach in which a certain percentage of federal contracts are set-
aside for domestic SMEs. Further detail on SME-friendly policies in the EU, Ireland, 
the UK and the US is given in sections 1.7.1-1.7.4.      
1.7.1 SME-friendly procurement policy in the EU   
EU policy relating to SME participation in public procurement originated with the 
creation of an internal market for goods and services in 1992. Maximising the 
participation of small firms was back then, and continues to be, understood as critical 
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for the full realisation of the internal market and regional economic development. As 
envisaged in policy at that time, ‘greater participation of SMEs would add both to 
the quantity and quality of competition in public markets’ (European Commission, 
1990:2). To increase SME participation a suite of ‘positive measures’ were set out in 
a series of official communiques (European Commission, 1989, 1990, 1992). These 
measures were designed to make it easier for small firms to compete in the public 
sector marketplace at home and abroad. Included among them was the simplification 
of tendering procedures, reduction in contract sizes, and the provision of information 
and training to small firms. European policy at this time was explicit in ruling out 
any arrangement that directly or indirectly discriminated in favour of small firms 
when tendering. The accent was on what could be done to ensure that SMEs found it 
easier to access contract competitions and be in a position to tender for business. 
Fostering competition and supporting a single EU market for goods and services was 
the dominant logic behind the policy. 
 
The thrust of EU SME-friendly policy has not fundamentally changed since the 
creation of the Single Market in 1992. The forthcoming Procurement Directives
12
 re-
affirm the EU’s original position on how and why SMEs should be facilitated in 
competing for public sector business (European Commission, 2011c; Kotsonis, 
2011). Public procurement policy is still driven by the ideal of creating a ‘level 
playing field for all economic operators wishing to participate in public tendering’ 
(European Commission, 2008c:2). The logic for policy intervention is still presented 
as a ‘win-win’ situation for SMEs, public sector organisations and the economy. 
Increased SME involvement is understood to bring about more competition, which 
                                                            
12 The new EU Directives, which must be transposed into national law by April 2016, replace 
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC.   
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results in better value for money for the public sector. In parallel, growth and 
professionalisation opportunities for SMEs are created, with knock-on 
macroeconomic benefits. Just as it did in 1990, contemporary EU procurement 
policy, latterly in the form of the European Code of Best Practices Facilitating 
Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts, advocates ‘positive measures’ 
designed to make it easier for SMEs to compete (European Commission, 2008c). 
The areas prioritised are still to do with minimising the administrative burden, 
helping SMEs to overcome problems relating to large contract sizes, and enhancing 
their knowledge of tendering. There has been no change in the pre-eminent belief in 
equality of opportunity for SMEs, as distinct from equality of outcome. SMEs’ 
interests are to be promoted, but without compromising competition in the 
marketplace.  
1.7.2 SME-friendly procurement policy in Ireland 
EU policy on SMEs and public procurement is mirrored across its Member States. 
Two countries will be used here for illustrative purposes: Ireland and the UK. During 
the last ten years successive Irish governments have sought to broaden SME 
participation in the public procurement marketplace as part of a more integrated 
approach to policy making (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2007). Like at 
EU level, the rationale for facilitating greater SME participation is grounded in 
concerns over economic competitiveness: SMEs are deemed vital to Irish economic 
competitiveness and public procurement is viewed as a critical enabler of SMEs’ 
survival and growth. Not surprisingly, the international financial crisis of 2007 
galvanised political efforts to harness the resources of the Irish state, including 
public procurement, in support of SMEs (see section 3.11.3). A succession of policy 
initiatives was the outcome. The first of these was a consultation document entitled 
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Improving SME Access to Public Procurement (National Public Procurement Policy 
Unit, 2007). This was followed in quick succession by Using Public Procurement to 
Stimulate Innovation and SME Access to Public Contracts (Procurement Innovation 
Group, 2009) and Facilitating SME Participation in Public Procurement 
(Department of Finance, 2010). The second of these was updated and reissued in 
2014 as Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2014). 
 
In its content and intent SME-friendly policy in Ireland resembles the European 
Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement 
Contracts (European Commission, 2008c). It too focuses on increasing the visibility 
of contracts through a national e-procurement portal; reducing information 
asymmetries by publishing tender information online; eliminating barriers to 
competing for contracts by using open tendering procedures as standard; reducing 
the administrative burden for firms by allowing them to self-declare their financial 
capacity and insurance cover; and addressing issues over too large contract sizes by, 
for example, encouraging SME consortia and dividing contracts into lots. Public 
buyers in Ireland are expected to adhere to these prescribed measures in order to 
facilitate SME participation. At the same time these measures are not legally binding 
and do not take precedence over EU Procurement Directives guaranteeing free and 
fair competition (McGovern, 2011). ‘Public sector purchasing must still be carried 
out in a manner that is legal, transparent, and secures optimal value for money for 
the taxpayer’ (Department of Finance, 2010:1). The ‘need to maximise competition 
in the market for goods and services purchased by the State’ is still paramount 
(National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2005:4). As the same report goes on to 
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assert, ‘where practical and legally possible the policy should also seek to promote 
whole of Government objectives’ (2005:4).   
1.7.3 SME-friendly procurement policy in the UK 
The public procurement landscape in the UK is similar to Ireland. Over the last 
fifteen years a number of policies and codes designed to make it easier for SMEs to 
access the public procurement market have been adopted. The rationale for these 
policies is recognition that public procurement can contribute to SME growth and 
competitiveness. In 2003 the Office of Government Commerce published Small 
Supplier…Better Value? to highlight the advantages to public sector organisations of 
using SME suppliers (Office of Government Commerce, 2003). In 2005 the Small 
Business Friendly Concordat was initiated (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
2005). A voluntary, non-statutory code of practice, its purpose was to encourage 
local authorities to engage more with SME suppliers. Among the more recent 
developments is the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, which requires public 
sector agencies to consider the economic, social and environmental implications of 
their purchasing decisions. The signs are that this intervention is already starting to 
bear fruit (HM Government, 2014). The 2010-2015 Coalition Programme for 
Government contains a series of initiatives designed to increase SME involvement in 
the public sector marketplace (Cabinet Office, 2011). These include transparency in 
the advertising and award of contracts, eliminating non-essential procurement 
procedures, providing feedback on unsuccessful tenders, and expediting payments to 
suppliers. Again, these mirror the ‘positive measures’ set out at EU level (European 
Commission, 2008c).   
 
The same Coalition Programme for Government has also set a target of 25 per cent 
of the total value of state contracts to go directly and indirectly to SMEs. Figures 
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released to date show that progress is being made towards reaching this goal, 
although with some way still to go. For the period 2012-2013 10.5 per cent of the 
total value of procurement contracts went directly to SMEs and an additional 9.4 per 
cent was awarded by way of sub-contracting (Cabinet Office, 2013). Individual 
government departments are also setting targets and reporting on their own progress. 
The UK Department of Health, for example, aims to double the value of its 
procurement spend with SMEs so as to reach 18 per cent by 2015 (Department of 
Health, 2013). Establishing an explicit target for SMEs’ market share and then 
getting government departments to report on their progress towards meeting this 
target arguably adds greater focus and oversight to policy efforts. Of course, as with 
all EU Member States, the UK must still work within the parameters of the 
Procurement Directives in pursuing its SME-friendly policy agenda.  
1.7.4 SME-friendly procurement policy in the US 
Procurement policy in the US has commonalities with EU policy. It is predicated on 
the idea that small firms are vital to a dynamic economy and that public procurement 
has a critical role to play in supporting them - a principle first enunciated in the 
Small Business Act 1953 (Clark and Moutray, 2004). To make this a reality the same 
Act articulates two related principles that govern federal procurement as it concerns 
small firms (Kidalov and Snider, 2011, 2013). The first principle of ‘maximum 
practical opportunity’ specifies structural and facilitative actions around the 
advertising of contracts, subcontracting plans and setting aside opportunities for 
small firms. The second principle of ‘fair proportion’ concerns contracting and sub-
contracting targets for federal agencies to meet. Compared to the EU, US federal 
policy is more interventionist. Contracts below a certain value are reserved or set-
aside for small firms; and federal agencies are mandated to award a negotiated 
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percentage of their procurement spend to small firms
13
 (Denes, 1997; Herbert and 
Becker, 1985). It has, in other words, a legally-binding, compulsory element to it that 
EU policy lacks. A similar interventionist approach operates at US state level where 
set-asides and preference programs for small and locally-based firms are 
commonplace (Qiao, Thai and Cummings, 2009).     
1.8 Compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy  
Evident from the preceding discussion, policies to increase SME involvement in 
public procurement are common throughout the EU and the US, and even evince 
similarities in content. The formulation and official adoption of these SME-friendly 
policies does not, of itself, bring about change in public sector tendering. For change 
to happen policy has to be complied with. Someone has to do something or refrain 
from doing something, as the case may be (Montjoy and O’Toole, 1979). In public 
policy this ‘someone’ is invariably a public sector employee. Their attitudes, 
capabilities and eventual actions are a crucial determinant of whether public policy 
produces its intended effect or not (Beyer, Stevens and Harrison, 1983; Elmore, 
1979; Matland, 1995). What is known on compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy is the subject of discussion here. Section 1.8.1 touches on recent 
commentary by procurement scholars on SME-friendly policy. They caution against 
pre-supposing that policy automatically translates into practice. Following on, 
section 1.8.2 reviews the little evidence that has been produced on compliance with 
SME-friendly procurement policy. Thereafter, consideration is given in section 1.8.3 
to the possible reasons why evidence in this area has not been more forthcoming. 
The final section 1.8.4 assesses policy compliance in aspects of public procurement 
other than the facilitation of SMEs.  
                                                            
13 23 per cent of prime contracts and 40 per cent of subcontracts. 
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1.8.1 Policy versus practice 
It has long been argued that there is nothing inevitable about government intentions 
translating into practice at organisational level. Berman (1978), for example, made 
clear that policy is never ‘self-executing’ and that implementation of any 
government injunction should not be presupposed. Lipsky’s (1980) now famous 
account of the behaviour of public servants, or ‘street-level bureaucrats’, proved this 
point by exposing the disconnection between official policy and everyday practices. 
Recent policy perspectives have reiterated the importance of scholars not taking 
policy implementation for granted, arguing that macro policy aspirations and 
organisational practices do not necessarily coincide (De Leon and De Leon, 2002; 
Matland, 1995). These same maxims are just as applicable to SME-friendly 
procurement policy. Its translation into practice should not be taken for granted. 
Murray (2012) has quipped of these same policies that just because elected 
representatives declare a desire for reform does not mean that this will result in 
substantive change. Similar reservations have been expressed by others - Jones 
(2007), for example, in the case of SME-friendly procurement policy in South East 
Asian countries. The crux of the matter is that while procurement policies are 
‘owned by ministries and agencies’, successful implementation of them depends on 
public servants who may not have the same level of dedication or even wherewithal 
to act on them (Georghiou et al., 2014:10). 
1.8.2 SME-friendly procurement policy compliance: what we know  
Interest surrounding SME-friendly procurement policy has not been matched by 
evidence on its implementation. While public buyers’ interaction with small 
suppliers has been examined using qualitative methods on a number of occasions 
(Loader, 2007, 2010, 2011; McKevitt, Flynn and Davis, 2014; Walker and Brammer, 
2009), only a handful of studies have sought to directly test policy compliance. 
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Among them are assessments of the functioning of the EU-wide public procurement 
market undertaken in 2007 and repeated in 2010 (GHK and Technopolis, 2007; 
GHK, 2010). The 2007 study uncovered low-moderate rates of SME-friendly policy 
compliance among public buyers in EU Member States. Sixty per cent of public 
buyers were allowing consortia to jointly fulfil technical or financial capacity 
requirements
14
, 58 per cent were utilising e-procurement, 38 per cent were dividing 
contracts into lots and only 10 per cent were publishing PINs. The 2010 study 
involving 296 public buyers indicated that some progress was being made in 
advancing the SME-friendly agenda. By this time almost 80 per cent of public 
buyers were claiming to award contracts based on the most economically 
advantageous tender (MEAT) system and similar percentages were using flexible 
functional specifications and incorporating corporate social responsibility 
considerations into their evaluation criteria.  
 
The extent to which SME-friendly procurement policy is translating into practice has 
also been reported on at national level. The UK government claimed that as of 2011 
14 out of 17 of its departments had eliminated pre-qualification questionnaires for 
procurements valued below £100,000, which is in conformance with official policy 
recommendations (Cabinet Office, 2011). Two years later it added that the use of 
open tendering procedures for above EU-threshold contracts increased from 19 per 
cent in 2012 to 54 per cent in 2013, and that over 3000 low value contracts had been 
advertised online through the dedicated Contracts Finder site (Cabinet Office, 2013). 
Less positive, a review of the Small Business Act by the European Commission 
(2011d) found that only a minority of Member States had started to implement the 
European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public 
                                                            
14 This measure is mandatory in the case of contracts above EU thresholds.  
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Procurement Contracts three years after its introduction in 2008. US government 
data shows that federal agencies have regularly failed to meet specified targets 
regarding the number and value of contracts that should be awarded to SMEs (Clark 
and Moutray, 2004). The same has been true of efforts to expand SMEs’ presence in 
subcontracting in both the US and in the EU (Kidalov, 2013). Insights to emerge 
from the International Research Study of Public Procurement also point to problems 
experienced by governments in getting SME-friendly policies implemented and in 
evaluating their effects (Harland, Telgen and Callender, 2013).  
In the academic domain, Murray’s (2011) investigation of local government 
authorities in the UK found that approximately half of the sample had embedded 
SME-friendly procurement policy into their practices and strategy. Flynn and Davis 
(forthcoming) surveyed over 400 Irish public buyers on their policy compliance. 
Their results revealed SME-friendly policy to be of a truncated form wherein public 
buyers were acting on some but not all of the measures prescribed. For example, 
compliance was relatively high on the use of open tendering (75 per cent), the 
provision of feedback to unsuccessful tenderers (88 per cent) and allowing tenderers 
to self-declare their financial capacity and insurance cover to undertake the contract 
(80 per cent). Less impressive was compliance with measures designed to reduce 
barriers associated with contract size by, for example, dividing contracts into lots and 
encouraging consortium bidding. Only a minority admitted putting these measures 
into practice. In a separate paper the same authors examined SME-friendly policy 
compliance in Ireland using SMEs as informants (Flynn and Davis, 2015b). The 
SME verdict was that many of the measures devised for their benefit were not being 
put into practice. Consistent with what public buyers admitted, SMEs believed that 
dividing contracts into lots or encouraging consortium bidding was not 
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commonplace. As well, they did not agree that public buyers were using 
proportionate qualification criteria nor were they being flexible when it came to 
accepting proof of tenderers’ financial capacity.  
 
Collating the available data on SME-friendly policy compliance in public 
procurement leads to the following conclusions. Firstly, the evidence that has been 
put forward to date is contradictory. Some studies report moderate-high rates of 
compliance. Other studies report low rates. At the very least this should temper any 
assumption that SME-friendly procurement policy automatically translates into 
practice. Secondly, public buyers appear to be willing or able to act on some 
measures more than others. Thirdly, the data on SME-friendly policy compliance is 
not directly comparable as the measures tested differ in number and type from one 
study to the next. Fourthly, some of the findings are not representative of the 
population from which the data is drawn. Fifthly, the methodologies used by 
governments to determine what actions public buyers are taking to facilitate SMEs 
are opaque and some of the evidence is anecdotal. Consequently, there are questions 
over the accuracy and validity of any claims made. Finally, there has been little 
empirical scrutiny of the determinants of SME-friendly policy compliance. What we 
are left with is a dearth of reliable descriptive evidence on the extent of policy 
compliance and even less evidence or theoretical elaboration on what enables or 
inhibits it. The latter issue will be returned to in section 1.9.       
1.8.3 Reasons for lack of evidence on SME-friendly policy compliance 
There are a number of factors that likely explain why evidence on SME-friendly 
policy compliance has not been more forthcoming. To begin with, we must 
remember that public procurement is a new field of academic inquiry (Snider and 
Rendon, 2008; Thai, 2001). As such, it may simply be the case that researchers have 
66 
 
not got round to empirically examining SME-friendly policy. Poor oversight of 
SME-friendly procurement policy is another contributory factor. While the majority 
of OECD countries have taken steps to assist SMEs in public procurement, only a 
minority monitor policy effectiveness (OECD, 2013). This means that there is no 
repository of data for researchers to mine. A related issue is that government 
objectives for SMEs in public procurement are oftentimes vague and aspirational, as 
they are for SMEs generally (Storey, 1994, 2003). Such a situation does not lend 
itself to conducting policy assessments (Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014). Questions 
around the impact of enterprise policies have tended not to be a priority for 
management scholars (Mason, 2009). Low engagement with SME-friendly 
procurement policy needs to be seen in this context. Methodological obstacles, 
particularly around identifying and accessing suitable respondent populations, could 
also be playing a part. Whatever the reason or reasons, the effect has been to leave us 
with a less than complete and satisfactory understanding of SME-friendly 
procurement policy in practice.   
1.8.4 Procurement policy compliance: what we know  
Researchers have been more proactive in investigating compliance in areas of public 
procurement other than SME-friendly policy. Prominent among these areas is 
adherence to EU law governing public procurement. The findings that have emerged 
imply that even legally-binding obligations are not immune to being disregarded by 
public buyers and their organisations. De Boer and Telgen (1998) estimated that 
among Dutch municipalities EC Procurement Directives were not being complied 
with in up to 80 per cent of procurement projects. Non-adherence to the legislative 
rules governing EU public procurement by, for example, failing to publish contract 
award notices was also detected by Martin, Hartley and Cox (1999) in the UK public 
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sector. ‘Maverick buying’, which denotes public servants sidestepping official 
purchasing rules, has also been shown to be pervasive in the public sector 
(Karjalainen, Kemppainen and van Raaij, 2009;  Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011). 
So too has opportunistic and unethical procurement behaviours. Comparing public 
and private sectors, Hawkins, Gravier and Powley (2011) observed that public 
buyers at the operational level deviated less from prescribed rules than their private 
sector counterparts. The situation was reversed at managerial level where public 
procurement managers were more opportunistic in their behaviours than private 
sector managers. As Khan (2013) has illustrated, buyers can end up constructing 
their own ‘unwritten ground rules’ in preference to official procurement procedures 
and best practices.     
Compliance with environmentally responsible procurement policies has also 
generated interest among researchers and several in-depth studies exist on the topic. 
The common denominator is that policy recommendations are being followed up to a 
point. As evidence of this semi-compliance, Thomson and Jackson (2007:440) 
recorded some progress in the use of ‘green’ procurement practices at UK local 
authority level, but conceded that these were ‘limited in terms of the range of 
products involved and the level of ambition’. Morgan (2008) was also able to discern 
positive developments in the procurement of fresh, locally-produced food while 
admitting that sustainable procurement practices remained, for the most part, 
aspirational. Assessments on sustainable procurement initiatives being of a ‘patchy 
nature’ and only being engaged in to a ‘modest extent’ have also transpired in 
research by Preuss (2007), Walker and Brammer (2009) and Mansi (2015). Gormly 
(2014) reported growing acceptance of sustainability considerations within Irish 
semi-state companies, although internal and external barriers to its full realisation 
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had by no means disappeared. Policy implementation deficits in sustainable 
purchasing find their match in the wider literature on environmental protection and 
corporate social responsibility (see, for example, Krause, 2011; Nilsson, Eklund and 
Tyskeng, 2009; Pitt, 2010; Randhawa and Marshall, 2014).   
1.9 Explaining compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy   
The previous section compiled what evidence there is on compliance with SME-
friendly policy and procurement policies and regulations generally. Now this section 
explores what is known on the factors that promote or inhibit compliance. The 
answer, in short, is very little. As demonstrated in section 1.8.2, there is a paucity of 
evidence and theorising on compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. To 
date, only one study by Flynn and Davis (forthcoming) has empirically tested 
predictors of SME-friendly policy compliance among public buyers. In it the authors 
found that policy familiarity, procurement involvement and the perceived importance 
of SME involvement in public contracting acted as enablers of policy compliance. 
Apart from this no other comparable study has been undertaken. Several studies have 
tested predictors of compliance behaviour across other aspects of procurement and 
so their findings are overviewed in section 1.9.1. Debates on tensions in the public 
procurement policy environment and the way in which ‘public agencies are pushed 
and pulled in many directions simultaneously’ (Boyne, 2002:101) are engaged with 
in section 1.9.2. These debates are relevant to explaining compliance as they imply 
that the multiple, contradictory demands governments make in public procurement 
are responsible for vitiating the SME-friendly agenda and preventing public buyers 
from acting on its policies.  
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1.9.1 Predictors of compliance behaviour in public procurement  
Some investigation has been undertaken on the factors that affect the implementation 
of procurement policy. Results from this line of inquiry show that the individual 
attributes of public buyers, the organisational context and the macro-policy 
environment all come into play (see Table 7). At the individual level policy 
awareness, personal motivation, professionalism and perceptions around 
administrative burdens have been put forward and, in some cases, tested. For 
example, the evidence indicates that the human capital of purchasing professionals 
has a positive impact on adherence to procurement rules (Hawkins and Muir, 2014); 
that motivation, commitment and ‘buy-in’ are prerequisites to socially responsible 
procurement practices (Murray, 2011; Thomson and Jackson, 2007; Williams and 
Smellie, 1985); and that the perceived work effort associated with legal injunctions 
affects compliance (De Boer and Telgen, 1998). Organisational factors germane to 
explaining policy compliance include managerial support, incentives and monitoring 
(McCarthy, 2006; Nijaki and Worrel, 2012; Tukamuhabwa, 2012). Macro- 
environmental factors, particularly contradictory policy directives emanating from 
government, have also been cited in rationalising non-compliance with sustainable 
procurement (Coggburn and Rahm, 2005; Morgan 2008; Schapper, Veiga Malta and 
Gilbert, 2006). There is, therefore, a broad range of factors linked to compliance 
behaviour in procurement. Importantly, in only a few studies are these factors 
theoretically grounded (Blount and Hill, 2015; Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 
2010; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013).     
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 7 Predictors of policy compliance in public procurement 
Factor Authors 
Individual 
Policy awareness Coggburn and Rahm (2005); Flynn and Davis 
(forthcoming) Gelderman, Ghijsen, and Brugman 
(2006); Karjalainen, Kemppainen and van Raaij 
(2009); Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013); 
Tukamuhabwa (2012)  
Personal motivation Flynn and Davis (forthcoming); Karjalainen, 
Kemppainen and van Raaij (2009); Murray (2011); 
Thomson and Jackson (2007); Williams and Smellie 
(1985)    
Professionalism Blount and Hill (2015); Flynn and Davis 
(forthcoming); Hawkins and Muir (2014); Morgan 
(2008); Murray (2011); OECD (2013); 
Tukamuhabwa (2012); Williams and Smellie (1985)    
Perceived administrative 
burden 
De Boer and Telgen (1998) 
Organisational 
Top/middle management 
support  
McCarthy (2006); Nijaki and Worrel (2012); 
Thomson and Jackson (2007); Tukamuhabwa (2012) 
Organisational incentives Gelderman, Ghijsen, and Brugman (2006); Nijaki 
and Worrel (2012); Tukamuhabwa (2012) 
Monitoring and sanctions Blount and Hill (2015); Gelderman, Ghijsen and 
Schoonen (2010); Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) 
Macro-policy environment 
Competing policies and 
goals (incl. cost reduction 
pressures and legal 
obligations) 
Coggburn and Rahm (2005); Morgan (2008); Preuss 
(2007); Schapper, Veiga Malta and Gilbert (2006); 
Thomson and Jackson (2007); Walker and Brammer 
(2009); Williams and Smellie (1985)    
 
1.9.2 Goal conflict in public procurement  
Debates over the expanding remit of public procurement are also revealing as 
regards compliance with SME-friendly policy in this area. Two points are relevant 
here. Firstly, conflicts are said to exist between proximate procurement goals like 
value for money and legal compliance with ‘softer’ goals like facilitating greater 
SME participation and protecting the environment (Herbert and Becker, 1985; 
Erridge and McIllroy, 2002; Matthews, 2005; Pickernell et al., 2011; Schapper, 
Veiga Malta and Gilbert, 2006). Secondly and relatedly, these conflicts are believed 
to render SME-friendly policy objectives ‘contested, unclear, or misaligned’ 
(Kidalov and Snider, 2011:5). These points will now be discussed in more detail. 
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Public sector management is subject to multiple demands made by elected 
representatives, regulators, media and non-governmental organisations (Boyne, 
2002). These multiple stakeholder demands cascade down to the functional level, 
which includes procurement (OECD, 2013; Telgen, Harland and Knight, 2007). 
Scholars have argued that it is not altogether obvious how, if at all, these multiple 
demands can be reconciled (Bovaird, 2006; Gelderman, Semeijn and Bouma, 2015; 
Martin, Berner and Bluestein, 2007). The situation has been likened to one in which 
public sector organisations are expected to behave like private sector entities while 
simultaneously giving effect to policy objectives grounded in the public interest 
(Astrom and Brochner, 2007; Greer and Hoggett, 1999). Inevitably, this creates 
tensions within organisations over how procurement should be managed and whose 
interests it should serve.  
Pressures to minimise spending costs are known to militate against SME 
involvement in public procurement. This was certainly the conclusion Loader 
(2007:313) reached. She noted that ‘while procurement officers would like to do 
business with small firms, in practice their primary aim is to achieve value for 
money’. The same phenomenon has been observed elsewhere. Cabras (2011) and 
Peck and Cabras (2010) found that cost-effectiveness arguments typically emerge as 
politically expedient, practically dominant and easier to justify to public fund-
holders than taking the steps required to accommodate small firms. Recently, 63 per 
cent of public buyers surveyed by the National Institute of Government Purchasing 
(2013) admitted that budgetary constraints restricted their ability to leverage 
procurement for economic, environmental and social sustainability objectives. SME 
participation is not the only casualty of cost containment pressures. Sustainable and 
environmentally-friendly purchasing is also compromised (Coggburn and Rahm, 
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2005; Preuss, 2007; Walker and Brammer, 2009). Tensions between cost reduction 
and the socio-economic dimension to public procurement are unlikely to abate any 
time soon. If anything, trends towards consolidated purchasing arrangements and 
pressures to exploit economies of scale will only exacerbate the situation (Loader, 
2013; Morand, 2003; Smith and Hobbs, 2001).  
Along with cost pressures, legal obligations pose a challenge to the realisation of 
SME-friendly policy. Across the EU public buyers are compelled to ensure that 
procurement is carried out in accordance with the EU Treaty principles of non-
discrimination, equal treatment, transparency, mutual recognition, proportionality, 
freedom to provide service, and freedom of establishment (National Public 
Procurement Policy Unit, undated). Whether they would like to or not, public buyers 
are prohibited from discriminating in favour of domestic SMEs or any other atypical 
supplier when awarding a contract (Arrowsmith, 1995; Bovis, 1998; Fee, 2002). To 
the extent that SMEs’ interests are promoted, this can only be done within the 
parameters of EU procurement law
15
. The aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis 
threw this constraint into sharp relief as Member States were disbarred from ring-
fencing contracts for their struggling domestic SME sectors (Murray, 2009a). The 
same legal constraints apply in the case of promoting sustainable purchasing. 
Tellingly, legal ambiguity appears to have a dissuasive effect on public buyers 
following through on environmentally-friendly policy recommendations (Morgan, 
2008; Thomson and Jackson, 2007). Summarising this section, it is clear that 
                                                            
15 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 31, 2004 co-
ordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors [2004] OJ L134/1 and Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of March 31, 2004 on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114. 
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competing priorities in public procurement are relevant to explaining the 
effectiveness or otherwise of SME-friendly policy.  
1.10 Conclusion  
The main strands of the SME-friendly procurement debate have now been covered. 
The chapter itself is based on a comprehensive literature review, drawing on 
academic studies and government reports at the intersection of SMEs, public 
procurement and public policy. There is no doubt but that SME-friendly procurement 
constitutes a burgeoning line of inquiry. In large part this is due to successive 
government policy initiatives over the last two decades, which have been designed to 
increase the number of SME suppliers in the public sector. These initiatives have, in 
turn, stimulated academic engagement. Scholars have paid particular attention to the 
barriers that stifle SME participation in the public sector marketplace as well as the 
actions governments are taking to eliminate these barriers. There is near universal 
consensus that SME-friendly policy is justified not only in the interests of SMEs but 
also in the interests of public sector organisations and national economic 
competitiveness. Outside of these research foci a prosaic yet crucial aspect of the 
debate has fallen under the radar of scholars: compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policies. Amid all the discussion on ways to help small firms, questions 
on whether these policies are being complied with and the factors that promote or 
inhibit this process have gone largely unasked. This represents a significant gap in 
the literature, one which this study sets out to address. Towards this end the next 
chapter offers a theoretically-informed view of compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy.      
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2.0 Overview of chapter two 
Chapter one reviewed the literature on SME-friendly public procurement. This 
chapter presents institutional theory as a lens that can be used to explain and predict 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. Prior to demonstrating the 
applicability of institutional theory in this respect, a number of preliminary aspects 
on the use of theory are dealt with. Section 2.1 begins with a general discussion on 
theory by interrogating its meaning, its purpose in social inquiry and issues 
associated with its use in management science. Rumination on these issues is 
advisable before immersion in the details of any one theory. Section 2.2 weighs up 
the use of theory to date in SME-friendly procurement and in the wider public 
procurement field. Emerging from this exercise is the predominantly a-theoretical 
character of research at the intersection of SMEs and public procurement. This can 
be seen in the context of a public procurement research domain that is itself 
relatively under-theorised. Having scrutinised the theoretical profile of the field, 
section 2.3 makes the case for using institutional theory. It does so by reference to its 
suitability for explaining and predicting responses to SME-friendly procurement 
policy, its novel application to this topic, and its scientific validity.    
The second half of the chapter focuses on the tenets of institutional theory. By way 
of introduction section 2.4 provides an outline of what institutional theory explains 
and predicts of organisational practices and what this means for investigating SME-
friendly procurement policy. Section 2.5 goes into greater detail on the main 
elements of institutional theory. It describes the emergence of ‘new institutionalism’ 
and explains why the concepts of legitimacy and isomorphism are central to 
institutional explanations of organisational behaviour. Section 2.6 focuses on 
institutional forces. It clarifies what is meant by the term ‘institution’ and what 
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purpose institutions serve in social relations. It also outlines the three main types of 
institutional forces: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. Section 2.7 
critiques institutional theory on two points. Firstly, individuals are not always willing 
or able to conform to the institutional demands made of them. Secondly, institutional 
environments are often contested. Section 2.8 reproduces Oliver’s (1991) predictive 
framework for how individuals respond to institutional pressures aimed at changing 
their behaviour. The framework encompasses rationales for institutional compliance, 
the institutional context, the content of institutional pressures and the institutional 
control mechanisms in operation. In section 2.9 the same predictive framework is 
used to hypothesise relationships between institutional pressures and SME-friendly 
compliance behaviour among public buyers.  
2.1 Considerations on theory 
Theory selection is among the most important decisions to be taken when conducting 
research. Theories influence the research questions we ask, the type of data we deem 
acceptable and the way we interpret our findings (Miller, 2007). Theory selection is 
also among the most challenging decisions for management researchers. While some 
disciplines enjoy paradigmatic consensus and coalesce around a few major theories, 
management science adopts a more permissive attitude (Pfeffer, 1993). This is 
evident in the pervasiveness of economic, psychological and sociological theoretical 
perspectives in management research (Agarwal and Hoetker, 2007). If theoretical 
plurality can be viewed as advantageous in terms of offering alternative perspectives 
and new ideas for management researchers to work with, it can also lead to 
uncertainty and confusion when it comes to theory selection – a case of having too 
much choice. Before setting out the theoretical framework in this study, two 
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questions fundamental to scholarship in management science need to be addressed
16
. 
The first is ‘what is theory’? As with SMEs, public procurement and policy, clarity 
over the meaning of theory is essential. The second is ‘why do we use theory’? In 
deliberating on the pluses and minuses of selecting one theory over another, it is vital 
that we do not lose sight of the purpose of theory in research. These issues are 
explored in more detail in sections 2.1.1-2.1.4.    
2.1.1 What is theory?  
There is no doubt that theory has assumed greater prominence as management 
science has matured, largely in consequence of decisions taken over fifty years ago 
to strengthen its scientific underpinnings (Bailey and Ford, 1996). Reviews of 
premier management journals show that the number of articles making a theoretical 
contribution, either through theory testing or theory building, increased steadily 
between 1963 and 2007 (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). Management-specific 
theories have proliferated over the same period and are now used alongside the more 
established psychological, sociological and economic theories for studying 
organisations and markets (Agarwal and Hoetker, 2007). These developments reflect 
agreement on the criticality of theory in management research. There is less 
agreement over what theory means. Within management science theory is variously 
understood and presented as a set of covering laws that explain and predict social 
phenomena, a detailed and plausible account of a social process, and even a form of 
enlightenment (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Di Maggio, 1995). The input of 
different disciplines and their associated theories, research foci and methodologies 
account for these multiple interpretations (Pfeffer, 1993). In practice, the varying 
                                                            
16 There is a long running debate over the role of theory in management science. Over the last 
three decades numerous editions of premier journals have been dedicated to debating theory, 
including: Administrative Science Quarterly, 1982 Vol. 27 (4) & 1995 Vol. 40 (3), Academy of 
Management Review, 1989 Vol. 14 (4) and Academy of Management Journal, 2007 Vol. 50 (6). 
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conceptions of theory in management science are not mutually exclusive, and many 
of the best theories incorporate generalizable laws, thick descriptions and deductive, 
inductive and enlightenment aspects (Di Maggio, 1995).  
Differences in emphasis on its meaning notwithstanding, a theory should contain 
four essential elements (Whetten, 1989). To being with, it must have variables, 
constructs or concepts that explain the phenomena of interest. Next, it must specify 
how these variables, constructs or concepts are related to one another. There must 
also be a rationale or logic associated with the selection of factors and their causal 
relationships. Finally, all theories should have contextual and temporal boundaries 
that set the limits of generalisability for its use. In this way a theory can be 
understood and defined as ‘a statement of relationships between units observed or 
approximated in the empirical world’ (Bacharach, 1989:498). These relationships are 
simplified by the use of abstract concepts which are tested using operationalised 
definitions (Thompson, 1956). Acceptance of theory on these terms enables 
researchers to differentiate it from the ‘half-baked pretensions to theory’ that abound 
in the literature (Weick, 1995:385). It also means that researchers do not confuse 
theory with citations of other scholars’ work, raw data, variables, diagrams and 
hypotheses (Sutton and Staw, 1995). At the same time we should be mindful that 
theory is not only a finished product but oftentimes a work in progress, and that data, 
variables, diagrams and hypotheses form part of the ‘interim struggle’ of theory 
development (Weick, 1995).  
2.1.2 Why do we use theory? 
Articulating theory as a statement of relationships between entities in the empirical 
world is suggestive of its descriptive, explanatory and predictive roles. As 
researchers theory helps us to organise our thoughts and knowledge, formalise our 
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predictions, generate coherent explanations of real world phenomena, develop 
hypotheses and integrate knowledge (Hambrick, 2007; Miller, 2007). It is how we 
make sense of, disaggregate and rationalise the complex phenomena we are 
interested in revealing. Theory, as Bacharach (1989:513) succinctly puts it, is ‘how 
we diminish the complexity of the empirical world’. It guides us to concepts that 
might be relevant to a problem (De Vaus, 1991) and provides us with a ‘story about 
why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur’ (Sutton and Staw, 1995:378). As 
well as scientific value theory can also be of practical utility. Good theory not only 
‘advances knowledge in a scientific discipline’ but also ‘guides research toward 
crucial questions, and enlightens the profession of management’ (Van de Ven, 
1989:486). Herbert Simon (1967), a pioneer in management research, stated his 
conviction that the success of business research and education depends on its ability 
to synthesise knowledge from scientific conceptions of management with insights 
from the real world of organisation management. Premier management science 
journals such as Administrative Science Quarterly espoused similar values at their 
outset, envisaging theory as a threefold strategy ‘to organize knowledge, guide future 
research, and inform practice’ (Litchfield, 1956; Palmer, 2006:538).     
2.1.3 Scientific validity versus practical utility  
By most accounts theory has a dual mandate of contributing to management as 
science and informing business practice. In reality scholars appear to have privileged 
the former over the latter. This led Hambrick (2007:1351) to bemoan a ‘hyper-
commitment to theory’ which stymies the emergence of interesting facts and 
Gunther McGrath (2007) to diagnose an identity crisis afflicting the management 
field. Ghoshal (2005) even went so far as to posit that morality and common sense 
have fallen victim to the pursuit of management as a science. What we have ended 
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up with is the dominance of ‘pedantic science’ over ‘pragmatic science’ in the 
opinion of Anderson, Herriot and Hodgkinson (2001). The implications of an 
ascendancy of theory in management science are understood in quite stark terms. 
Miller (2007:179) spoke of interesting and novel empirical findings being 
straitjacketed with a particular theory, linked to meretricious reasoning or couched 
dishonestly in explanations that were formulated post hoc. Tushman and O’Reilly 
(2007:770) claimed that ‘self-imposed distance from the phenomena we study 
reduces the quality of our field’s research, undermines the external validity of our 
theories, and reduces the overall relevance of the data used to test theories’. For these 
and other scholars, contemporary management research stands accused of the 
‘compulsive and mindless theorizing’ that Hirschman (1970:329) railed against some 
decades previously. 
2.1.4 Re-orienting management science 
Responding to the above criticisms, efforts are being made to re-orient management 
research so that its outputs are more relevant to business practitioners. Echoing 
earlier work by Thompson (1956), Tranfield and Denyer (2004) contemplated 
management in terms of a professional science much like engineering or medicine. 
Under the epithet of ‘engaged scholarship’ Van de Ven and Johnson (2006) raised 
the idea of academics and practitioners working more closely together to solve 
contemporary organisational challenges. Along similar lines Gunther-McGrath 
(2007) and McGahan (2007) separately recommended a focus on managerially 
actionable problems. Starkey and Madan (2001) envisaged increasing practitioners’ 
stake in the research process as the way forward. Allowing the space and time for 
empirical regularities to emerge before prematurely trying to explain why they occur 
is also regarded as conducive to more practice-focused research (Hambrick, 2007; 
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Helfat, 2007). These various proposals are predicated on the assumption that rigour 
and relevance are not mutually exclusive (Gulati, 2007). Not everyone shares this 
view. Some see ‘engaged scholarship’ as quixotic (McKelvey, 2006; Weick, 2001). 
Others point to a conflict between theoretical rigour, which aims to formulate 
general propositions, and practitioner relevance, which depends on context-specific 
knowledge (Aram and Salipante, 2003; Hammersley, 1992). Miner (1984) even 
demonstrated that the perceived validity of a theory is not necessarily related to its 
practical relevance.  Based on what we know so far, pursuing rigour and relevance 
through theoretical application, while laudable, is a challenge in management 
science.    
2.1.5 Implications for this study 
The foregoing discussion has sought to clarify what is meant by theory and why we 
use it in social scientific inquiry. These are not trivial questions. Rumination on them 
leads to more judicious and purposeful use of theory, which is the reason why they 
opened this chapter. In the first instance, being clear on what constitutes a theory 
helps to avoid the pitfall of confusing citations, models or hypotheses for theory. 
This is important because not everything that is labelled ‘theory’ is theoretical in the 
sense of a statement of relationships between observable phenomena that is 
underpinned by a defensible logic (Sutton and Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995). Secondly, 
having a clear sense that theory should be used to explain and predict social 
phenomena helps to ensure that it is exploited to maximum effect (Bacharach, 1989; 
Thomspson, 1956). A failure to grasp the purpose of theory increases the likelihood 
that it is only used descriptively. Relatedly, an understanding of the purpose of 
theory implies an awareness of its potential to contribute to practice (Litchfield, 
1956; Simon, 1967; Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006). Not fully grasping this aspect 
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of theory’s purpose means that converting research findings into practical insights 
for policy makers and managers is less likely to happen.  
2.2 Theory in the public procurement domain 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, theory selection is among the most important 
and challenging decisions in the research process. In this study a theory had to be 
found that was suitable for investigating compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy. A broad sweep of the major theories in management science was initially 
undertaken. Recourse was made to compendiums of management and its ‘greatest 
thinkers’ by Pugh and Hickson (2007) and Smith and Hitt (2005). Additional 
literature on individual theories and their originators was then consulted depending 
on the initial appraisal of their usefulness. Included in this category was Lindblom’s 
(1959, 1979) ‘muddling through’ theory of policy and governance, decision making 
theory (Simon, 1959, 1979) and principal-agent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Yukins (2010) recently proposed the latter as an overarching 
theory for public procurement. Notwithstanding the respective merits of each of 
these theoretical perspectives, institutional theory was selected. The decision to use 
institutional theory was taken after careful deliberation on the part of the researcher 
and in consultation with the supervisory team. The suitability of institutional theory 
for this study and the contribution it makes is set out in section 2.3. Before this, the 
use of theory in research on SME-friendly procurement and cognate areas is 
examined. 
2.2.1 Theory and SME-friendly procurement  
A review of the literature on SME-friendly procurement reveals that there has been 
minimal use of theory. Empirical studies which examine SME-friendly procurement 
from the perspective of either public buyers or suppliers have tended to do so 
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without using an explicit theoretical frame of reference. Previous research is cited, 
government data is used and models and hypotheses put forward but no attempt is 
made to theoretically anchor the study. As a result, studies are strong on description 
but less so on explanation. This is evident, for example, in Loader’s (2011) 
examination of local authority purchasing practices where difficulties in 
accommodating small firms are reported on but the problem itself is not theoretically 
framed. To take another example, Fee, Erridge and Hennigan (2002) do not employ 
any theoretical framework in their assessment of SMEs’ access to public 
procurement in Northern Ireland. Flynn and Davis (forthcoming) tentatively put 
forward an institutional interpretation of public buyers’ responses to SME-friendly 
policy initiatives but without operationalising any of the theoretical concepts. A 
recent exception is Blount and Hill’s (2015) use of policy implementation theory to 
investigate the success of supplier diversity initiatives. The predominantly a-
theoretical form of studies to date is something of a mixed blessing for researchers. 
On the plus side it means that there is ample opportunity to make a substantive 
contribution to the field. The flipside is that there is little in the way of precedent to 
work with.  
Theory does feature in some non-empirical studies on SMEs and public 
procurement. Principal-agent theory is cited by Kidalov and Snider (2013) in 
discussing policy support for SMEs; as it is by Soudry (2007) and Yukins (2010) for 
explicating regulatory compliance and public accountability in public procurement 
respectively. It is, as Yukins (2010) contends, a prism through which we can 
rationalise the strategies adopted by the principal (i.e. government) and its agents 
(i.e. public buyers and their organisations) when the former seeks to impose its 
mandate through the latter. Erridge (1998) invokes no less than three theories in 
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discussing public procurement and the involvement of small firms therein: public 
choice theory; transaction cost theory; and ‘new public management’ theory. The 
latter, for example, suggests a private sector ethos for public purchasing, which 
presents both opportunities and threats for small suppliers. Institutional theory is 
averred to by Kidalov and Snider (2011) in explaining the origins and perpetuation 
of norms and structures in national public procurement systems. Theory is not 
operationalised or tested in these or any other policy-related investigation of SMEs 
and public procurement, however. 
2.2.2 Theory and procurement policy  
As with SME-friendly policy, studies which concentrate on compliance in other 
aspects of public procurement are predominantly a-theoretical. Survey-based 
assessments of policy compliance have relied on previous empirical findings to 
identify variables for testing (De Boer and Telgen, 1998; Karjalainen, Kemppainen 
and van Raaij, 2009; Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006). Exceptions include 
the application of principal-agent theory to explain and predict regulatory 
compliance (Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013), institutional theory to account for 
environmentally-friendly purchasing (Hoejmose, Grosvold and Millington, 2013), 
and psychological-based theories to do the same thing (Preuss and Walker, 2011). 
Theoretical application is no better in qualitative inquiries. Coggburn and Rahm 
(2005), Morgan (2008), Preuss (2007), Thomson and Jackson (2007) and Walker and 
Preuss (2008) each discuss the drivers of ‘green’ procurement, overview the findings 
of previous studies and research reports, and detail the policy context of their studies. 
Yet no attempt is made to ground the empirical component in an overarching 
theoretical framework. This represents a missed opportunity for advancing 
knowledge in the procurement field. There is no shortage of theory options for 
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exploring procurement policies, as Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman (2006) have 
pointed out. The problem, instead, appears to be one of reticence on the part of 
researchers in using it. 
2.2.3 Theory and public procurement research 
As an academic field public procurement is also marked by a deficit of theoretical 
application. Analysis carried out by Flynn and Davis (2014) revealed that only 29 
per cent of articles published in the Journal of Public Procurement between 2001 
and 2013 had a theoretical base. To put this in context, the comparable figure for 
supply chain management was estimated at 37 per cent by Chicksand et al., (2012) 
and 53 per cent by Defee et al., (2010). The same review by Flynn and Davis (2014) 
did determine, however, that the incidence of theoretical articles in public 
procurement is on an upward trajectory (see Fig. 4). While 20 per cent of output 
published between 2001 and 2004 had some theoretical grounding, this figure had 
increased to 36 per cent by 2010 and to 39 per cent by 2013. In respect of the 
theoretical content of public procurement research, Flynn and Davis (2014) found 
that the economics discipline has predominated. Approximately 56 per cent of 
theoretically-informed articles had their antecedents in economic theory. Examples 
included theory of auctions and competitive bidding, principle-agent theory, 
transaction cost economic theory and contract theory. The three disciplines of 
sociology (18 per cent), management science (18 per cent) and psychology (8 per 
cent) made up the remainder (see Table 8, pg. 87). Trends analysis suggests that 
economic theory will continue to prove influential, but that management theory may 
start to rival it in the coming years (see Fig. 5).   
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Fig. 4 Theoretically-based articles in public procurement 
 
Flynn and Davis (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Trends in theory use in public procurement 
 
Flynn and Davis (2014) 
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Table 8 Disciplinary influences in public procurement research 
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Economics 28 56 Theory of auctions & competitive bidding 
Principal-agent theory 
Transaction cost economic theory (including in 
combination with other theories) 
Contract theory (including in combination with other 
theories)  
Fuzzy set theory 
Game theory (including in combination with other 
theories)  
Classic economic theory 
New institutional economic theory 
Sociology 9 18 Institutional theory  
General systems theory 
Social constructivism 
Social exchange theory 
Social network theory  
Theory of professions 
Management  9 18 Organisation behaviour theory (including in combination 
with other theories)  
Supply chain management theory 
Healthcare management theory 
Organisation learning theory 
Theory of innovation  
Theory of lean 
Psychology 4 8 Leadership theory 
Process theory (of trust) 
Theory of self-determination 
Total 50 100  
Flynn and Davis (2014) 
 
2.2.4 Assessment of theory use 
From the preceding review it is clear that there has been relatively low application of 
theory in public procurement scholarship. This is true of studies focusing on SME-
friendly procurement, which are predominantly descriptive in nature. It is equally 
true of research on sustainable procurement. The public procurement field as a whole 
is also under-theorised, although signs of progress and maturation can be discerned. 
The paucity of theory in public procurement has not escaped the attention of other 
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researchers. Snider and Rendon (2008:311) were minded to say that ‘scholars have 
yet to give sufficient efforts to the sort of conceptual theorising about policy that will 
lead to ordering devices and approaches that can help researchers and students make 
sense of its complexity, uses and limitations’. Earlier, Snider (2006) hinted at a 
tendency towards introspection in public procurement research and a failure to marry 
it to more overarching theoretical frameworks. McCue and Prier (2008) and Yukins 
(2010) have each alluded to the need for more theoretical application if our 
knowledge of contemporary procurement phenomena is to mature and develop. 
Theoretical rigour need not come at the expense of practitioner relevance. To quote 
Dimitri (2013:152), ‘daily procurement design can benefit from the more robust 
theoretical findings, while practice can fruitfully feed academic research with new 
problems, suggestions and intuitions’.   
2.3 Justifying the use of institutional theory    
Having mapped theory usage in public procurement, this section sets out the 
justification for taking an institutional perspective on compliance with SME-friendly 
policy. Justification for this choice rests on three pillars. The first is relevance and 
appropriateness. Institutional theory explains why individuals comply with 
government policies and identifies the conditions under which compliance is more or 
less likely to come about. The second is originality. There has been limited 
application of institutional theory in public procurement research. Its deployment 
here holds out the promise of making a substantive contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge. The third is validity. Institutional theory enjoys prominent status in 
management science. Its application to SME-friendly procurement stands to 
strengthen the scientific underpinnings of the latter by infusing it with greater 
explanatory depth. Sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 address these three arguments in more detail. 
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While the case for using institutional theory is strong, no claim is made that it is the 
definitive lens to investigate compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. 
Conceding this point is consistent with the critical realist philosophical stance 
operative in this study (refer to Chapter 3). For critical realists, scientific theories are 
‘under-determined’ by nature, meaning that the possibility of an alternative theory 
that better explains the phenomenon of interest can never be discounted (Phillips, 
1990).  
2.3.1 Relevance to topic  
The focus of this study is on compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. 
Institutional theory is an obvious choice as it is about institutional pressures - of 
which SME-friendly policy is one - and how and why individuals and organisations 
respond to these pressures. Institutional theory highlights the role that government 
and professional bodies play in influencing organisational practices (Schneiberg and 
Clemens, 2006). SME-friendly policy is an attempt by government to influence 
procurement practices within public sector organisations. Specifically, it is an 
attempt by governments to change the behaviour of public buyers so that 
procurement practices are more facilitative of SMEs. In pursuing this course 
governments are hoping to institutionalise SME-friendly purchasing practices. 
Institutional theory is especially suited to research contexts in which the profit 
motive does not figure. Here the research context is public procurement, which is 
shaped and bounded by policy and political diktats (Lian and Laing, 2004). In its 
most recent form institutional theory identifies the conditions under which 
compliance with policies, laws, norms and taken-for-granted cultural assumptions is 
more or less likely to come about (Oliver, 1991). This is critical as one of the main 
motivations for this study is to predict compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
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policy. Finally, institutional research is synonymous with real-world empirical 
questions (Davis and Marquis, 2005; Steinmo, 2008). Investigating policy 
compliance in public procurement sits comfortably within this tradition.    
2.3.2 Novel application 
Employing institutional theory to explain and predict compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy is original and novel. To date, no study has operationalised 
institutional theory for this purpose. In contrast, institutional theory has been used as 
the basis for predictive models on the uptake of environmentally sustainable 
purchasing practices (Hoejmose, Grosvold & Millington, 2013; Sancha, Longoni and 
Gimenez, 2015; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2013). Doherty, McConnell and Chadwick 
(2013) also relied on it to interpret external pressures on public sector organisations 
to implement e-procurement technology. Several non-empirical studies have weaved 
institutional explanations into their arguments. Relevant here is Kidalov and Snider’s 
(2011) comparative account of procurement regimes in the US and the EU;  
Akenroye’s (2013) discussion of how social responsibility criteria have come to be 
incorporated into contract award processes; and Dickens-Johnson (2008) assessment 
of outsourcing trends across the public sector. These studies constitute the sum total 
of institutional theory’s application in public procurement research. Looked at from 
the other side, institutional theorists have all but neglected public procurement as a 
research context. Given the heavily institutionalised character of public procurement, 
as well as its economic significance, this is remarkable and something that needs to 
be righted (Flynn and Davis, 2014). 
2.3.3 Scientific validity  
Justification for using institutional theory is also to be found in its scientific validity. 
Institutional theory has undergone a renaissance over the last three decades and 
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currently enjoys a high profile in organisation studies. Proof of these developments, 
the percentage of institutional-related articles published in top tier journals climbed 
from four per cent in 1984 to fourteen per cent in 2007 (David and Bitektine, 2009). 
Institutional theory has, in the estimation of Tolbert and Zucker (1996), become 
institutionalised in management science. As a theory it has reached ‘adulthood’ and 
many of its original assumptions have been revised to reflect empirical realities 
(Scott, 2008a, 2008b). It is now accepted that institutional forces in the form of 
regulations and policies are not as deterministic as initially thought (Scott, 2005), 
and that change is as much a part of institutional environments as stability (Dacin, 
Goodstein and Scott, 2002; Hoffman, 1999). Far from undermining institutional 
theory, these revisions have proved a necessary corrective to its earlier limitations 
and have enhanced its ability to explain and predict the impacts of institutional 
pressures on individuals and organisations (Scott, 2008a). The prestige of 
institutional studies stands in contrast to the relatively peripheral status of research 
on SME-friendly procurement
17
. It is hoped that the application of institutional 
theory here will go some way towards bolstering the scientific underpinnings and 
raising the profile of the latter. What institutional theory is about is dealt with in the 
next section.   
2.4 An overview on institutional theory  
‘The beginning of wisdom in approaching institutional theory is to recognise at the 
outset that there is not one but several variants’ (Scott, 1987:493). As Scott and 
esteemed institutional theorists like Powell and Di Maggio (1991, Introduction) and 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) have acknowledged, the meaning of institutional theory 
                                                            
17 Institutional-related research features prominently in 5* journals, including Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Review and Academy of Management Journal. 
Research at the intersection of SMEs and public procurement tends to be found in lower ranked, 
niche journals.    
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alters depending on the disciplinary context in which it is being used. How 
institutional theory is understood and applied in political science is different to that 
in economics and different again to management science and the sociology of 
organisations. Its meaning and usage in an organisational context is solely of interest 
here. In this section an overview of institutional theory is provided. It begins in 
section 2.4.1 by setting out the tenets of institutional theory – what it explains and 
predicts about organisational practice. If theories are statements of relationships 
between empirical phenomena (Bacharach, 1989), institutional theory is a statement 
of relationships between institutional forces and organisational practices. As with 
many theories, the initial assumptions of institutional theory have been subject to 
critique and revision. Section 2.4.2 identifies the main points of critique – under-
estimating human agency and pre-supposing institutional balance - and presents 
institutional theory in its revised form. What this means for compliance with SME-
friendly procurement policy is then addressed in section 2.4.3. 
2.4.1 Institutional theory: explanation and prediction 
Institutional theory draws attention to the role of the institutional environment in 
influencing the behaviour of individuals and organisations. The primary actors or 
‘authoritative organisations’ shaping the institutional environment in modern society 
is government and professional representative bodies (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; 
Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Scott, 1987). Transnational corporations and non-
governmental organisations have latterly been put forward as shapers of their own 
institutional environments (Suddaby, Greenwood and Cooper, 2007). Institutional 
theory contends that much in the way of individual and organisational behaviour and 
practices is explained not by an economic logic or a technical logic, but by an 
institutional logic (Edelman, 1992; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1983). In other 
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words, pressures from regulatory agencies and professional bodies determine how 
individuals and organisations behave. Institutional theory predicts that individuals 
and organisations conform to institutional pressures, even where there is not always 
an economic advantage to be had from doing so (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977, 1987). The impetus for conformance lies in a desire for social legitimacy 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer, 1979; Parsons, 1956). To conform to 
institutional pressures is necessary in order to maintain social legitimacy. Not to 
conform to institutional pressures jeopardises legitimacy. The effect of institutional 
pressures is to lead organisations to adopt the same practices and outlooks – a 
process referred to as institutional isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2008b). 
2.4.2 Institutional theory: a critique and revision 
Institutional theory in its original form assumed that institutional forces were 
invariably deterministic of organisational practices. This assumption has since been 
critiqued and revised (see Fig. 6, pg. 95). Firstly, there is now acceptance that 
organisations and their employees are not passive recipients of institutional forces 
and do not automatically exhibit compliance. Rather, they can and do engage in 
purposive, self-interested and politically-oriented behaviour (Di Maggio, 1988). 
Intra-organisational dynamics in the form of interests, values, power dependencies 
and capacity for action make it so that organisational actors can exercise choice in 
how they respond to institutional forces (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 
1988, 1992; Powell, 1991). Supporting this view are recorded cases of groups and 
organisations exercising power and self-interest in response to the institutional 
demands made of them (Elsback and Sutton, 1992; Holm, 1995; Oliver, 1988; Scott 
et al., 2000; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt, 1998). Secondly, there is greater 
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awareness of the often contested and fluctuating nature of institutional environments 
(Scott, 2005, 2008a). In circumstances where there are conflicting forces at play 
within an institutional field, the power of any one of these forces to influence 
organisational behaviour diminishes. Moreover, institutional ambiguity creates the 
space in which individuals may be able to avoid or even rebuff institutional pressures 
(Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). These theoretical revisions concerning agency and 
institutional imbalance lead to a more nuanced depiction of the institutionalisation 
process; one in which the power of the state to shape organisational practices 
ultimately depends on the nature and context of the institutional pressures (Oliver, 
1991). 
2.4.3 Institutional theory: application to this study 
Original conceptions of institutional theory assumed that institutional pressures 
elicited automatic compliance. More recent perspectives see institutional responses 
as ‘behaviors to be predicted rather than theoretically predefined outcomes of 
institutional processes (Oliver, 1991:174). In its revised form institutional theory is 
useful for predicting compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. Across 
developed economies public buyers and their organisations are under pressure to 
incorporate SME-friendly policy measures into their procurement practices. 
Compliance on their part cannot be taken as given, though. As several studies have 
revealed, what the institutional environment says public buyers ought to do and what 
they actually do are not always aligned (De Boer and Telgen, 1998, Martin, Hartley 
and Cox, 1999; Ntayi, Ngoboka and Kakooza, 2013). Organisational actors in 
procurement have their own interests and values, which may not be coterminous 
with those of the institutional rule setters (Gelderman, Semeijn and Bouma, 2015). 
The contention, simply, is that public buyers should not be thought of as conduits for 
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policy edicts to pass through. As discussed in sections 1.9.2, the institutional 
environment of public procurement is not without contradictions: facilitating SMEs 
must compete with cost reduction pressures and supranational laws. All this raises 
the prospect that individuals at organisational level may be unable or unwilling to 
comply with SME-friendly procurement policy. Section 2.9 addresses this area in 
more depth. Before this, sections 2.5-2.8 go into more detail on institutional theory.  
Fig. 6 Institutional 
effects
 
2.5 Institutionalism  
The evolution of institutional theory over the last half century is examined here. It 
begins in section 2.5.1 by situating institutional theory in its historical context. While 
institutional theory is synonymous with ideas and terminology put forward by Di 
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Maggio and Powell (1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977), Scott (1987, 2008b) and 
Zucker (1977, 1987), its origins belong to an earlier period in organisation theory. As 
far back as the 1940-50s organisation theorists including Selznick (1948) and 
Parsons (1956) were starting to tease out how events at the institutional or societal 
level percolated down to the organisation level. This ‘old institutionalism’ laid the 
foundations for the emergence of ‘new institutionalism’ in the 1970s. The new 
institutional thesis is described in section 2.5.2 in terms of what it explains and 
predicts of organisational practices. It is followed in section 2.5.3 by a synopsis of 
the empirical body of evidence, which leaves little doubt that institutional forces 
matter when it comes to explaining what goes on inside organisations. A recognised 
effect of institutional forces is that organisations end up exhibiting similar-type 
practices and structural characteristics. The process through which this occurs – 
isomorphism - is dealt with in section 2.5.4. The final section 2.5.5 discusses the idea 
of institutional legitimacy and its centrality in explaining the power of institutions to 
wield their influence.  
2.5.1 Institutional theory in historical context 
The impact of the institutional environment on organisational behaviour has been a 
recurring theme since the inception of organisation studies. Over sixty years ago 
Selznick (1948:25) talked of the organisation as an ‘adaptive social structure’ 
reacting to stimuli from institutional actors. As he saw it, organisations, as rational 
systems for the achievement of stated goals, are embedded in a wider institutional 
environment that has a direct bearing on how they are managed. A similar stance 
was assumed by Parsons (1956). He modelled the organisation as a social system 
situated within a superordinate social system. From this perspective the decisions 
organisations take and the goals they pursue cannot be divorced from their social and 
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institutional milieu. Later studies were also to make the connection between the 
institutional environment and organisational practices. Benson (1975) positioned the 
organisation and its network within the macro environment of state agencies, 
legislative bodies, media and society. These higher-level forces were understood to 
exercise power over the flow of resources to organisational networks, the distribution 
of power among organisations, and the governance of organisations. Zald (1978) saw 
social forces as critical in shaping the standards and norms that govern industries and 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) spoke of the need for organisational behaviour to 
embody and reflect social norms. The common thread running through these 
contributions is the influence of institutional and societal forces, in addition to 
market forces, in explaining organisational practices and behaviours.  
2.5.2 Emergence of ‘new institutionalism’ 
Towards the end of the 1970s a ‘new institutionalism’ movement emerged, which 
had its antecedents in the pioneering work of Selznick (1948) and Parsons (1956). 
‘New institutionalism’ eschewed exclusively technical-rationalist interpretations of 
organisational behaviour. Instead, it directed its attention to the role that institutional 
forces play in determining organisational structure and practice. Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) are credited with articulating the ‘new institutionalism’ thesis. In their 
watershed paper on ‘institutionalised organisations’ they argued that the structures, 
policies and practices of many organisations reflect the prevailing norms of their 
institutional environments rather than the demands of their work activities. In the 
same year Zucker (1977) proposed that forces within the institutional environment 
were causative in terms of the types of behaviours and practices adopted by 
organisations and their employees. This institutional thesis represented a departure 
from prevailing thinking in organisation studies. The latter privileged organisation-
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centric stances and largely discounted the determining influence of institutional 
forces (Powell and Di Maggio, 1991, Introduction; Scott, 2008b). ‘New 
institutionalism’ sought to counter what it believed to be under-socialised views of 
human action (Granovetter, 1985) and ‘bring society back in’ to analysis of 
organisational practices (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Under the institutional lens, 
organisations came to be seen not only as rational wealth maximisers but also as 
‘cultural rule followers’ (Edelman and Suchman, 1997).  
2.5.3 Empirical support for ‘new institutionalism’  
Soon after Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) ‘new institutionalism’ thesis evidence around 
institutional impacts on organisational behaviour started to emerge. Among the 
earliest of these empirical studies was Rowan’s (1982) longitudinal examination of 
education practices in Californian schools. Rowan was able to show that the 
provision of particular educational services and the undertaking of curriculum reform 
resulted from regulatory pressures and sector norms rather than organisation size. 
Also in an education context, Meyer, Scott and Strang (1987) described how changes 
in the administrative structure of schools were related to regulatory changes and their 
impact on funding provision. The power of institutional forces in shaping 
organisational practices was also evident in other industries. Mezias (1990) found 
that regulators and professional accounting bodies were significant in overhauling 
financial reporting practices used by large for-profit firms. Dacin (1997) investigated 
trends in the establishment of Finnish language newspapers across three centuries 
and concluded that institutional forces were more important than market forces in 
explaining their founding. Event-history analyses of organisations in the US by 
Barron, Dobbin and Devereaux-Jennings (1986) and Dobbin and Sutton (1998) 
demonstrated that changes in employment practices after WWII had their origins in 
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regulatory activism and normative pressures. These studies typify a vast body of 
work, which lends empirical support to the thesis that institutional forces shape 
organisational behaviour.   
2.5.4 Institutional isomorphism 
Institutional forces provide one answer to the question of why organisations come to 
display striking similarities in their practices and outward orientations. Institutional 
forces, as Di Maggio and Powell (1983) pointed out, induce organisations into 
adopting the same practices and exhibiting the same structural attributes. Through 
responding to the same institutional cues organisations start to become isomorphic 
with each other and with their wider environment (Dacin, 1997). Instances of 
institutional isomorphism have been detected in various contexts. Edelman (1990) 
linked the diffusion of formal industrial relations grievance procedures to the 
enactment of 1960s civil rights laws. In a subsequent study, Edelman (1992) 
demonstrated that innovative firms were the first to adopt grievance procedures, 
followed by a more universal adoption once the organisational benefits and social 
legitimacy of these procedures had been established. Westphal, Gulati and Shortell 
(1997) showed something similar in respect of the adoption of total quality 
management (TQM) systems in the hospital sector. A small number of innovative 
hospitals initially embraced TQM for efficiency purposes. Only after TQM became 
an institutional standard did the majority follow suit, and then for social legitimacy 
rather than efficiency reasons. Isomorphism has also been used to rationalise the 
diffusion of reform across the US public sector (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) and the 
erosion of permanent employment within Japanese corporations (Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001). As implied here, social legitimacy is integral to explaining 
institutional conformity. The next section examines it in more detail.  
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2.5.5 Institutional legitimacy 
Central to the ‘new institutionalism’ thesis is social legitimacy. It is the felt need for 
legitimacy that is used by theorists to explain why actors conform to institutional 
pressures (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Parsons, 1956; 
Suchman, 1995). Institutional conformity is said to underscore legitimacy 
irrespective of the economic or technical effectiveness of the institutional practices. 
Legitimacy, in turn, helps organisations to secure resources and political support 
from key stakeholders (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). The opposite occurs when 
institutional expectations are openly defied: legitimacy is compromised and 
stakeholder support may be withdrawn. Findings from a range of studies support this 
hypothesis. Singh, Tucker and House (1986) found that conferred legitimacy by 
powerful institutional actors mattered more for the survival of young voluntary 
social service organisations than internal efficiency. In a similar way, institutional 
linkages and the legitimacy they bestow have been shown to be decisive in 
organisational survival for social care providers and hospitals (Baum and Oliver, 
1991; Ruef and Scott, 1998). Maintaining social legitimacy has particular salience 
for organisations operating in environments subject to high levels of state control 
(Meyer, Scott and Deal, 1983). In these environments legitimacy can be more 
important than the coordination and control of productive activities in preventing 
organisational mortality (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell, 1988). The chapter now 
turns to unpacking the nature of institutional forces.  
2.6 Institutional forces 
Institutions reside at the heart of institutional theory and so this section takes a closer 
look at them. The meaning of the term ‘institution’ is interrogated in section 2.6.1. 
Institutions are shown to be socially constructed rules and modes of behaviour. The 
function of institutions is clarified in section 2.6.2. Essentially, institutions provide 
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stability and order to social life by prescribing some forms of behaviour and 
practices while proscribing others. The guidance function of institutions assumes 
particular significance when social actors are uncertain over what course of action to 
embark on. Based on the work of Scott (2008b), sections 2.6.3-2.6.5 distinguish 
between three manifestations of institutional forces: regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive. Regulative institutions are instantiated in laws and policies. Social 
actors can be coerced to comply with these institutional pressures under threat of 
sanction by the state, professional bodies or other rule setters. Normative institutions 
are associated with professional standards, although they can also encompass wider 
societal expectations about what is proper and acceptable conduct. Moral obligation 
rather than coercion is the basis of compliance. The third institution-type is cultural-
cognitive. It denotes taken-for-granted assumptions about how things should be done 
and operates on the basis of shared cultural understandings. Regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive forces are all present to varying degrees in any given 
institutional field. The section concludes with a reminder that institutions exist only 
to the extent that social actors reproduce them.     
2.6.1 Defining institution 
In the middle of the last century Radcliffe-Brown (1940:9) spoke of institutions as 
standardised modes of behaviour that underpin social structures and networks of 
social relations. This interpretation of institutions persists to the present day, with 
particular emphasis placed on their rule-like quality and their ordering function. For 
Mantzavinos (2011) institutions are normative social rules, which are enforced by 
the state and the professions. Institutions assume the form of ‘organised, established 
procedures’ that determine social behaviour (Jepperson, 1991:143) and act as 
‘blueprints’ (Dacin, 1997) or ‘archetypes’ (Scott, 2008b) by which individuals and 
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organisations orient themselves within their environments. Institutions have the 
property of a ‘rule-like, social fact quality of an organised pattern of action’ and are 
so pervasive as to be taken-for-granted (Zucker, 1987:728; also: Davis, Diekmann 
and Tinsley, 1994; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As will be discussed presently, 
institutions can be disaggregated into regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
forms. By defining institutions as ‘social rules’ or ‘blueprints’ for how to act in our 
social environments, we can rule out what institutions are not, namely: organisations. 
The distinction is important as ‘institution’ is used interchangeably with 
‘organisation’ in everyday parlance even though the two are analytically distinct. 
2.6.2 Function of institutions  
Institutions perform a vital function in the ordering of society and social relations. At 
the most fundamental level institutions represent solutions to social problems 
(Mantzavinos, 2011). Institutions ‘define new organizing situations, redefine existing 
ones, and specify the means for coping rationally with each’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977:344). They detail not only the ends to which behaviour should be directed, but 
also the means to the achievement of those ends (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
Viewed from this angle, institutions have a directive, controlling influence and 
represent external constraints on individuals and organisations. They structure 
choices by providing individuals with ‘vocabularies of motives and with a sense of 
self’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991:251). ‘Predefined patterns of conduct’ for 
individuals to follow are embodied in institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:52). 
Conformance to these patterns of conduct becomes a sense making activity for all 
institutional actors (Edelman, 1992). Simultaneously, institutions serve to empower 
social actors (Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 2008b). They are ‘scripts for behavior’ and 
‘provide substantive guides for practical action’ (Clemens and Cook, 1999:445). By 
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proscribing some courses of action institutions actively promote alternative courses 
of action. This reduces uncertainty by ensuring that actors can follow legitimised 
routines to deal with familiar and regularly occurring situations (Mantzavinos, 2011). 
The connotation and ultimate effect of institutions, whether proscriptive or 
prescriptive, is to provide stability and meaning to social behaviour (David and 
Bitektine, 2009; Scott, 2008b).  
2.6.3 Regulative institutions  
Institutions manifest themselves in three main ways according to Scott (2008b). The 
first institutional manifestation is regulative in form. Regulative institutions emanate 
from the state and include, inter alia, laws, policies, directives and other instruments 
of public administration. The underlying mechanism through which regulative 
institutional forces work is coercion, which can be experienced as either direct force 
or persuasion (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). In all cases regulative institutions are 
legally sanctioned by the state and impose some form of official obligation on parties 
to comply. As Scott (2008b:53) stated, with regulative institutions the state acts as 
‘rule maker, referee, and enforcer’. Regulative pressures are an expression of state 
power and are intended to promote or prohibit certain types of behaviour within 
organisations. The institutional literature is replete with cases of regulatory forces 
effecting change in organisational structure. Baron, Dobbin and Devereaux-Jennings 
(1986) traced the emergence of personnel departments and specific models of 
employment to federal regulation in the US. Along similar lines, studies have 
described how the practices and policies of schools and public sector organisations 
took shape in response to demands made of them by government departments and 
agencies (Meyer, Scott and Strang, 1987; Rowan, 1982; Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983).  
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2.6.4 Normative institutions 
The second institution type is normative in form. Normative institutions are 
primarily associated with advocacy, education and standard setting by professional 
representative bodies. Included also are the prevailing norms and values in society 
(Dacin, 1997). In contrast to regulative forces, normative institutions do not operate 
through coercion. Norms are morally governed and exert their influence by imposing 
a social obligation on parties to comply (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). As an 
example of the power of normative institutional pressures, Greenwood, Suddaby and 
Hinings (2002) described how over a twenty-year period professional accounting 
bodies in Canada redefined the role of accountants by lobbying for change, 
endorsing local innovations and diffusing best practices. Normative institutional 
pressures can work in concert with legally-binding regulations in shaping 
organisational practices (Scott, 2008b). Mezias (1990) found that regulatory 
stipulations and stances adopted by professional accounting bodies each had a part to 
play in driving the uptake of new financial reporting practices in large corporations. 
The combination of regulative and normative institutional pressures can bring about 
shared understandings of appropriate social practices so that they become taken for 
granted and assume a reality of their own, ‘a reality that confronts the individual as 
an external and coercive fact’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:55). This leads to the 
third of the institution types, cultural-cognitive, which is described next.  
2.6.5 Cultural-cognitive institutions 
As the name suggests, the cultural-cognitive institution refers to cultural beliefs and 
shared understandings around social behaviour. Whereas the regulative and 
normative institution types take effect through coercion and norm setting 
respectively, the cultural-cognitive institution operates through actors mimicking one 
another (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). As an institutional pressure it is culturally 
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supported rather than legally sanctioned or morally governed. The cultural-cognitive 
institution assumes heightened importance under conditions of environmental 
uncertainty; for example, when new technologies are introduced or new modes or 
working come on stream. Mimicking other actors, especially prominent actors 
perceived to have a high degree of institutional legitimacy and/or marketplace 
credibility is a coping device for managing uncertainty. Empirical research bears this 
out. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) revealed that senior decision makers took 
their cue in philanthropic decision making from persons whom they affiliated with, 
knew and respected. Burns and Wholey (1993) found that mimetic forces and 
normative pressures had explanatory value in rationalising the decision of hospitals 
to adopt matrix management programs. Mimetic forces were also important in 
explaining how the multidivisional structure became standard (Fligstein, 1985), as 
they were in explaining how TQM systems were adopted by hospitals (Westphal, 
Gulati and Shortell, 1997). In sum, institutions manifest themselves in three main 
ways, but these are not mutually exclusive and may operate in concert with one 
another (see Table 9).    
Table 9 Institutional forces  
 Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience Social obligation Shared 
understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding 
expectations  
Constitutive 
schema 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, laws, 
sanctions 
Certification, 
accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally 
supported 
(Scott, 2008b) 
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2.6.6 Inhabited institutions  
The tenor of the discussion so far has been institutional determinism. Powerful as 
their effects may be, institutions only exist to the extent that they are ‘inhabited by 
people and their social interactions’ (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006:213). The 
metaphor of ‘inhabited institutions’ finds resonance in the much earlier observation 
of Berger and Luckman (1966:57) that ‘the objectivity of the institutional world, 
however massive it may appear to the individual, is a human produced, constructed 
objectivity’. Institutions are not ‘disembodied phenomena’, as Covaleski and 
Dirsmith (1988:582) made clear from their investigation into the implementation and 
eventual decline of a university budget system. While institutional pressures - be 
they regulatory, normative or cultural-cognitive – influence behaviour, they still only 
become real through the actions of those subject to them (Barley, 1986). The result is 
that organisations and their employees are simultaneously ‘institutional carriers’ and 
‘institutional agents’ (Scott et al., 2000). Individuals are ‘institutional carriers’ to the 
extent that they enact and perpetuate authoritative guidelines, norms and cultural 
assumptions. Simultaneously, individuals are ‘institutional agents’ insofar as they 
enjoy some discretion over how they respond to institutional pressures. If institutions 
provide the guidelines for social interaction, the meanings of institutions are 
themselves constructed by social interactions (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006:213). The 
import of this depiction of institutions will become clear in the next section. 
2.7 Critiquing institutional theory  
In its original form institutional theory understood regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive forces to be highly deterministic of behaviour within 
organisations: ‘all institutions appear in the same way, as given, unalterable and self-
evident’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:56). The new institutional movement 
associated with Meyer and Rowan (1977) that emerged in the 1970s concurred with 
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this viewpoint. In the years since then scholars have moved beyond assumptions of 
institutional determinism to something more nuanced and contingent (Di Maggio, 
1988; Powell, 1991; Oliver, 1991, 1992; Zucker and Darby, 2005). Scott 
(2008a:429) has described it as institutional theory making the transition from 
‘determinant to interactive arguments’. Two major developments have brought about 
this shift in thinking. The first is acceptance that individuals and their organisations 
are capable of exercising agency in the face of institutional demands. As Mills and 
Murgatroyd (1991) have made clear, organisational actors do not always mirror the 
social rule system governing them. The second is appreciation that institutional 
environments are often beset with contradictions and conflicts (Eisenstadt, 1964a). 
Such institutional flux leaves open the possibility that individuals will evade or defy 
institutional expectations. These two points are subject to further examination in 
sections 2.7.1-2.7.2. The section concludes by drawing these points together to 
provide a more contingent view of the effects of institutional pressures on 
organisational practices.   
2.7.1 Agency  
One of the main deficiencies of ‘new institutionalism’ was the insufficient weight it 
accorded to agency and interest (Di Maggio, 1988; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). 
Individuals and organisations were portrayed as passive, without power and 
beholden to institutional rule setters. More recent empirical insights contradict this 
assumption and show individuals to be capable of purposeful and self-interested 
behaviour. The voluntary service organisations in Oliver’s (1988) study exercised a 
degree of latitude over how they configured their operations despite institutional 
pressures impinging on them. Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) and latterly 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) were also able to show how powerful accounting 
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firms engaged in ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ and succeeded in introducing a 
multidisciplinary practice model of organising that became the new institutional 
standard. That institutionalisation can be an interactive process between regulatory 
agencies and firms is also evident in the literature. The establishment and subsequent 
disbandment of the mandated sales organisation in Norwegian fisheries, as described 
by Holm (1995), resulted from government agents and the fishing sector alternately 
influencing one another. A similar dynamic of interaction obtained in Covaleski and 
Dirsmith’s (1988) account of the transformation of a university budgeting system. 
Depending on the precise context, institutional responses may be ‘open to 
organisational construction’ and the attainment of institutional legitimacy need not 
come at expense of managerial discretion (Edelman, 1992; Edelman and Suchman, 
1997). 
Part of the problem with ‘new institutionalism’ was its reification of socially 
constructed realities (Mezias, 1990). The impression given of institutionalisation was 
as a ‘once-and-for-all-process’ (Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994:550). The 
deterministic power of institutional forces was over-emphasised while the ability of 
actors to respond to these same forces was under-emphasised (Hirsch, 1997); a 
conclusion also reached by Vermeulen, Buch and Greenwood (2007) from their 
examination of Dutch government efforts to reform the concrete industry. Precisely 
because individuals have interests and power, institutional pressures are not wholly 
deterministic. Contemporary institutional perspectives capture this idea. Institutional 
environments are understood as ‘centres of debates in which competing interests 
negotiate over issue interpretation’ (Hoffman, 1999:351); ‘arenas of power relations’ 
in which actors hold varying degrees of power (Brint and Karabel, 1991:355); ‘sites 
within which renegotiations of meaning take place’ (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994:649); 
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‘battlefields’ (Reay and Hinings, 2005); and ‘a field of struggles’ in which the rules 
change through shifting power dynamics (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:101). This 
actor-centred interpretation is also closer to the politicised nature of institutional 
environments and the various machinations and manoeuvrings that take place 
between governments, professional associations and those subject to their influence 
and control (Di Maggio, 1988; Elsback and Sutton, 1992; Steinmo, 2008). 
2.7.2 Institutional imbalance 
‘New institutionalism’ has also received criticism for assuming that institutional 
environments are monolithic and that governments exert their influence in a 
unilateral and unrestricted manner (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Scott, 2005; Zucker, 
1988). Early in the life of ‘new institutionalism’ Meyer and Scott (1983) conceded 
that what they called the ‘legitimating theory’ of the organisation is sometimes riven 
by competing institutional pressures at local, national and federal levels. Others were 
also to note the ‘conflicts, contradictions, and ambiguities’ inherent in the creation 
and implementation of institutional arrangements (Powell and Di Maggio, 1991:28, 
Introduction). Meyer, Scott and Strang (1987) highlighted how institutional fields are 
often fragmented owing to the presence of multiple regulative, normative and 
cognitive forces. There can also be more than one institutional logic or ruleset for an 
organisational field at any given time period (Purdy and Gray, 2009). As one 
example, D’aunno, Sutton and Price (1991) documented how drug treatment centres 
were forced to selectively respond to the conflicting demands of two major 
stakeholders in order to maintain their funding and institutional legitimacy. It is 
under conditions of institutional conflict that the ability and willingness of actors to 
conform to institutional pressures start to unravel. Gaps between ‘institutional 
templates’ and the daily demands of organisational life can also start to open up 
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(Barley, 1986). In more extreme situations, conflicting institutional pressures may 
even lead to organisational paralysis and disbandment (Pache and Santos, 2010).   
A conflicted institutional environment has implications for actor agency. Scott 
(2005) noted that institutional imbalance creates space for individuals to engage in 
self-interested, strategic behaviour. Seo and Creed (2002) espoused the same view, 
suggesting that the combination of institutional contradictions and human praxis can 
lead to the formation of alternative practices and behaviours at organisational level. 
Empirical support for this position can be found across a number of studies. Results 
from Goodrick and Salancik’s (1996) investigation of patient care practices 
supported the hypothesis that organisational discretion takes effect when institutional 
standards are uncertain, but is constrained under conditions of institutional certainty. 
Rowan (1982) inferred from his analysis of the diffusion of civil service reform 
practices that institutional consistency is a pre-condition of organisational 
compliance. The same argument can be applied to situations where conflicts arise 
between institutional legitimacy and organisational efficiency. Fox-Wolfgramm, 
Boal and Hunt (1998) described how banks rebuffed regulatory pressures aimed at 
overhauling lending practices when they were deemed to be inconsistent with, or 
superfluous to, their organisational identity. Conflicted institutional environments 
not only increase the probability of individual resistance to institutional pressures; 
they also make it more likely that actors feel empowered to introduce new 
institutional standards (Eisenstadt, 1964a, 1964b). Instances of this happening have 
been documented in such diverse areas as corporate structuring (Davis, Diekmann 
and Tinsely, 1994), recycling (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch, 2003) and radio 
broadcasting (Leblebici et al., 1991). 
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2.7.3 A contingent view of institutional effects 
The above critique of ‘new institutionalism’ yields two key points. The first is that 
individuals are more animate under institutional pressures than ‘new 
institutionalism’ gave them credit. The second is that institutional environments are 
not always coherent, and this creates the space for various types of non-
conformance. These two observations do not invalidate the contention that 
regulatory pressures, industry norms and shared cultural understandings are 
significant in influencing organisational practices (Oliver, 1988). What they do 
suggest is a more qualified take on institutional determinism. This more qualified 
stance helps to avoid the extremes of under or over-socialised views of human action 
in organisational contexts (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1991). Tacking to this line is 
consistent with the view expressed by management scholars many times over that 
both institutional pressures and strategic choice influence what happens within 
organisations (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Greening and Gray, 1994; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Selznick, 
1996). Equally, it resonates with Van de Ven’s (1983) concept of ‘reasonable’ 
administrative behaviour on the part of organisational members, which is neither 
purely rational nor purely random. Pragmatism, as opposed to automatic compliance 
or unilateral resistance, is the logic of action for most actors in negotiating their 
institutional environments (Seo and Creed, 2002). This more contingent view of 
institutional effects is taken up another level in section 2.8.   
2.8 Predicting institutional responses 
As asserted in section 2.7, there is now acceptance among institutional theorists that 
individuals are not always able or willing to respond positively to institutional 
pressures, particularly under conditions of institutional imbalance. As a corollary, 
institutional pressures cannot be said to be deterministic in all circumstances. This is 
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the starting premise used by Oliver (1991, 1992) in predicting how actors respond to 
institutional pressures. For Oliver institutional conformity is only one of five 
possible response strategies. The other four are avoidance, compromise, 
manipulation and outright resistance. Subsequent empirical work supports her 
position, finding that institutional responses range across a defiance-conformity 
spectrum (Bigelow and Middleton-Stone, 1995; Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and 
Simons, 1995; McKay, 2001). The response exhibited, whether it is conformity, 
avoidance, resistance or something else, is believed to be contingent on the nature 
and context of the institutional pressures. In this regard Oliver (1991) proposes a 
number of factors relevant to predicting responses, all of which are grounded in 
institutional theory. These factors relate to the rationale for compliance with 
institutional pressures, the institutional context, the content of the institutional 
pressure, and the means by which the institutional pressure exerts itself on 
individuals and organisations
18
. These four areas are examined in sections 2.8.1-
2.8.4 below.     
2.8.1 Rationale for institutional compliance 
The rationale for compliance is the first of the four dimensions for predicting how 
people respond to institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) breaks this down further into 
two components: social legitimacy and economic efficiency. As already discussed, 
securing and maintaining social legitimacy is central to institutional explanations of 
why individuals comply with the demands made of them by government agencies 
and professional associations (Meyer, 1979; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975). The legitimacy connotations stemming from institutional pressures 
                                                            
18 Oliver (1991) also sees the environmental context within which institutional pressures are 
being exerted as a predictive dimension. As this study limits itself to the public sector it is not given 
any  further consideration here.    
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are not the same in all cases. Some institutional pressures are imbued with high 
levels of legitimacy. Their impact on social standing is likely to be substantial. Other 
institutional pressures are imbued with lower levels of legitimacy and have a 
corresponding lower impact on social standing. Where actors at the organisation 
level perceive institutional pressures to be integral to their legitimacy and 
reputational status, then compliance is to be expected. Illustrative of this scenario, 
Deephouse (1996) described how commercial banks adopted certain strategic 
postures primarily to reassure financial regulators and media commentators of their 
corporate rectitude and risk management capabilities. Not to have done so would 
have jeopardised their marketplace credibility and, from this, their ability to trade. 
Where there are doubts over the social legitimacy of an institutional demand, the 
probability of compliance reduces. It was under such circumstances that the 
corporations in McKay’s (2001) study showed themselves to be reluctant to adhere 
to environmental protection legislation.  
 
As well as social legitimacy, there is also an economic-efficiency logic that guides 
actors’ calculus in responding to institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
This stems from the fact that organisations operate in both institutional and economic 
environments. The relative influence of each environment on organisational 
behaviour varies across sectors (Meyer, Scott and Deal, 1983; Powell, 1991). 
Institutional pressures that are associated with some form of economic gain for the 
organisation are likely to induce a high degree of compliance. Economic benefits 
serve to incentivise institutional compliance and make it worthwhile not only in a 
social legitimacy sense but also in an instrumental sense. In effect, they reinforce the 
social fitness aspect of institutional compliance. As an example, the perceived 
organisational benefit of family-friendly work practices was found by Goodstein 
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(1994) to be among the significant predictors of compliance with this government-
led initiative. The opposite effect is predicted to occur where there is no obvious 
economic or technical-efficiency advantage to be had from complying with 
institutional pressures. That is, in the absence of an economic incentive, motivation 
to comply weakens. Responses may range from compromise and avoidance to 
manipulation and rejection depending on the economic cost to the organisation of 
incorporating the institutionally-sanctioned change into their everyday practices 
(Bigelow and Middleton-Stone, 1995).   
2.8.2 Institutional context 
The second predictive dimension of Oliver’s (1991) framework relates to 
institutional context. Two factors are relevant here. The first of these is the 
coherence of the institutional order or ruleset. The ability of governments and 
professional associations to influence organisational practices presupposes a high 
degree of institutional consistency (Meyer, Scott and Strang, 1987; Rowan, 1982). In 
reality, institutional environments are not always consistent in their rules or in the 
demands they make of individuals and organisations. That environments may have 
more than one institutional rule setter is often the case – several government 
agencies and departments regulating a particular industry, for example. When this 
happens the institutional environment can fragment and the ability of institutional 
pressures to determine practices within organisations starts to diminish (Clemens and 
Cook, 1999; Galvin, 2002; McKay, 2001; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Purdy and Gray, 
2009). On this basis consistency between the rules structuring an institutional field is 
considered to be a predictor of compliance. Where institutional rules are consistent 
and not mutually exclusive, compliance is at least possible. The relationship starts to 
breakdown when the institutional environment is characterised by uncertainty and 
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ambiguity (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Individuals may be unable to signal 
institutional compliance, even where their willingness to do so is not in question 
(D’aunno, Sutton and Price, 1991).  
 
The dependency relationship between rule setters and organisations is also predicted 
to have a bearing on compliance. Observed elsewhere, the level of dependency on 
the state or other institutional actors varies by organisation and by sector (Brint and 
Karabel, 1991; Dawson, 1996; Reay and Hinings, 2005). Some categories – public 
sector organisations, for example – have a relatively high dependence on the state; 
although even within the public sector organisation dependence on government is 
not uniform (Doyle, 2001). Other categories, such as privately-owned firms, are 
much less reliant on the state. With different levels of resource and mandate 
dependency come different expectations over how organisations should behave and 
orient themselves in their institutional environments (Gottfredson and White, 1981; 
Tolbert, 1985). Organisations with high institutional dependence will find it difficult 
to resist the demands made of them. Their continued existence is heavily dependent 
on reciprocity and trust with their institutional sponsor. Non-compliance with 
regulations, policies and norms jeopardises not only their social legitimacy but also 
resource flows and budget allocations (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Organisations 
with lower levels of institutional dependence will experience less pressure to be 
compliant (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). They also have comparatively less to 
lose in resource terms from non-conformance. Organisational dependence on the 
institutional rule setter is, therefore, understood to be a predictor of compliance.   
2.8.3 Content of institutional pressures 
The content of the institutional pressure is the third predictive dimension of 
compliance. Again, this is disaggregated into two factors by Oliver (1991). 
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Compatibility of institutional pressures with organisational goals is the first factor. 
Where there is compatibility organisations should encounter few problems in giving 
effect to institutional prescriptions. Moreover, their policies and goals stand to be 
buttressed by embracing the institutional standard. Institutional pressures are not 
always compatible with organisational goals, as has been shown across a number of 
studies (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt, 1998; Hoffman, 1999). In these 
circumstances organisations might seek to buffer their core activities from 
institutional forces (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976). Among reported cases 
of buffering, Westphal and Zajac (1994) revealed how, consistent with industry 
norms, corporations officially adopted long-term incentive plans for their chief 
executive officers, but never enacted them in practice. ‘Ceremonial conformity’ of 
this kind is often necessary to deflect capricious institutional demands and to make 
sure that organisational operations are not adversely affected by them (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). This leads to the prediction that where institutional pressures 
complement organisational goals, compliance with them is likely. Alternatively, 
incompatibility between external pressures and internal priorities increases the 
prospect of institutional non-compliance.    
 
In addition to compatibility with organisational objectives, the constraining effect of 
institutional pressure is another salient factor in predicting compliance. Institutional 
pressures are constraining to the extent that they prescribe how actors should behave 
in their social environments. They are the ‘blueprints’ for action (Dacin, 1997) and 
‘legitimised conventions’ (Jepperson, 1991) for actors to follow. By their very 
nature, institutions channel organisational behaviour ‘in one direction against the 
many other directions that would theoretically be possible’ (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966:52). Against this, organisational actors strive to retain autonomy over their 
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decision making processes and preserve their identity (Mills and Murgatroyd, 1991). 
These same attributes underpin the ability of actors to remain flexible and adaptable 
for future challenges and opportunities (Seo and Creed, 2002). Critically, they also 
enable organisations to tailor their policies and practices to the idiosyncratic 
demands of their operating environments. It was on this basis that Rowan (1982) and 
Meyer, Scott and Deal (1983) found schools to be selective over how they 
incorporated institutionally prescribed education initiatives into their curricula. For 
the aforementioned reasons constraints on discretion and autonomy associated with 
institutional demands are understood to have a bearing on compliance. Low 
constraints increase the chances of compliance whereas high constraints do the 
opposite. 
2.8.4 Control mechanisms  
The mechanisms through which institutional pressures exert control represent the 
fourth and final predictive dimension. The two factors relevant to control are the 
coerciveness of the institutional pressure and the extent to which it is diffused 
throughout the organisational field (Oliver, 1991). Implied by their name, coercive 
forces are legally sanctioned and embody the power of the state or other institutional 
rule setters to dictate organisational behaviour (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2008b). In various ways the institutional literature makes the connection between 
coercion and how actors respond to external stimuli. Cook et al., (1983) envisaged 
organisational response to regulatory pressures as a function of the scope of 
regulation, its restrictiveness, its duration and the uncertainty created by it. Campbell 
(2007) postulated that the scope of state regulation, in addition to industrial self-
regulation, monitoring and normative pressures cause organisations to behave in 
socially responsible ways. The coercive power behind an institutional pressure is 
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considered to be a predictor of compliance. Where institutional pressures are 
understood to be coercive i.e. enforceable and backed up by the threat of sanction, 
compliance is likely to be forthcoming (Scott, 2008b). Compliance is less likely 
where institutional pressures are not seen to be coercive.  
  
Coercion is not the only means through which institutionally-derived practices 
become embedded in organisational practice. Institutional forces also take effect 
when actors model their behaviour on what others around them are doing (Di 
Maggio and Powell, 1983). By this mimicking process practices and structural 
configurations are diffused along organisational and professional networks (Scott, 
2008b). The institutional literature is replete with instances of organisations 
replicating the behaviours of others, whether in respect of organisational structure 
(Fligstein, 1985), corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989) or 
TQM (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). The diffusion of new institutional 
norms and practices across industries generates its own momentum. As greater 
numbers of organisations adopt a practice it becomes more widely diffused and 
visible. A point is eventually reached at which the practice becomes institutionalised 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The more diffused a practice is throughout an 
organisational field the more likely it is that actors will be swayed to copy it. 
Separate studies on family-friendly work practices by Goodstein (1994) and Ingram 
and Simons (1995) prove this to be the case. Conversely, low rates of diffusion 
remove a subtle yet powerful driver of institutional conformance.  
2.9 Predicting responses to SME-friendly procurement policy 
Four dimensions of institutional compliance are described in section 2.8. These same 
dimensions will now be used to predict compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy (see Fig. 7, pg. 131). Consistent with current institutional perspectives, 
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automatic compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy is not pre-supposed. 
Responses are understood to be contingent on the rationale for compliance, the 
institutional context, the content of the institutional pressure, and the institutional 
control mechanisms at play (Oliver, 1991). Each of these aspects will be discussed in 
turn. Section 2.9.1 sets out the rationales for compliance. These are the social 
legitimacy connotations of facilitating SME suppliers and the economic benefits of 
having more SMEs compete for public sector contracts. Section 2.9.2 examines how 
the institutional context of public procurement influences compliance. Relevant here 
is consistency between institutional rules governing public procurement as well as 
organisational dependence on the state. Section 2.9.3 focuses on the content of SME-
friendly policy in terms of its compatibility with organisational goals and its effects 
on professional discretion. The fourth section 2.9.4 concentrates on the control 
mechanisms behind SME-friendly policy. The first of these is coercion and the 
second is perceptions around what other actors are doing to facilitate SMEs. The 
final section 2.9.5 looks at interactive effects between institutional factors and 
individual and organisational characteristics, and how these impact policy 
compliance.   
2.9.1 Rationale for compliance with SME-friendly policy 
Social legitimacy is the first rationale for complying with SME-friendly policy. 
Public buyers who perceive the SME-friendly agenda in public procurement as 
having direct implications for their reputation and professional credibility will be 
more inclined to exhibit policy compliance. Increasingly, the facilitation of SMEs 
has come to have legitimacy connotations for public procurement actors. In political 
and policy discourse maximising the number of SME suppliers is inextricably linked 
to the national economic interest and the common weal. Discussed in detail in 
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chapter one, public sector contracts represent opportunities for small firms to grow 
and professionalise (Bovis, 1996; Erridge, 1998; Loader, 2005). SME growth and 
professionalisation, in turn, yields positive externalities for the rest of society, 
including the creation of employment and the strengthening of local and regional 
economies. The innovativeness, export activity and contributions to GVA of a 
buoyant SME sector also underpin national economic competitiveness. Further 
legitimacy connotations stem from the fact that SMEs have been historically under-
represented as suppliers in the public sector marketplace (Anglund, 1999). Taking 
action to encourage their participation now can be seen as a means of redressing this 
inequity and delivering a fairer, more transparent and publicly accountable tendering 
system; all of which is consistent with the expectations of government and other 
external stakeholders on how public procurement should be managed. This gives the 
following hypothesis: 
H1a: The social legitimacy attached to facilitating SMEs in contract competitions 
has a positive impact on policy compliance 
Economic gain is the second rationale for complying with SME-friendly 
procurement policy. Research has already shown that economic gains can have a 
positive effect on compliance with EU Procurement Directives (Gelderman, Ghijsen 
and Schoonen, 2010) and on the adoption of environmentally-friendly purchasing 
practices (Walker, Di Sisto and McBain, 2008). The same relationship is expected to 
obtain in the case of facilitating SMEs. Where SME involvement in tendering 
competitions is predicted to result in economic gains for the organisation, policy 
compliance is more likely to come about. Having more SMEs tender for contracts 
helps organisations to achieve financial savings directly and indirectly. Directly, 
SMEs are capable of rivalling large firms in offering value for money (Office of 
121 
 
Government Commerce, 2003). Indirectly, their involvement in tendering intensifies 
competition and leads to more competitive bid prices for the purchasing organisation 
(European Commission, 1990, 1992; Europe Economics, 2004, 2011). As with the 
goal of supporting small suppliers, optimising value for money in public 
procurement has taken on added urgency in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis 
(Dimitri, 2013). Among the effects of the ‘recession dividend’ is that public sector 
organisations are under pressure to find savings across their span of operations. 
Procurement is no exception. Therefore, any procurement initiative that is capable of 
delivering financial savings to public sector organisations, at the same time as 
fulfilling expectations around facilitating small suppliers, is more likely to be acted 
on. This gives the following hypothesis:     
H1b: Economic gains from facilitating SMEs in contract competitions has a positive 
impact on policy compliance 
2.9.2 Institutional context of public procurement 
Consistency among the goals and policies governing public procurement is predicted 
to affect compliance with SME-friendly policy. As well as facilitating SMEs, public 
buyers face pressures from government to optimise value for money, referred to 
above, and to abide by national and international procurement laws. These demands 
are not necessarily consistent and adherence to one can, in some cases, make 
adherence to one or more others difficult. Value for money pursued through 
exploiting economies of scale de facto excludes SME involvement in public 
contracting (Loader, 2011; Morand, 2003; Smith and Hobbs, 2001). Regulatory rules 
predicated on the primacy of open competition, as is the situation in the EU, prevent 
public buyers from privileging SME suppliers over larger firms (Fee, 2002). This 
does not mean that value for money, regulatory compliance and facilitating SMEs 
are mutually exclusive. In-depth case studies by Erridge (2007) and Erridge and 
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Hennigan (2012) confirm that public contracts can be leveraged in support of socio-
economic goals without compromising value for money or legal obligations. The 
kernel of the matter is whether public buyers believe that reconciling these goals is 
practicable given their particular circumstances. In the absence of perceived 
conflicts, compliance with SME-friendly procurement is more likely to be 
forthcoming. The opposite is predicted where public buyers perceive conflict 
between facilitating SMEs and the other two institutional pressures. This gives the 
following hypothesis:    
 
H2a: Perceived consistency between SME-friendly policy, value for money and EU 
procurement law has a positive impact on policy compliance 
Organisational dependence on the institutional rule setter in public procurement – the 
legislative and executive arms of the state - is also relevant in predicting compliance 
with SME-friendly policy. Organisational dependence is not uniform in the case of 
public sector organisations. This is because the public sector is not homogeneous but 
differs on the dimensions of autonomy, goals, mandate and financial independence 
(Bovaird and Loffler, 2009; Doyle, 2001). Public sector organisation categories such 
as semi-state corporations enjoy relative autonomy. Central government departments 
and local government authorities have less autonomy than the former and are subject 
to greater public and political accountability. Public sector organisations are also 
heterogeneous as to their goals and mandates: some operate along semi-commercial 
lines while others exist solely to provide social services. Relatedly, there are 
differences in the extent to which public sector organisations are dependent on 
government for their operating budget. Proximity to the state and resource 
dependence has direct implications for management of procurement. Close proximity 
and high resource dependence is likely to bring about policy compliance. Supportive 
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of this position, Blount and Hill (2015) returned partial support for the hypothesis 
that proximity to the institutional rule setter predicted the level of conformity to 
supplier diversity initiatives in the state of Ohio. Distance from the institutional rule 
setter and lower resource dependence mean that institutional pressures are felt less 
strongly (Burns and Wholey, 1991). The compulsion to be institutionally compliant 
reduces accordingly. This gives the following hypothesis:        
H2b: Organisational dependence on the state has a positive impact on policy 
compliance  
2.9.3 Content of SME-friendly policy 
The extent to which facilitating SMEs is compatible with existing organisational 
procurement practices is also anticipated to influence compliance behaviour. 
Legislators have become increasingly proactive in promoting SMEs’ interests in 
public procurement (Loader, 2013). This reflects increased awareness of how public 
procurement can be leveraged in support of the SME competitiveness agenda. 
Political conceptions of the role of public procurement and whose interests it should 
serve do not necessarily reflect organisational realities (Gelderman, Semeijn, Bouma, 
2015; Matthews, 2005). For some public sector organisations there is a prima facie 
fit between facilitating the broadest participation of firms in contract competitions, 
particularly SMEs, and their own procurement policies and corporate goals. In the 
case of local government authorities, for example, encouraging SMEs to compete for 
business opportunities is coincident with their mandate to foster economic 
development at the local-regional level and to support social cohesion (Murray, 
1999, 2001b). Procurement staff will take their behavioural cues from these 
embedded values and company policies (Hawkins, Gravier and Powley, 2011). For 
other types of public sector organisations, such as those with a quasi-commercial 
focus, the inclusion of small and atypical suppliers in contract competitions is not as 
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evidently compatible with their remit and objectives (Pickernell et al., 2011). 
Facilitating SMEs may even confound established purchasing strategies and business 
prerogatives; for example, where the emphasis is on rationalising the supply base 
and maximising cost savings through aggregating procurement spend (Loader, 
2010). This gives the following hypothesis:      
H3a: The compatibility of SME-friendly policy with the existing procurement goals 
of the organisation has a positive impact on policy compliance  
As well as compatibility with organisational goals, the impact that facilitating SMEs 
has on professional discretion is expected to affect policy compliance. SME-friendly 
policy represents a concerted attempted on the part of the state to change 
procurement behaviour (Procurement Innovation Group, 2009). It rules in practices 
designed to make it easier for small firms to identify, access and compete for public 
sector contracts and rules out practices believed to inhibit SME participation. SME-
friendly policy is about making sure that a standard set of best practices in tendering 
is adhered to across the public sector. It is a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy and its effects 
are likely to be experienced differently across the public sector. To the extent that it 
is compatible with the existing work practices and goals of a public buyer, it is less 
likely to be interpreted as a constraint. Some might even see it as providing positive 
guidance over how to navigate the marketplace, which is the whole point of 
institutions (Mantzavinos, 2011). Compliance should be forthcoming as a result. 
Where SME-friendly policy jars with the established practices and goals of a public 
buyer, it is more likely to be viewed as a constraint on professional discretion. Under 
such circumstances public buyers are more likely to resist it. This gives the following 
hypothesis:       
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H3b: Constraints on professional discretion associated with SME-friendly policy 
have a negative impact on compliance 
2.9.4 Control mechanisms associated with SME-friendly policy 
SME-friendly policy constitutes a regulative force bearing on public buyers and their 
organisations. It is state sanctioned and carries the imprimatur of the legislature. 
Furthermore, it is codified and there is an explicit point of reference to guide 
behaviour and to subsequently assess compliance (see, for example, Department of 
Finance, 2010). The threat of sanctions or some form of official reprimand for non-
compliance is implied by it. Unlike EU Public Procurement Directives, SME-
friendly policy is not legally binding, however (Bovis, 1998; Kidalov and Snider, 
2011; McGovern, 2011). Elsewhere it has been shown that the perceived 
coerciveness of both organisational and national procurement policies fosters 
compliance. Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen (2010) reported that the severity of 
sanctions boosted compliance with EU Public Procurement Directives. Mwakibinga 
and Buvik (2013) found that sanctions and monitoring individually predicted 
compliance rates with national procurement rules. Enforcement action and increased 
penalties for transgressions were also identified by Sang and Mugambi (2014) as 
promoting procedurally correct buying practices. The evidence is suggestive of the 
coerciveness of procurement rules and policies leading to compliance, although non-
significant findings on the relationship between reward-sanction systems and the 
incidence of ‘maverick buying’ have also been returned (Karjalainen and von Raaij, 
2011). This gives the following hypothesis:         
H4a: Coerciveness of SME-friendly procurement has a positive impact on policy 
compliance 
Coercion is not the only mechanism through which SME-friendly procurement 
policy exerts its influence. The degree to which SME-friendly practices are 
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perceived to be diffused throughout the population of public buyers is also germane 
in accounting for compliance. There is a substantial literature showing that as 
practices across public sectors domains like the arts, education and healthcare 
become more prevalent, individuals and their organisations are more likely to adopt 
them where they have not already done so (Burns and Wholey, 1991; Di Maggio, 
1983; Meyer, Scott and Deal, 1983; Rowan, 1982; Scott et al., 2000; Sherer and Lee, 
2002; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Added to this body of work is evidence that 
mimetic behaviours are central to explaining the proliferation of sustainable 
purchasing practices across organisations (Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 2015). 
Mimetic behaviours are also applicable to explaining SME-friendly practices in 
public procurement. Where public buyers perceive that the majority of their peers are 
implementing these practices, it is anticipated that they will take this as their cue to 
exhibit similar-type behaviours. This can happen even where the instrumental or 
technical-efficiency grounds for doing so are not altogether obvious. Conversely, a 
perception that SME-friendly procurement practices are not widely diffused, and 
hence not part of the established institutional rules of the game, is assumed to have 
the opposite effect. This gives the following hypothesis:         
H4b: The perceived diffusion of SME-friendly procurement practices has a positive 
impact on policy compliance  
2.9.5 Moderating effects and SME-friendly policy compliance 
The effect of institutional pressures on procurement practices and behaviours can be 
moderated by organisation variables (Hoejmose, Grosvold and Millington, 2013; 
Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 2015; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2013). Consideration is 
given here to three such moderating effects in explaining policy compliance. The 
first is between social legitimacy and procurement experience. It is reasoned that the 
legitimacy connotations of being seen to facilitate SMEs increase with the number of 
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years spent working in procurement. Arguably, safeguarding professional reputation 
and maintaining a sense of social legitimacy has greater salience for individuals with 
a longer tenure in public purchasing. Having built their reputation, experienced 
public buyers stand to lose more from evading institutional standards. The 
expectations from organisational stakeholders that experienced public buyers will be 
able and willing to exhibit institutional compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy will also be higher. Social legitimacy is less salient in the case of individuals 
who are in the formative stages of their public service careers. They will still be in 
the process of establishing their profile and credentials as public buyers. Their 
visibility to organisational stakeholders will not be as great as their more experienced 
counterparts, which comes with a concomitant reduction in expectations surrounding 
them. Early stage public buyers are also likely to be more concerned with 
augmenting their knowledge and skillset in purchasing. This gives the following 
hypothesis:  
H5a: Procurement experience positively moderates the relationship between the 
social legitimacy attached to facilitating SMEs in contract competitions and policy 
compliance 
The second moderating effect is between the perceived diffusion of SME-friendly 
practices and procurement involvement. The contention is that the effect of peer 
behaviour on policy compliance is amplified when individuals spend most or all of 
their time on procurement-related activity. Full-time procurement professionals or 
those for whom procurement constitutes a significant part of their role are more 
likely to be aware of, and have a vested interest in conforming to, industry trends. 
They will also be more sensitive to the behaviours and initiatives of other public 
buyers, including what they are doing to accommodate SMEs. Where these other 
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public buyers are well regarded and held in high professional esteem, their actions 
are more likely to be copied and replicated by their peers. Di Maggio (1983) used 
this same logic in linking the professional activism of arts administrators to their 
knowledge of industry developments and appreciation of how their contemporaries 
were positioning themselves. By contrast, individuals for whom procurement is 
ancillary to their main work role – a school principal, for example – will be less 
attuned to procurement trends, less aware of what others around them are doing, and 
have less of a professional interest in copying their behaviour. As such, they will be 
less susceptible to mimetic forces driving SME-friendly procurement. This gives the 
following hypothesis:                 
H5b: Procurement involvement positively moderates the relationship between the 
perceived diffusion of SME-friendly practices and policy compliance  
 
The third moderating effect is between the coerciveness of SME-friendly policy and 
organisation size. Within institutional scholarship attention is paid to organisation 
size and its role in conditioning responses to regulatory pressures. One perspective is 
that because larger organisations have greater public exposure they are under more 
pressure to conform to the expectations of the institutional rule setters (Greening and 
Gray, 1994; Scott, 2008b). An alternative perspective is that larger organisations are 
capable of buffering their internal operations, including procurement practices, from 
external control influences. Blount and Hill (2015) revealed that organisation size, 
measured in terms of the available budget, had a negative effect on compliance with 
an executive order for public agencies to award more contracts to minority business 
enterprises. Outside the procurement domain, Sherer and Lee (2002) found that the 
size of legal firms was also negatively related to institutional conformance on the 
question of adopting certain human resource management practices. Large 
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corporations are even known to bend institutional standards and norms to suit their 
own strategic interests (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby, Greenwood, and 
Cooper, 2007). For this study, the latter interpretation suggests that the large size and 
relative power of some public sector organisations will dampen the coercive effect of 
SME-friendly procurement policy. Smaller public sector organisations will be less 
able to insulate their operations from the demands of institutional environment. 
Hence, a more linear relationship is expected between coercion and policy 
compliance in their case. This gives the following hypothesis:              
H5c: Organisation size negatively moderates the relationship between the 
coerciveness of SME-friendly procurement and policy compliance 
2.10 Conclusion 
Theories help us to explain and predict our social phenomena of interest. The 
phenomenon of interest in this study is compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy and the theory selected to shed light on it is institutional theory. Institutional 
theory has much to say on the way in which policy pressures impact organisational 
practices, and the conditions under which policy is more or less likely to be complied 
with. Surprisingly, it has yet to be empirically tested in research on SME-friendly 
procurement policy. Its use here is novel and injects greater scientific rigour and 
intellectual depth to the SME-public procurement debate.  An institutionally-derived 
framework put forward by Oliver (1991) is employed to explain and predict 
compliance with SME-friendly policy. It understands institutional compliance to be a 
function of four major factors: the rationale for compliance with SME-friendly 
policy; the institutional context of public procurement; the content of SME-friendly 
policy; and the control mechanisms associated with it. These factors are brought 
together in a predictive model of SME-friendly policy compliance. A priori, the 
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model is expected to have significant explanatory and predictive value. The next 
chapter makes explicit the realist philosophical assumptions underpinning the model, 
the survey method used to conduct the study, and the operationalisation and 
measurement of all the variables under consideration.    
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Fig. 7 Predictive model of institutional compliance  
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Chapter 3:  
Methodology 
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3.0 Overview of chapter three 
This chapter sets out the methodological basis of the study. It is divided into two 
main parts. The first, covered in sections 3.1-3.4 inclusive, deals with questions on 
the philosophy of science and what they mean for investigating policy compliance. 
The predictive model put forward in chapter two implies that the study is 
philosophically positivist. It is hypothetico-deductive in form and presumes that 
causative effects can be observed in the social world. Elucidation on the 
philosophical precepts of the study is still required, however. The chapter begins in 
section 3.1 with a discussion on the need for philosophical awareness in social 
inquiry. Following on, section 3.2 provides an overview of the divergent 
philosophical perspectives available to researchers. The degree to which any 
philosophical perspective should dictate social inquiry is queried in section 3.3. One 
school of thought argues that philosophical first principles should strictly determine 
research practice. Another school advocates an agnostic take on the role of 
philosophy in social inquiry. Section 3.4 then maps out the critical realist 
philosophical assumptions made in this study and their implications for investigating 
SME-friendly policy compliance.  
 
The second part of the chapter concentrates on the design and implementation of the 
primary research phase of the study (sections 3.5–3.17). The research objectives and 
the questions that flow from it are articulated first in section 3.5. In section 3.6 the 
focus is on the survey method, which was used to gather data for the predictive 
model. The strengths and weaknesses associated with the survey method are 
enumerated. So too are the various modes through which surveys can be conducted. 
Justification is given for why the self-administered questionnaire was most 
appropriate for this study. The practicalities of using questionnaires in social inquiry 
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are grappled with in section 3.7. Particular attention is paid to best practice 
questionnaire design and how it was applied in this study. Leading on, section 3.8 
describes the steps that were taken to underscore the reliability and validity of the 
questionnaire instrument, including guarding against social desirability bias. Having 
dealt with questionnaire design issues, the chapter proceeds to the data collection 
phase. Information is given in section 3.9 on why public buyers were selected as 
survey respondents and how this population was accessed. Aspects around survey 
implementation are dealt with in section 3.10. E-surveying was used, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of this approach are listed.    
Ireland served as the setting for the study. The suitability of Ireland as a research 
context, including major trends and events that have shaped public procurement in 
recent years, is discussed in section 3.11. The next two sections deal with the 
measurement of policy compliance, which is the dependent variable in the predictive 
model. Section 3.12 explains how an index was specially created to measure 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. Section 3.13 then clarifies the 
weighting system employed to compute compliance scores. The two sections after 
this deal with the independent and control variables used to predict policy 
compliance Section 3.14 describes how the eight institutional factors in the model 
were operationalised and measured. Section 3.15 then identifies the seven control 
variables used in the model and explains how these were operationalised and 
measured. Preliminary analysis of the survey data is undertaken in section 3.16. 
Covered here is the survey response rate as well as a profile of the respondents. The 
penultimate section 3.17 looks at respondent representativeness. Using the 
extrapolation technique, it is shown that respondents are representative of the public 
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buyer population in Ireland. The main points of the methodology chapter are 
summarised in section 3.18.    
3.1 Philosophical awareness  
Over three decades ago Morgan and Smircich (1980) made the prosaic point that 
social inquiry of any form embodies assumptions over the nature of reality 
(ontology), the nature of the relationship between the inquirer and reality 
(epistemology), and how the inquirer can and should go about discovering 
knowledge (methodology). Their highlighting of the ontological, epistemological 
and methodological dimensions of social inquiry was a reaction to the predominance 
of ‘abstracted modes of empiricism based on both quantitative and qualitative 
methods’ (1980:491). It was also a salutary reminder that the philosophical 
orientations of the individual researcher generate particular forms of knowledge, not 
the methods themselves. In the intervening years many other scholars have reiterated 
the need for researchers to be cognisant of the philosophical assumptions on which 
their inquiries are based (Astley, 1985; Cunliffe, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; 
Henwood and Pidgeon, 1996). The common thread in the various arguments made is 
that the gathering, analysis and interpretation of data are inextricably linked to our 
understanding of what constitutes legitimate inquiry and warrantable knowledge. 
Social inquiry methods, as Buchanan and Bryman (2007:497) noted, are never 
‘neutral techniques for bringing reality into focus’. As has been illustrated by 
Kirkwood and Campbell-Hunt (2007) and Gioia, Donnellon and Sims (1989), 
phenomena can be rendered in very different ways depending on the philosophical 
vantage point of the researcher.   
The ends which we see social inquiry serving are also products of our underlying 
philosophical assumptions. That is to state that the purpose of inquiry is 
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philosophically implied (Guba, 1990; Sarantakos, 1993; Slife, and Williams, 1995). 
Those for whom social inquiry is akin to natural science prioritise the explanatory 
and predictive function of research. Their social phenomena of interest are to be 
causally explained, predicted and controlled through experimental design in much 
the same way as scientists study the natural and physical environment. Alternatives 
to this scientific approach understand the purpose of social inquiry in markedly 
different terms. Among these, the interpretivist perspective focuses on eliciting the 
meanings that individuals and groups ascribe to events and objects (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003). As far as they are concerned, prediction and control are not 
applicable to social inquiry. The stance of critical theorists, which include Marxists 
and feminists, is different again. They understand social inquiry as a politically-
oriented process to enlighten, empower and ultimately emancipate subjugated groups 
(Fay, 1996). Social inquiry can mean very different things and be put to very 
different uses depending on the starting premises of the researcher. The next section 
overviews the main philosophical perspectives and their implications for social 
inquiry.  
3.2 Competing philosophical perspectives 
Questions on the nature of reality, our relationship to reality and how we can make 
claims about it have been largely settled in the physical sciences. The same cannot 
be said of the social sciences. Whether the study of social phenomena is amenable to 
scientific principles has long been debated and there is no agreement on even the 
most fundamental of philosophical questions (Ryan, 1981). Morgan (1980) identified 
four philosophical positions in organisation science based on objectivist or 
subjectivist ideas of knowledge and whether research has a change or stability logic. 
These included a functionalist or standard scientific worldview, an interpretivist 
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perspective, and radical humanist and structuralist critiques aimed at transforming 
society. Opinion is divided as to the effect of multiple philosophical perspectives for 
social inquiry. For some, philosophical pluralism has led to less complacency over 
the use of the standard model of science and has stimulated innovation in research 
methods (Buchanan and Bryman 2007; Eisner, 1990; Popkewitz, 1990). Others see it 
as symptomatic of an unhealthy pre-occupation with philosophy (Hammersley, 
2011), which begets intellectual provincialism (Gioia and Pitre, 1990) and stokes 
‘methodology wars’ (Bredo, 2009). The sections below set out the main 
philosophical perspectives and their tenets. Section 3.2.1 focuses on the positivist 
strand of philosophical thought. Anti-positivism is described in section 3.2.2. Section 
3.2.3 engages with critical realism, a revised form of positivism which is widely 
adhered to in contemporary scientific inquiry.     
3.2.1 Positivism 
Historically, social science took as its philosophical reference point the principles of 
empiricism set down in the natural sciences (for a full history see Baert, 2005 or 
Outhwaite, 1987). This led social scientists to assume the existence of an external 
reality, albeit ‘incarnate in the practices and products of its members’ (Manicas, 
1987:272), which could be fully apprehended by the inquirer through the use of 
controlled experiments. In philosophical terms the study of society was envisaged as 
both realist and objectivist. It was also positivist to the extent that scientific method 
was understood as the sole source of knowledge. Developments within the natural 
sciences throughout the twentieth century challenged at a fundamental level the 
tenets of positivism. Discoveries around sub-atomic particles, for one, proved that 
reality was more than that which could be sensed or observed (Phillips, 1990). The 
belief that researchers were able to access reality in theory-neutral, value-neutral 
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ways also started to break down, and with it the assumption of pure objectivism 
(Miller, 1987; Mitroff, 1972). These discoveries and changes in beliefs undermined 
positivism’s status as the preeminent philosophical standard for scientific inquiry 
(Manicas, 1987). Nonetheless, its precepts continue to pervade thinking on scientific 
inquiry, including in the management science discipline (Behling, 1980).      
3.2.2 Anti-positivism 
Exposure of the limitations of positivism led social science down a number of routes 
in search of philosophical alternatives (Outhwaite, 1987). One of these routes 
advocated outright rejection of the standard scientific model – a paradigm that came 
to be known as interpretivism. Its origins are found in earlier anti-positivist thinking 
from the 19
th
 century, which eschewed natural sciences as the ideal for rational 
understanding and encouraged researchers to empathise with their social objects of 
investigation (Von Wright, 1996). From an interpretivist worldview there is no 
independently existing reality; rather, the world is mind-dependent and inseparable 
from the beliefs of social actors (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Lincoln, 1990). The 
only way that researchers can apprehend reality is by tapping into the meanings that 
they and other relevant social actors hold about it. Objectivity in social inquiry 
disappears under this perspective and all claims to knowledge become products of 
social conventions and group interests (Trigg, 1985). The implications of abandoning 
realism and objectivism as philosophical cornerstones are profound. Instead of 
explaining and predicting a single tangible reality, the rationale for inquiry turns on 
how we socially construct our own realities.    
3.2.3 A middle way - critical realism 
Not all the paradigmatic alternatives that emerged in the wake of positivism 
repudiated its core tenets. One of these, critical realism, grew out of a revision of the 
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core tenets of positivism (Baert, 2005; Benton and Craib, 2001; House, 1991; 
Phillips, 1990). As the name suggests, critical realism, like positivism, still adheres 
to a realist ontology in which a social world exists and acts independently of any 
beliefs held about it. Unlike its predecessor, critical realism does not claim that this 
reality can be perfectly apprehended. It concedes that many of the mechanisms that 
generate social phenomena are unobservable and cannot be experienced (Manicas, 
1987). Epistemologically, critical realists propose a modified form of objectivism. 
Even though human access to an independent reality is theory-laden and value-laden, 
discovering the truth of reality can still serve as a ‘regulative ideal’ (Phillips, 1990). 
Rejection of a foundation of knowledge is not taken to mean that valid knowledge 
claims and scientific description are impossible (Douglas, 2011; Trigg, 1985). 
Scientific belief for critical realists is neither the ultra-rationality of positivism nor 
the mob rule of anti-positivism (Manicas, 1987). Important from the perspective of 
this study, critical realism is said to have a high degree of application in the 
management field; affording researchers a philosophical foundation that is at once 
intellectually defensible and practical to use (Fleetwood, 2004).  
3.3 Questioning philosophical determinism 
As stated at the outset, social inquiry and the knowledge claims generated by it are 
predicated on a set of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. 
These assumptions influence what researchers see as data and how they collect, 
analyse and report on it (Cunliffe, 2010). Before this again, philosophical 
assumptions determine the actual purpose of social inquiry – prediction versus 
meaning, elicitation versus emancipation. Just how far researchers should allow 
philosophical first principles to shape practice is open to debate. Some take the view 
that ontological and epistemological commitments should strictly determine research 
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practice (Lincoln, 1990; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Morgan and Smircich, 1980; 
Smith, 1983; Smith and Heshusius, 1986). This philosophical determinism view is 
set out in section 3.3.1. For others a looser coupling of philosophy and research 
practice is advisable (Firestone, 1987, 1990; Henwood and Pidgeon, 1996; Howe, 
1985; Seale, 1999a, 1999b). Their position is set out in section 3.3.2 Following on 
from the latter, section 3.3.3 raises a number of points relevant to the practicalities of 
doing research. While these do not detract from the desirability of philosophical 
awareness, they are a reminder that factors other than philosophical first principles 
having a bearing on how research is conducted.  
3.3.1 The case for philosophical determinism 
The position taken by some methodologists is that philosophical first principles are 
the starting point for any social inquiry. Advocates of this view include Guba (1990), 
Lincoln (1990), Lincoln and Guba (1985), Morgan and Smircich (1980), Smith 
(1983) and Smith and Heshusius (1986). Their contention is that each of the main 
philosophical perspectives implies a distinct conceptualisation of research, which has 
to be followed through in practice. In the first instance a researcher must situate 
themselves in one or other of the main philosophical traditions. After this, the 
researcher is obliged to carry out their inquiry in ways consistent with the principles 
of the chosen tradition. For those working within the positivist tradition, this entails 
conducting controlled research designs to discover empirical generalisations. In 
contrast, researchers adhering to an interpretivist perspective are supposed to use 
hermeneutic and dialectic techniques to uncover the meanings of their social objects 
of interest. What is critical is that there is a consistent thread running from the 
ontological position, through to the epistemological commitment, on to the 
methodology, and even the criteria for judging the credibility of knowledge claims. 
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Smith and Heshusius (1986:10) sum up the philosophical determinism position 
through their assertion that ‘what works depends on the kind of work one wants 
inquiry to do, which in turn depends on the paradigm within which one is working’. 
3.3.2 The case against philosophical determinism 
The appropriateness of using philosophical first principles as the starting point for 
research is questioned by other methodologists. Seale (1999a, 1999b) voiced concern 
about the over-determination of research practices by philosophical schemes, arguing 
that philosophical positions should not be ignored, but nor should they be treated as 
dogmas whose postulates must always be acted out in practice. As he stated, ‘intense 
methodological awareness, if engaged in too seriously, can create anxieties that 
hinder practice, but if taken in small doses can help to guard against more obvious 
errors’ (1999b:475). Bredo (2009), Firestone (1987, 1990), Henwood and Pidgeon 
(1996), Howe (1985, 1988) and Ramsay (2007) have expressed similar reservations 
over fixating on epistemology when selecting research methods. The latter author 
addressed his message directly to the field of supply chain management. Instead of 
philosophical assumptions strictly determining practice Howe (1988:13) and 
Firestone (1987, 1990) have both recommended that the former ought to be brought 
into ‘some reasonable state of equilibrium with methods’. What happens in research 
practice supports this less dogmatic understanding of philosophy in social inquiry as, 
for example, with interpretivists’ use of positivist criteria to defend the validity and 
reliability of their work (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982; Maxwell, 2002).   
3.3.3 Philosophical determinism and the practicalities of doing research  
The practicalities of doing research should not be forgotten when considering the 
role of philosophy in social inquiry. The prominent management academic Richard 
Daft (1983) postulated that limiting debate on how to generate new knowledge to a 
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choice of quantitative versus qualitative methodologies obscures the ‘craft of 
research’. His experience led him to believe that interesting findings are less the 
outcome of unthinking adherence to one philosophical paradigm or another and more 
the result of ‘experience and mastery of the attitude and frame of mind that make up 
the research craft’ (1983:544). Acknowledgement that research practice cannot 
always be ascribed to a single paradigm and is more of a serendipitous process than 
depicted in the literature is a theme that cuts across discussion of methodology in 
management science (Lundberg, 1976; Mintzberg, 1979). Precisely because of this it 
is argued that researchers should not feel under ‘obligation to fulfil philosophical 
schemes through research practice’ (Seale, 1999b:466). To make the resolution of 
philosophical problems a precondition of social inquiry is even believed to stifle the 
emergence of interesting findings. Hammersley (2011) surmised that researchers can 
end up treating philosophical debates as if they had direct repercussions for practice 
when they do not, dwelling needlessly on existential questions, and misrepresenting 
abstruse philosophical insights. 
Resource availability can be just as important as philosophical beliefs in determining 
research practice; and methodologies are often selected for pragmatic rather than 
paradigmatic reasons (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1996). Time availability, financial 
resources and securing access to research subjects often shape the contours of the 
inquiry process more so than rumination on the nature of reality and our access to it. 
The same can be said of researchers’ skillsets. A lack of statistical ability rather than 
a genuine commitment to an interpretivist worldview might lead researchers to 
gravitate towards qualitative modes of inquiry that unearth meanings and feelings. 
The context in which a research project is conceived can also affect what happens in 
practice. Buchanan and Bryman (2007), for instance, identified the possibility of 
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organisational, political, historical and personal factors impacting on research 
practices. For the same authors, these factors are not impediments to social inquiry 
so much as naturally occurring influences, and should be accepted on this basis. The 
implication is that in addition to ontological and epistemological commitments, 
social inquiry is dictated by individual, organisational and contextual circumstances. 
Inquiries guided strictly by philosophical first principles are unlikely to be either 
workable or even optimal in terms of generating interesting findings about our 
phenomena of interest.     
3.4 Critical realism  
Philosophical awareness has been the defining theme of this chapter so far: 
awareness in the sense that all research is philosophically grounded; awareness of the 
opposing philosophical schools of thought; and awareness that a doctrinaire 
approach is best avoided when conducting social inquiry. These themes provide a 
lead-in to discussing the critical realist basis of this study. As referred to in section 
3.2.3, critical realism stands apart from pure positivism and relativism (Baert, 2005; 
Benton and Craib, 2001; Bernstein, 1983; Garrison, 1986; House, 1991; Phillips, 
1990). It is realist in ontology, aims for objectivism and recognises fixed research 
design as central to the process of knowledge discovery. It also qualifies these 
precepts in important ways: reality is more than what humans can observe or sense, 
and knowledge claims are mediated through pre-existing theories, concepts and 
values. Critical realism adds up to a ‘balanced and eclectic scepticism’ that treads a 
path between the naïve realism of positivists and the anchorless relativism that 
defines anti-positivism (Webb, 1995:2). It is, as Bernstein (1983:230) put it, cut 
through with an element of ‘practical rationality’. Sections 3.4.1-3.4.8 examine the 
ontological, epistemological, methodology and criteria foundations of critical realism 
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and what they mean for investigating compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy (see Table 10, pg. 151). Throughout the same sections reference is made to 
what this study would have looked like had an interpretivist perspective been taken 
(see Table 11, pg. 153).    
3.4.1 Realist ontology 
Perspectives on the nature of reality in social inquiry can be split into realist and 
relativist camps (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Critical realism falls within the 
former. For critical realists, reality exists and acts independently of any beliefs held 
about it. The alternative is a relativist stance wherein reality has no existence save 
that which individuals or groups mentally construct of it. Its realist ontology 
notwithstanding, critical realism is distinct from positivism in its original form. 
While the latter delimits reality to entities that are manifested in experience 
(Kolakowski, 1996), critical realism accepts that many of the theoretical concepts of 
science have meanings that go beyond sense impression (Phillips, 1990). There is, as 
Hanson (1958) succinctly said, more to reality than meets the eyeball. Reality is 
understood by critical realists to be stratified, comprising phenomena which we can 
know and empirically measure and, beneath these, causal mechanisms that are more 
difficult to observe (Baert, 2005; House, 1991). The events we observe, experience 
and measure – the objects of theory – do not fully reflect the complexity of the 
underlying mechanisms that cause these events (Manicas, 1987; Von Hayek, 1979). 
Human apprehension of social reality is imperfect as a result.  
3.4.2 Realist ontology and policy compliance 
Taking a critical realist stance has a number of implications for investigating SME-
friendly procurement policy. Fundamentally, it means that the public procurement 
system, the policies that govern it and the behaviours of its main actors all exist as 
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part of a single, independent reality. They sit outside any beliefs that the researcher 
holds about them. This study does not create nor alter the reality of public 
procurement; rather, the reality of public procurement exists outside the study. 
Specifically in relation to the objectives of this study, it means that the object of 
inquiry – compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy – is knowable and can 
be empirically observed and measured. At the same time it is acknowledged that the 
causative processes associated with policy compliance are unlikely to be definitively 
explicated. An anti-realist or interpretivist stance asserts the opposite. SME-friendly 
procurement policy is not part of an independent reality and is not discoverable on 
such terms. Instead, the subjective beliefs held by the relevant stakeholders and 
actors constitute SME-friendly procurement. Any account based on these beliefs is 
only one among an infinite number of possible interpretations.  
3.4.3 Modified objectivist epistemology 
The epistemological stance of critical realism is neither wholly objectivist nor 
subjectivist (Benton and Craib, 2001; Guba, 1990; Hammersley, 1992; Phillips, 
1990; Webb, 1995). Unlike the pure objectivism of the positivist school, critical 
realism rejects the idea that access to a foundation of knowledge is ever possible. 
From a critical realist perspective all claims to knowledge are theory-laden and 
value-laden. Whereas subjectivists see this admission as grounds for abandoning any 
possibility of discovering truths, critical realists do not. Discovering truths about our 
social world is still valued as a ‘regulative ideal’ (Phillips, 1990) which should shape 
one’s ‘attitude of mind’ when it comes to social inquiry (Seale, 1999a). As Trigg 
(1985) and Webb (1995) have each argued, conceding that pre-existing concepts and 
theories mediate any claims we can make about our social realities does not preclude 
knowledge claims that are largely true from emerging. So while social inquiry for 
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Astley (1985:497) is a ‘fundamentally subjective enterprise’, critical realists demur 
from this view and subscribe to a qualified form of objective truth. Various labels 
have been used to denote this epistemological stance, including ‘modified 
objectivism’ (Guba, 1990) and ‘epistemological conservatism’ (Garrison, 1986). 
 
Integral to the epistemology of critical realism is acceptance that values and interests 
influence knowledge discovery. Values are said to make up the ‘fabric of social 
research’ and can be defended like any other kind of judgement (Howe, 1985:12). 
Even in the natural sciences normative judgements, moral, religious and political 
considerations impinge on inquiries (Barber, 1961; Mitroff, 1972). By some 
accounts values and interests are indispensable to the research process and act as 
resources for scientific thinking (Benton and Craib, 2001). Mitroff (1972) came to 
this conclusion after conducting interviews with scientists. He found that their 
motivation for discovering new knowledge was spurred on by their own hunches, 
preferences and personal interests. Popkewitz (1990:62) did likewise. For him, ‘the 
common sense approach that defines values as distinct and separable from the 
procedural concerns of science has its own poverty by decontextualizing the way 
choices are made and the priorities formed’. The very act of choosing one line of 
inquiry over another is itself a value-based decision; a reflection of what the 
researcher believes to be worth pursuing (Douglas, 2011; Trigg, 1985). For critical 
realists, values are inherent to the research process. What is important is maintaining 
the distinction between a researcher’s own normative judgements and scientific 
description (Douglas, 2011).    
 
The modified objectivism of critical realism has another important implication for 
social inquiry. Acceptance that theories and values mediate how we discover 
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knowledge means that reality is represented rather than reproduced (Hammersley, 
1992). Representation of reality comes through ‘specific truth-producing social 
practices’ (Manicas, 1987:264). Arriving at absolute certainty that knowledge 
corresponds to an independent reality is never possible, but producing knowledge 
claims whose validity we are reasonably confident of is possible (Hammersley, 
1992). Just because our knowledge claims never carry absolute certainty does not 
mean that we cannot adjudicate between rival claims or achieve a degree of 
consensus over which claims appear to be most trustworthy (Miles and Huberman, 
1984; Phillips, 1990; Webb, 1995). Not every claim to knowledge is valid and some 
claims to knowledge are more plausible than others. In the final analysis, ‘knowledge 
is generated not by fiat in the minds of individuals but through a rigorous 
examination of ideas in public communication’ (Astley, 1985:499).  
3.4.4 Modified objectivist epistemology and policy compliance 
If, as critical realists contend, there is no foundation of knowledge that we can 
access, then there is no way of knowing with certainty if the reality of policy 
compliance has been captured. How we know it is mediated through pre-existing 
theoretical concepts and is represented and reported as such. This representation is 
intended to be authentic and accurate, so that compliance as represented 
approximates to its true reality. Critical realists’ acceptance that some claims to 
knowledge are more valid than others makes accurate representation an imperative. 
A subjectivist approach produces a markedly different depiction of policy 
compliance, mainly because there is no external reality of SME-friendly 
procurement to be apprehended and represented in the first place. The only way to 
know it is to access the meanings and beliefs that procurement actors hold about it. 
The reality of SME-friendly procurement is whatever they believe it to be. While 
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true to the holder of the beliefs, a subjectivist account of SME-friendly procurement 
could never claim privilege over any other account. It would simply be one among 
multiple mental constructions of what SME-friendly procurement is and how it 
should be understood.    
3.4.5 Non-experimental fixed design methodology 
As with ontology and epistemology, the methodology associated with critical realism 
represents a refinement of that advocated by the original positivists. According with 
the latter, a fixed research design is still held as the primary strategy for discovering 
knowledge and the emphasis is still on measuring and quantifying phenomena of 
interest, and then testing cause and effect relationships (Guba, 1990). Where critical 
realist methodology diverges from original positivism is in its acceptance that the 
nature of social inquiry precludes the use of experimental research design. This is 
because the social objects of our investigation cannot be manipulated by the 
researcher, for the most part. As well, for critical realists the process of knowledge 
discovery is fallible and fixed research designs are no guarantee that an accurate 
representation of reality will be produced (Benton and Craib, 2001). Critical realists 
also admits to the possibility that pragmatic as well as paradigmatic factors – access 
to research subjects, for example – can determine methodological strategies (Daft, 
1983; Firestone, 1987; Seale, 1999a). In effect, this opens the way for other 
methodological strategies to be used as substitutes for, or in conjunction with, a fixed 
research design. 
3.4.6 Non-experimental fixed design methodology and policy compliance 
The critical realist methodological stance is reflected in how SME-friendly 
procurement policy is investigated in this study. A theoretically-informed model is 
devised to test the conditions under which policy compliance is more or less likely to 
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come about. Data to populate the model is systematically gathered from a national 
population of public buyers, thus allowing the key concepts to be measured and 
quantified (see section 3.9). Inferential statistical techniques are then used to test the 
effects of institutional pressures on policy compliance. As part of this process a 
number of variables are controlled for. The use of a fixed research design was 
determined not only by realist philosophical principles, but also by practical 
considerations; something which critical realists are comfortable with. Crucial here 
was securing access to a national database of public buyers, which made the survey 
method possible. Reliance on non-realist methodological approaches would have 
precluded measuring and predicting policy compliance. The emphasis would have 
been on eliciting the meanings that actors ascribed to their procurement practices 
using the techniques of hermeneutics and dialectics (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). 
Discovering ‘objective truth’ is irrelevant under this perspective.   
3.4.7 Criteria 
Using criteria to assess and demonstrate the credibility of research output is expected 
of researchers operating from a realist position (Cresswell and Miller, 2000; Healy 
and Perry, 2000; Smith, 1990). Because truth is a ‘regulative ideal’ there must be 
some system or set of criteria that can be used to support the veracity of knowledge 
claims and gain the confidence and approval of the research community (Firestone, 
1990; Phillips, 1990; Webb, 1995). Researchers need to be able to persuade peers not 
only that their findings are ‘worth paying attention to, worth taking account of’ 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985:290; also, Lincoln and Guba, 2002) but also that they are 
not unreasonable and correspond to reality (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982; Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). There is no pre-specified set of criteria in the critical realist 
tradition, although validity, reliability and objectivity act as benchmarks (Cook and 
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Campbell, 1979; Marshall, 1990). The recommendation is for researchers to be 
guided by what is most effective and practical given the circumstances of the inquiry 
(Seale, 1999a). Cognisance should also be taken of the norms and protocols 
established around the use of criteria in the particular subject domain (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). The academic community of interest also has a key role to play as 
arbiter of what counts as credible, objective knowledge (Douglas, 2011).  
3.4.8 Criteria and policy compliance 
The critical realist approach to appraising research output has the following 
implications for this study. First and foremost, it imposes a requirement for criteria 
capable of demonstrating that the empirical component is of acceptable academic 
standard and that any claims made from it are credible and scientifically robust. This 
relates back to the realist contention that some claims to knowledge are more valid 
than others, and so there must be criteria for separating valid from invalid claims. An 
anti-realist philosophical perspective places no such obligation on the researcher as 
all knowledge claims are deemed to be equally valid and legitimate. The two broad 
criteria appealed to in this study are truth and relevance. Their use here is consistent 
with advice offered by Hammersley (1992:68) that ‘research must not only produce 
findings that seem likely to be true, these findings must also be of human relevance’. 
Truth as a criterion is understood by reference to the positivist standards of reliability 
and validity (see section 3.8). The relevance criterion concerns the contribution of 
the findings to the current body of scholarship on SME-friendly procurement, as well 
as their import for policy making and practice. These are discussed in detail in 
chapter five.     
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Philosophical dimensions The postulates of critical realism  What critical realism means for this study 
Ontology 
What is the nature of 
reality? 
 
 
Critical realism 
An independent reality exists  
 
 
 
 
Reality is stratified 
 
 
 
 
Reality can be apprehended but not 
everything can be observed or sensed by 
human faculties 
 
Natural laws and empirical 
generalisations govern reality 
 
 
Actions taken/not taken to make public procurement more SME-
friendly form part of an independent reality. The researcher had no part 
in constructing this reality. It exists separate from any beliefs held 
about it and from the process of inquiry 
 
The reality of SME-friendly procurement can be understood at a 
number of levels: as an event that is discernible; as an event that can be 
empirically captured; and as a complex series of mechanisms that give 
it form and shape   
 
The precise mechanisms that lead to SME-friendly procurement are 
likely to lie beyond full explication  
 
 
The workings of the public procurement system and the behaviours of 
public buyers can be understood in terms of empirical generalisations 
or regularities 
 
Epistemology 
What is the nature of the 
relationship between the 
knower and the known? 
 
 
Modified objectivism 
There is no foundation of knowledge 
that we can access 
 
Our knowledge of reality is always 
mediated through pre-existing concepts, 
theories and interests  
 
It is possible to make claims to 
knowledge which are representative of 
reality. The aim is to produce accounts 
No definitive account of SME-friendly procurement is ever possible 
 
 
No account of SME-friendly procurement is concept-neutral or theory-
neutral 
 
 
The inquiry endeavours to represent the reality of SME-friendly 
procurement  
 
Table 10 Implications of a critical realist stance 
152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that correspond to reality    
 
Some claims to knowledge are more 
valid/true than others 
 
 
 
The aim of the inquiry is to produce credible and defensible findings 
on compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy 
 
Methodology 
How should the inquirer go 
about discovering 
knowledge? 
 
 
Modified experimentalism 
Methodology should take the form of 
modified experimentalism  
 
 
 
 
Methodological selection can be based 
on pragmatic considerations (as well as 
paradigmatic considerations) 
 
Investigating policy compliance is conducted using a fixed research 
design. Firstly, a hypothetico-deductive model for policy compliance is 
constructed. Secondly, data is systematically gathered from a 
population of public buyers. The model is then tested using inferential 
statistical procedures 
 
The choice of a survey-based approach (as part of a fixed research 
design) was made possible by having access to a database of public 
buyers  
Criteria 
What criteria should be 
used to assess the quality of 
research output? 
 
 
Blended 
Establishing the credibility of research 
findings is required 
 
 
A paradigmatic blend of assessment 
criteria is permitted 
 
 
Two assessment criteria – truth and relevance – are used to underscore 
the credibility of the findings 
 
 
To demonstrate the truth of the findings the positivist standards of 
reliability and  validity are relied on 
Demonstrating relevance is by way of the empirical, theoretical and 
practitioner contributions of the findings  
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Table 11 Implications of an interpretivist stance 
Philosophical dimensions The postulates of interpretivism  What interpretivism would have meant for this study 
Ontology 
What is the nature of 
reality? 
 
 
 
Relativist 
There is no reality independent of the human 
mind; reality is only ever a mental construction 
 
 
 
 
Natural laws do not govern (social) reality  
 
 
 
The apprehension of reality is socially and 
experientially based 
 
Public procurement, policies governing public procurement 
and public buyers’ behaviours do not exist as part of an 
independent reality. Instead they are mentally constructed at 
individual/group level   
 
 
The workings of the public procurement system and the 
behaviours of public buyers cannot be reduced to natural laws 
and empirical generalisations  
 
Apprehension of public procurement comes through our own 
mental schemas. There is no external referent for 
apprehending public procurement  
Epistemology 
What is the nature of the 
relationship between the 
knower and the known? 
 
 
Subjectivist 
Reality has no meaning apart from what is held to 
be real by individuals/groups 
 
How we know our social world is entirely 
subjective 
 
Human knowledge is socially constructed 
 
 
 
 
No claim to knowledge is more privileged than 
any other; ‘truth’ is illusory  
 
The reality of SME-friendly public procurement is whatever 
individuals/groups hold it to be  
 
There are an infinite number of SME-friendly procurement 
realities 
 
Concepts and theories constitute our apprehension of SME-
friendly procurement (as opposed to mediating it)  
Everything that is known or can be known of SME-friendly 
procurement is the product of social forces  
 
No account of SME-friendly procurement is more valid/true 
than any other. Accounts of SME-friendly procurement are 
true only from the perspective of the individuals/groups 
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The inquirer has an active role in creating 
findings 
 
responsible for constructing them  
 
The construction of a particular reality of SME-friendly 
procurement is co-created by the inquirer 
 
Methodology 
How should the inquirer go 
about discovering 
knowledge? 
 
Hermeneutics-Dialectics 
Standard scientific methodology is inapplicable to 
investigating the social world 
 
 
To discover knowledge we need to tap into how 
individuals construct realities (hermeneutics) 
 
 
Individual constructions of a particular social 
phenomenon should be  compared and contrasted 
so that patterns or commonalities can be 
discerned (dialectics) 
The public procurement system, policies governing public 
procurement and public buyers’ behaviours cannot and 
should not be explicated using fixed research designs   
 
How public buyers and other stakeholders construct the 
reality of SME-friendly procurement should be the focus of 
the inquiry  
 
Constructions around the reality of SME-friendly 
procurement offered by public buyers and other stakeholders, 
including that of the inquirer, should be brought into some 
sort of dialogue   
Criteria 
What criteria should be 
used to assess the quality of 
research output? 
 
 
Not applicable 
Assessment criteria are not relevant to 
interpretivist inquiry as no account can claim to 
have privileged status over any other  
It is not necessary or even appropriate to demonstrate the 
credibility of the results using assessment criteria such as 
truth and relevance  
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3.5 Research objective 
Up to this point the chapter has attended to the philosophical dimension of the study. 
The emphasis now shifts to the primary research phase. Before delving into the 
mechanics of how the research was carried out it is important to be clear on the 
overarching objective of the study and the questions it seeks to answer (see Fig. 8). 
As claimed in the introduction and as detailed in chapter one, interest in SME-
friendly procurement policy has not been matched by evidence on its 
implementation. Responding to this gap, the research objective is to determine how 
SME-friendly policy is working out in practice. Research objectives lead to the 
specification of research questions (Hok, De Leeuw and Dillman, 2008; White, 
2009). Two research questions guide the study. The first is the extent to which SME-
friendly policy is being complied with - the descriptive part of the research. The 
second is the impact of the institutional environment on policy compliance – the 
explanatory part of the research. Underneath the second question are eleven 
hypothesised relationships between institutional factors and compliance behaviour 
(see section 2.9). Testing these hypotheses will go some way towards deciphering 
how the institutional environment affects compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy.  
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Fig. 8 Research topic, objective and questions 
 
3.6 Survey method 
The survey method was used in this study. Using the survey method is appropriate 
where the design of the study is fixed prior to data collection and where there is a 
reasonable level of conceptual understanding about the phenomenon of interest 
(Robson, 2002). In this study a model of SME-friendly policy compliance was 
devised prior to the data collection phase (see page 131). The model was derived 
from concepts associated with an institutional theory perspective on compliance. The 
survey method enabled the theoretically-informed model to be tested. The remainder 
of this section explores the survey method in greater detail. Section 3.6.1 explains 
the logic behind the survey method. Important here is how surveys conform to the 
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scientific model of social inquiry. The limitations of using the survey method for 
social inquiry are unpicked in section 3.6.2. Achieving scientific rigour and 
standardisation is said to come at the expense of unearthing the meanings and 
complexity of the social world. Section 3.6.3 assesses the various ways through 
which surveys can be executed, ranging from observation to self-administered 
questionnaires. Justification for preferring self-administered questionnaires is given. 
The fourth and final section tackles issues relating to the design of self-administered 
questionnaires.   
3.6.1 Characteristics of the survey method  
The survey method approximates to a scientific model for carrying out social inquiry 
(Babbie, 1973). All survey instruments are designed to measure some social object 
of interest in a standardised and methodical way (May, 1997; Sapsford, 2006). Their 
implementation must also be systematic and consistent. Ideally, other researchers 
should be able to replicate any given survey with the same measurement instrument 
and population sample. The analytical approach characterising survey-based research 
finds its parallel in the natural sciences (Babbie, 1973; De Vaus, 1991; Marsh, 1982). 
The aim is not only to describe what is going on in the social world but to explain 
why it is going on. In explaining social phenomena deductive reasoning is employed 
(Hall and Hall, 1996; May, 1997; Sapsford, 2006). A researcher will start with a 
general theory before deriving specific concepts from it. Relationships between these 
concepts are specified in a causal model. The same concepts are operationalised and 
tested using data gathered from the population of interest. Findings are generalisable 
provided the survey sample is representative of the population from which it is 
drawn. The defining characteristics of survey research are its standardised and 
logical form, its attempt to make causal inferences between variables, its ability to 
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generalise findings beyond its respondent sample, and its parsimonious approach to 
representing social phenomena of interest (Babbie, 1973).  
3.6.2 Limitations of survey method   
As with all research designs, the survey method is not without limitations. At a 
philosophical level surveys have been criticised for being incapable of explicating 
the meaningful aspects of social action and why people come to adopt particular 
values and behaviours (Hakim, 2000; May, 1997). Critics of the survey method 
argue that the purpose of social inquiry is not to explain behaviour but to understand 
it in all its complexity (Marsh, 1982). Relatedly, surveys are criticised because they 
divorce individual beliefs and actions from the context in which they occur (De 
Vaus, 1991). The idea that the survey method can lead to the discovery or 
verification of causal relationships is also challenged. It is said that survey evidence 
can corroborate a hypothesis by observing correlations but cannot definitively prove 
that one or more independent variables cause some outcome (Marsh, 1982; Robson, 
2002). In terms of the accuracy of surveying, doubts have been raised over the extent 
to which expressed opinions correspond to habitual behaviour (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001; Sapsford, 2006). As well, responses to surveys can be affected 
by temporal and environmental factors (Schwarz et al., 2008). Another problem is 
that respondents may not necessarily treat the research exercise seriously and can 
misunderstand what is being asked of them (Robson, 2002). These generic criticisms 
of the survey method are a reminder that quantifying and predicting compliance with 
SME-friendly procurement policies does come with caveats attached.  
3.6.3 Survey modes  
Surveys can take a number of formats. While synonymous with questionnaires, 
surveys can also encompass visual observation techniques, content analysis and the 
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systematic counting and coding of qualitative data (Moser and Kalton, 1985). The 
survey instrument used in this study took the form of a questionnaire. It was the only 
survey method capable of gathering the data needed to measure and predict 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. The other modes were either 
inapplicable (content analysis) or impractical (visual observation or population-wide 
interviewing) for the purposes of this study. Expanding on this, there was no media 
or documentary source that would have enabled satisfactory measurement of policy 
compliance and the objective and subjective factors that predict it. Surveying 
behaviour through observation would have been similarly problematic, requiring on-
going observation of public buyers in their work environment over a number of 
months. Quite apart from the difficulties of securing consent for such a research 
undertaking, the time and effort required would have been beyond the means of this 
study. Direct observation can also interfere with an individual’s habitual behaviour 
patterns, which could have resulted in a skewed depiction of policy compliance. The 
next section provides more detail on questionnaires, paying particular attention to the 
pros and cons of the self-administered type.  
3.6.4 Administering questionnaires 
Questionnaires can either be self-administered, or administered to respondents by a 
trained researcher face-to-face or by telephone (Andres, 2012; Czaja and Blair, 1996; 
Dillman, 2008). The questionnaire in this study was self-administered by public 
buyers. This choice was dictated by several factors. The first was available 
resources. The financial costs and labour demands of directly administering a 
questionnaire to a geographically dispersed population (or population sample) of 
public buyers would have been prohibitive. Resource constraints are, in most cases, 
the reason why researchers choose the self-administered option (De Leeuw, 2008; 
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Hall and Hall, 1996). The opportunity to disseminate the questionnaire electronically 
made the efficiency rationale for using the self-administered approach even stronger 
in this study (see section 3.10). The use of self-administered questionnaires also 
meant that respondents were afforded a degree of confidentiality and anonymity in 
responding. The less intrusive nature of self-administered questionnaires is believed 
to be conducive to reducing respondent bias in comparison to face-to-face or 
telephone surveying (Fowler, 1993). Self-administered questionnaires do have some 
weaknesses. Average response rates are lower than directly administered 
questionnaires (Bourque and Fielder, 1995; De Leeuw, 2008). Researchers have 
minimal oversight or control over how the questions are answered or by whom, 
which can have implications for the quality of data obtained (Fowler, 1993; Hall and 
Hall, 1996). Self-administered questionnaires are also unsuitable where researchers 
want to ask open ended questions (De Leeuw, 2008; Moser and Kalton, 1985). The 
next section discusses design issues around the questionnaire used in this study.        
3.7 Questionnaire design  
Two considerations should be foremost in the minds of researchers when designing a 
self-administered questionnaire. The first is the need to achieve an adequate response 
rate. It is imperative that sufficient numbers of individuals who receive the 
questionnaire feel able and willing to complete it. The reason for this is simple. Poor 
response rates increase the likelihood of non-response error (Dillman, 2007; Gomm, 
2008; Moser and Kalton, 1985). Non-response error occurs when statistical 
generalisations are made based on respondents who are not representative of the 
population from which they are drawn. As stated in section 3.6.1, the purpose of 
conducting a survey is to be able to make defensible generalisations. Having only a 
limited number of responses with which to test a model can also lead to low 
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predictive power and inaccurate size effect estimates (Frohlich, 2002). The second 
consideration is ensuring that survey measures are valid and reliable. Measures of 
dubious validity and reliability pose a ‘measurement error problem’ for researchers 
(Denscombe, 2002; Dillman, 2007). The scientific value of a study is compromised 
as a result. Primarily because of these two threats – non-response error and 
measurement error – it is advisable to dedicate time and forethought to questionnaire 
design aspects
19
. By doing so the probability of obtaining high quality data in 
sufficient quantity increases (Melnyk et al., 2012). Sections 3.7.1-3.7.2 delve into the 
major points of questionnaire design and their application in this study.    
3.7.1 Best practice in questionnaire design  
Clarity over what needs to be measured is the starting point for designing a 
questionnaire (Kane, 1991). Everything else flows from it – question content, 
question type and questionnaire length. In writing survey questions the following 
points are recommended (Andres, 2012; Bourque and Fielder, 1995; Converse and 
Presser, 1986; Czaja and Blair, 1996; Fink, 1995; Fowler and Cosenza, 2008). 
Firstly, the language used in the questionnaire should be kept simple. The concepts 
referred to in the questionnaire need to be commonly understood. Care is needed to 
avoid statements that are leading, jargon-laden, double-barrelled or ambiguous. The 
same principles apply to devising response categories. Each answer statement should 
be worded simply and precisely (Bourque and Fielder, 1995). Answers within a 
response set should be mutually exclusive and anticipate all likely responses (Fowler 
and Cosenza, 2008). How questions and response categories are phrased and 
presented have direct implications for both the reliability of the survey instrument 
and for the validity of the survey findings (see section 3.8). The layout of the 
                                                            
19 Population coverage error and sampling error can also threaten the integrity of a survey-
based study. They were not applicable in this study as the entire population of public buyers in 
Ireland was surveyed.   
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questionnaire also matters (Kane, 1991). It should be aesthetically pleasing, easy for 
respondents to navigate, have section demarcations and provide instructions for 
completion. The overriding goal is to develop a set of questions that every 
respondent will interpret in the same way, and be able and willing to answer 
(Dillman, 2007).    
 
Several other aspects of questionnaire design deserve mention. The number of 
questions included should be kept to a minimum. All the evidence points to 
questionnaire length as significantly and negatively related to final response rate 
(Deutskens et al., 2004; Dillman, Sinclair and Clark, 1993). If at all possible, 
respondents should be given the opportunity to fill out the questionnaire without 
having to disclose their identity. Again, the evidence indicates that anonymity 
increases willingness to respond (Jobber and O’Reilly, 1998; Michaelidou and Dibb, 
2006). In the questionnaire and accompanying correspondence an appeal to 
respondent goodwill and/or professional expertise is advisable (Dillman, 2007; 
Moser and Kalton, 1985). Targeted individuals need to be persuaded and motivated 
to participate. The rationale for the survey should also be explained to respondents 
and the entity behind it identified (Bourque and Fielder, 1995). When the 
questionnaire has been assembled in draft form, the next step is to pre-test it with 
selected academic experts and ‘cultural insiders’ i.e. individuals from the targeted 
population (Converse and Presser, 1986; Czaja and Blair, 1996; Dillman, 2007). Pre-
testing is a form of quality control. It enables researchers to gauge if their questions 
make sense, if the response categories are comprehensive enough and if the research 
topic is interesting to targeted respondents. Feedback received can then be used to 
revise and improve the draft questionnaire.  
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3.7.2 Questionnaire design in this study 
The best practice guidelines covered in section 3.7.1 were followed in designing the 
questionnaire for this study. The aim was to create a questionnaire that would 
achieve an adequate response rate and generate a reliable and valid dataset. The 
former is important to guard against non-response error while the latter reduces the 
likelihood of measurement error. A number of points are of note in this respect. To 
encourage response an appeal was made to respondents’ goodwill and professional 
insight. The introduction to the questionnaire stated that respondents’ experiences 
and opinions were needed to help policy makers and researchers better understand 
the workings of the public procurement system in Ireland. The questionnaire was 
also kept relatively short and was designed not to impinge on respondents’ time. Pre-
testing indicated that the survey would take no more than 15 minutes to complete
20
. 
Questions were kept brief and purposeful. Jargon and technical language was 
avoided. Only closed questions were used. Respondents answered each question by 
selecting from a pre-defined list of options. No typing was required to complete the 
questionnaire. All questions could be answered without respondents having to 
consult organisational literature. These steps were taken to undergird the reliability 
and validity of the measures. 
 
The questionnaire was designed, formatted and managed using SurveyMonkey, 
which is a dedicated survey software package (see Appendix B). Questions were 
grouped into coherent sections. Each section appeared as a new e-page. Respondents 
were able to observe their progress and get a sense of how many questions they had 
left to answer. There was no obligation on respondents to disclose any personal 
                                                            
20 Subsequent analysis of survey responses revealed that most respondents spent 10-15 
minutes completing it.   
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details or identify themselves or their organisation. Providing anonymity was crucial 
as the focus of the research was on compliance with government policies. The 
collaboration of Dublin City University (DCU) and the Office of Government 
Procurement (OGP) in conducting the survey was also highlighted with a view to 
enhancing the perceived credibility and authenticity of the survey. University 
involvement in survey research is suggestive of impartiality and scientific rigour 
(Jobber and O’Reilly, 1998; Sheehan, 2001) while the sponsorship of a government 
organisation signifies officialdom. Consistent with recent survey-based studies in the 
procurement field (Pemer et al., 2014), all questionnaire items were reviewed by a 
panel of academic scholars, public buyers and policy officials within the OGP (see 
Appendix C). Members of the panel individually scrutinised the proposed 
operationalisation and measurement of each variable. Following their 
recommendations some questions and response statements were re-phrased and a 
new control variable was added. By the time the final version of the questionnaire 
was distributed it had gone through a series of iterations.          
3.8 Effective survey measurement  
In survey-based research answers to questions are used as measures of the constructs 
researchers are investigating (Denscombe, 2002; Fowler, 1993, 1995; Fowler and 
Cosenza, 2008). The measure of a construct is only as good as the question on which 
it is based. For measures to be ‘good’ they need to be both reliable and valid. 
Reliability in the context of survey research refers to consistency. Specifically, it 
refers to ‘the extent to which a test would give consistent results if applied by 
different researchers more than once to the same people under standard conditions’ 
(Hall and Hall, 1996:44). Validity approximates to ideas around what is valid or true. 
For survey questions to be valid they should measure what the researcher intends 
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them to measure and not something else (Hall and Hall, 1996; Weller and Romney, 
1988). While validity has a number of dimensions to it, including content validity, 
construct validity and criterion validity, the common thread is the appropriateness of 
a measurement instrument for capturing the object of interest (Lavrakas, 2008). The 
survey literature suggests a number of techniques to strengthen the reliability and 
validity of survey questions. How these techniques were put into practice in this 
study is made clear in sections 3.8.1-3.8.4. 
3.8.1 Measurement reliability   
Fowler (1993) makes several recommendations for improving the reliability of 
survey questions. Firstly, it is essential that the questions put to respondents are 
identical in their form and content. Variation in what is asked or how it is asked can 
elicit different answers, which compromises the reliability of the survey. The use of 
a self-administered questionnaire in this study that was standard for all respondents 
obviated this threat to reliability. Secondly, it is necessary that all research 
participants interpret what is being asked of them in the same way. This is supported 
to the extent that survey questions are clearly worded and use concepts readily 
understood by the target population. The survey questions in this study were written 
in simple, concise English. They were purposeful and only referred to issues around 
procurement in a public sector context. Another aspect to upholding the reliability of 
survey questions according to Fowler (1993) is to standardise expectations for the 
type of acceptable response. That is, respondents should have the same perception of 
what counts as an adequate answer to any given question. The most effective means 
to achieve this is to furnish respondents with a predefined list of answers, which was 
the strategy employed here. All survey questions were closed, meaning respondents 
could only select their answer from a set list of options presented to them.       
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3.8.2 Measurement validity: objective measures  
Validity is a concept designating an ideal state that researchers should strive to 
achieve (Brinberg and McGrath, 1985; Campbell and Fiske, 1959). When using the 
survey method the challenge of establishing measurement validity varies by question 
type. Validation is relatively straightforward in the case of objective questions that 
relate to the observable and confirmable attributes of an individual or organisation 
(Sapsford, 2006). The validity of objective questions is supported by keeping them 
intelligible, ensuring that there is a reasonable probability that targeted respondents 
will be able to answer them, and limiting reporting of responses to the recent past 
(De Vaus, 1991; Dillman, 2007; Fowler, 1993). Every effort was made to put this 
advice into practice. As stated in section 3.7, clarity and simplicity guided the design 
of each survey question. Only questions that respondents were assumed to be 
capable of answering with confidence were included. Illustrative of this situation, it 
was originally intended to question respondents on the total number and value of 
contracts awarded to SMEs in the previous 12 months. In the pre-test phase it was 
pointed out by an experienced public buyer that many respondents would struggle to 
answer this question with any degree of precision or would not have this information 
available to them; hence its exclusion from the final version of the questionnaire.   
3.8.3 Measurement validity: subjective measures  
Questions aimed at eliciting individuals’ beliefs and attitudes present greater 
validation challenges (Sapsford, 2006). This is because there is no external referent 
against which answers can be validated. Referred to in section 3.7.2, an expert 
review panel made up of academics and practitioners scrutinised the questionnaire 
instrument, including the content validity of subjective measures. Expert assessment 
acts as a litmus test of the validity of survey questions (Campanelli, 2008; LeCompte 
and Goetz, 1982; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The panel made a number of valuable 
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recommendations for improving the content validity of the subjective measures. 
Based on their advice changes were made to the phrasing of several opinion and 
belief statements. As one example, a statement in the questionnaire draft originally 
read ‘facilitating SME participation in contract competitions is consistent with other 
procurement goals’. The recommendation made by several of the experts was to 
make explicit the ‘other procurement goals’. For the final version of the 
questionnaire the statement was changed to read ‘facilitating SME participation in 
contract competitions is consistent with optimising value for money and complying 
with EU law’. The fact that the questions were subjected to external validation 
should instil a degree of confidence that findings from the study are credible and 
have scientific merit. 
3.8.4 Measurement validity:  social desirability bias   
An additional threat to validity occurs when responses deviate from their true value. 
This is a particular problem when issues that are sensitive to the targeted population 
are being investigated. Under such circumstances respondents are liable to resort to 
impression management and supply answers that they consider to be ‘socially 
desirable’ but that do not reflect their true behaviours or opinions (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001; Fowler and Cosenza, 2008). Against this, a review of survey 
literature by Chan (2009) indicated that socially desirable or ‘fake’ answering is 
neither as ubiquitous nor as problematic as is sometimes assumed. Given that the 
focus of this study was on policy compliance, the prudent course of action was to 
pre-empt the threat of social desirability bias. A number of tactics were adopted for 
this purpose (Fowler, 1995). No reference was made to compliance at any stage 
throughout the questionnaire. The language employed was neutral and studiously 
avoided giving the impression that there was a preferred answer to any of the 
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questions. The questionnaire was self-administered, which allowed respondents to 
report on their behaviours without having to disclose them in person to a third party. 
Respondents were also able to participate in the survey while remaining anonymous. 
Together these tactics aimed to minimise the gap between the actual and reported 
behaviours of survey respondents and, in the process, uphold the validity of the 
compliance measures. This completes the discussion on effective survey 
measurement. The survey population comes under the microscope next.  
3.9 Survey population 
Public buyers in Ireland served as the survey population of interest. Section 3.9.1 
explains how the public buyer population was delimited. E-procurement is relevant 
here. By virtue of Ireland having a national e-procurement portal it was possible to 
identify all public sector employees involved in purchasing goods and services on 
behalf of their organisations, thus yielding a population with which to work. 
Justification for using public buyers as respondents is given in section 3.9.2. 
Included here is the appropriateness of having public buyers report their compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy; precedent in using public buyers as 
respondents; and problems with examining compliance at the organisational level. 
The limitations of using public buyers as survey respondents are dealt with in section 
3.9.3. Primarily, in privileging public buyers’ input the voices of other procurement 
actors, such as suppliers and elected representatives, are omitted. Weaknesses with 
self-reported data and an inability to control for the possibility of two or more 
individuals from the same public sector organisation submitting responses are also 
conceded. These and the other points will now be examined in more detail.     
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3.9.1 Delimiting the survey population 
The population of public buyers was taken to comprise the approximately 3000 
individuals who were registered on Ireland’s national e-procurement portal 
www.etenders.gov.ie at the time of the survey
21
, hereafter referred to as eTenders. 
Irish national procurement guidelines stipulate that all public sector contracts valued 
at €25,000 or more have to be advertised on eTenders. The effect is that all public 
buyers in Ireland are registered and active on eTenders. Among the main challenges 
that researchers have had to contend with is pinpointing the individual(s) responsible 
for procurement in any given public sector organisation
22
. Migration to e-
procurement, and the resulting database of active public buyers which it yields, is 
helping researchers to surmount this problem. Essentially it means that researchers 
can more easily identify and survey a national population of public buyers, or a 
sample thereof. Permission to access the eTenders population database was granted 
by the OGP. Their co-operation and backing was indispensable to the success of the 
study. Without it, surveying Ireland’s national population of public buyers would 
have proved all but impossible.   
3.9.2 Justification for using public buyers as respondents     
Reliance on public buyers as the survey informants can be defended on a number of 
grounds. The first is suitability to the aim of the study. Public buyers are responsible 
for putting SME-friendly policy into practice. On this basis they are the logical 
respondent choice when investigating compliance with SME-friendly policy in 
public procurement. The second is that ‘public buyers often operate with unique 
procurement authority that is separated from their direct line of supervision’ 
(Hawkins, Gravier and Powley, 2011:577). Hence, it makes sense to directly engage 
                                                            
21 Source: OGP, Ireland.  
22 Access has been less of a problem for researchers in the US owing to the existence of the 
National Institute of Government Purchasing. It has a database of 15,000 public buyer professionals. 
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with them. The third is the configuration and management of the procurement 
function in public sector organisations. It is quite common for procurement 
responsibility to be dispersed across departments and to be delegated to many 
individuals and teams (Flynn et al., 2013; Thai, 2001). As a result, there is not 
always a single, coherent procurement culture or set of practices that exist and that 
can be measured at organisational level. Owing to such circumstances surveying 
actors at the sub-organisational level is, arguably, the more effective means of 
capturing what happens in practice. Using public buyers as respondents also 
responds to calls to examine institutional effects at organisational sub-unit level 
(Hirsch, 1997; Pache and Santos, 2010). Institutional research has tended to fixate on 
the corporate level and ignore the intra-organisational dynamics of institutional 
responses.   
 
Research precedent was another reason for preferring public buyers as respondents. 
Public buyers feature prominently as informants in procurement research and, more 
so again, have been used in several studies on procurement compliance. Karjalainen 
and van Raaij (2011) investigated ‘maverick’ purchasing practices in the Finnish 
public sector by surveying approximately 3000 public sector employees with 
responsibility for procurement. Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman, (2006) and 
Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) pursued the same strategy in Dutch and Tanzanian 
contexts respectively. Preuss and Walker (2011) also highlighted the desirability of 
probing not only on what organisations are doing in sustainable purchasing but also 
what individual public buyers themselves are doing. As they reasoned, public buyers 
employ their own strategies based on their unique set of abilities, motivations and 
prerogatives. This chimes with previously made arguments by Nord and Fox (1996) 
on the need to re-centre the individual in organisational studies and to row back from 
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a preoccupation with meso-level analysis. Practical considerations to do with access 
and resource constraints also had a role to play in selecting public buyers. Already 
mentioned, the researcher was granted unique access to the eTenders database by the 
OGP. This meant that a large scale survey could be undertaken without incurring any 
significant financial or labour costs.   
3.9.3 Limitations of using public buyers as respondents     
Selecting public buyers as respondents is not without its drawbacks. Their inclusion 
comes at the expense of other public procurement actors. Suppliers’ opinions and 
experiences of SME-friendly policy were not captured, nor were those of public 
sector managers, service end-users, policy makers or elected representatives. Murray 
(2009b) has been critical of just this situation, lamenting the fact that public buyers 
are frequently favoured as informants while the voices of suppliers and political 
actors are heard much less. A second issue concerns the nature of the data. Like 
studies on procurement rule compliance, self-reported behaviours were used here to 
measure compliance (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010; Mwakibinga and 
Buvik, 2013). Non self-report measures of behaviour were not obtained. The validity 
of self-reported data has been a point of contention for many years and the threat of 
social desirability bias it carries can never be discounted (Campbell and Fiske, 
1959). Provisos notwithstanding, Chan (2009) has argued that there is no evidence to 
indicate that it is inherently flawed, or that the criticisms made of it do not equally 
apply to ostensibly ‘objective’ measures. Lastly, in surveying public buyers it was 
not possible to identify and control for two or more responses originating from the 
one public sector organisation.  
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3.10 Survey implementation 
The implementation phase of survey-based research is just as important as the design 
and construction of the questionnaire instrument (Dillman, 2007). Successful 
implementation can make all the difference in securing an acceptable response rate 
and having a high quality data set to work with. It is equally crucial from the 
perspective of successfully executing a research project on time and within budget. 
The implementation of the survey in this study was internet-based. All 
correspondence with the public buyer population was conducted via email. The 
questionnaire was accessed by respondents clicking on a web-link. Section 3.10.1 
explains why e-surveying was the most efficacious choice for this study; efficacious 
in terms of working within resource constraints as well as securing an acceptable 
number of responses. The downsides to using e-surveying are enumerated in section 
3.10.2. These include lower response rates relative to the traditional postal method 
and, relatedly, respondent fatigue and antipathy that have grown up around e-
surveys. The third and final sub-section provides details on the timeline of the survey 
and the steps that were taken to manage its successful implementation.     
3.10.1 Justification for e-surveying  
Public buyers were surveyed electronically in this study. Apart from access, the e-
survey approach made sense in resource terms; the latter being a critical factor when 
deciding on research strategies (Bourque and Fielder, 1995; Czaja and Blair, 1996). 
Trials have consistently shown that e-surveying costs a fraction of the traditional 
mail method (McDonald and Adam, 2003; Schreckhise, 2005; Shannon and 
Bradshaw, 2002; Shough and Yates, 2002; Weible and Wallace, 1998). In this study 
the financial cost incurred in distributing the questionnaire amounted to no more than 
the subscription fee to SurveyMonkey. Posting hard copy questionnaires to 3000 
public buyers at two separate time periods would have resulted in significant 
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financial costs. As well as being more cost effective, e-surveying enables quicker 
turnaround times compared to the traditional postal method (Kwak and Radler, 2002; 
McDonald and Adam, 2003; Michaelidou and Dibb, 2006). The survey of public 
buyers was completed within two weeks (see section 3.10.3). The traditional mail 
method would have taken significantly longer. E-surveying is also labour and time 
saving. Most e-survey products are compatible with statistical software packages and 
allow data to be seamlessly transferred from the former to the latter. This relieves 
researchers of the time-consuming task of entering hundreds of cases manually. The 
dataset generated from the survey in this study was able to be downloaded as an 
SPSS file for analysis.   
Apart from efficient use of resources, e-surveying has much to recommend itself 
from the perspective of respondent convenience (Manfreda-Lozar and Vehovar, 
2008). In this study e-surveying meant that the questionnaire was delivered directly 
to the electronic mailbox of each public buyer. The return of the questionnaire 
demanded nothing more than the click of a mouse on the part of the respondent. E-
surveying also affords individuals greater flexibility over when and where they 
complete the questionnaire, which can be seen as advantageous for boosting 
response rates. Supportive of this point, subsequent analysis of response patterns 
revealed that some respondents completed the questionnaire very early in the 
morning or late in the evening. Much of the work of public buyers is now done 
online. Partaking in an online survey should, in theory at least, be something that 
most public buyers feel comfortable and confident in doing. There is also reason to 
believe that e-surveying is conducive to generating better quality data than paper-
based methods. As evidence of this, several studies have reported that e-surveys 
generate higher levels of response completeness than mail surveys, measured in 
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terms of the percentage of questions answered, (Kwak and Radler, 2002; McDonald 
and Adam, 2003; Truell, Bartlett and Alexander, 2002).  
3.10.2 Limitations of e-surveying 
Against the advantages listed above, e-surveying does have some limitations. 
Comparisons of postal and e-survey response rates have in nearly all cases found that 
the former outperform the latter by a ratio of between two-three to one (Jones and 
Pitt, 1999; Mavis and Brocato, 1998; McDonald and Adam, 2003; Ranchhod and 
Zhou, 2001; Schuldt and Totten, 1994). Truell, Bartlett and Alexander (2002) were 
among the few exceptions, reporting no significant difference in final outcome 
between the two modes of transmission. Response rates to e-surveys have also been 
in steady decline since their introduction (Sheehan, 2001). Among the reasons for 
this is wariness around unsolicited email and the sheer volume of research requests 
that professionals receive via email. Because of the exponential growth in their use 
and the relative ease of creating and distributing them, e-surveys are said to be 
received less favourably than mailed questionnaires (Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001). 
Another problem is e-surveys failing to deliver to intended respondents due to 
incorrect email addresses and spam filters (Lynn, 2008; Manfreda-Lozar and 
Vehovar, 2008; Yun and Trumbo, 2000). Concerns have been raised that e-surveying 
impinges on the privacy and online security of individuals (Cho and Larose, 1999). 
Caveats aside, e-surveying was by far the most efficient method, making it possible 
to reach a population of geographically dispersed individuals in a cost effective way. 
3.10.3 Survey timeline 
The survey was conducted over a two-week time period at the beginning of 2015. On 
Monday, January 19
th
 an email notification with an embedded link to the 
questionnaire was distributed to public buyers (see Box 2). A second email, also with 
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an embedded hypertext link, was issued on Wednesday, January 28th. There is 
widespread consensus that following-up with the target population after the initial 
contact is among the most effective ways to increase the final response rate (Cook, 
Heath and Thompson, 2000; Duncan, 1979; Jobber and O’Reilly, 1998; Oliphant and 
Brady, 2006; Sheehan, 2001). Follow-up correspondence helps to jog the memory of 
individuals who intend to participate but have not got round to doing so (Dillman, 
2007). The survey closed on Monday, February 2
nd
. A fourteen day time period with 
two separate email contacts was deemed sufficient to generate an adequate response 
rate. Throughout this time period the survey was regularly monitored to ensure that it 
was running smoothly. The pattern of response activity was one in which most 
questionnaires were filled out within 24 hours of their release. The frequency of 
response activity reduced significantly outside of this period. This is consistent with 
how respondents have been shown to behave in other e-surveys (Jones and Pitt, 
1999; Shannon and Bradshaw, 2002; Yun and Trumbo, 2000).  
 
Box 2 Survey request emailed to public buyers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Public Buyer, 
 
The Office of Government Procurement in conjunction with 
Dublin City University (DCU) is undertaking a survey of 
public procurement. We kindly ask that you participate by 
clicking on the link below. The survey takes no more than 
15 minutes to complete.  
 
Thank you in advance for your input. It is much 
appreciated.   
 
Public buyer survey 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Buyers2015 
 
176 
 
3.11 Research context 
Ireland served as the research setting for the survey. Recent years have witnessed 
successive Irish government policy initiatives to promote greater SME involvement 
in public procurement. The process began in earnest in 2007 with a consultation 
document entitled Improving SME Access to Public Procurement (National Public 
Procurement Policy Unit, 2007). It canvassed the opinions of SME representative 
bodies and public sector organisations on how to create a mutually beneficial public 
tendering system. Thereafter followed three major policy guidance documents: 
Using Public Procurement to Stimulate Innovation and SME Access to Public 
Contracts (Procurement Innovation Group, 2009), Facilitating SME Access to Public 
Procurement (Department of Finance, 2010) and Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public 
Procurement (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2014). The first of 
these recommended opening up public procurement to innovative supply solutions 
and making it easier for small firms to compete for contracts. The second contained a 
list of ‘positive measures’ public buyers were requested to comply with in order to 
better accommodate SMEs in contract competitions. These same measures were 
reiterated in Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement in 2014. We will now 
look at three of the main trends and events that have propelled SME-friendly 
procurement policy in Ireland: joined-up policy making; European Commission 
policy guidance; and the international financial crisis of 2007.   
3.11.1 Joined-up policy making  
Irish efforts to increase SME involvement in public procurement have come about 
‘in the context of promoting whole of government objectives’ (National Public 
Procurement Policy Unit, 2007:1). ‘Promoting whole of government objectives’ 
means that policies should be designed and implemented mindful of the economic, 
enterprise, social, environmental and overall democratic goals set down by 
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government (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007). The philosophy behind it is that 
synergies in governance can be achieved when policies dovetail. In Irish public 
procurement ‘promoting whole of government objectives’ has manifested itself 
primarily in enterprise policies. Exemplifying this inter-connection, public 
procurement is presented in Sharing our Future as ‘a major opportunity for Ireland 
to advance its highest priority policy goals’ (Forfas, 2009:18). The same report then 
goes on to explain how this can be realised, such as by public sector organisations 
and innovative suppliers working in concert to develop technological solutions to 
public service challenges. A contemporaneous report, Making it Happen: Growing 
Enterprise for Ireland (Forfas, 2010) underlines the potential for public procurement 
to be used as a demand-side stimulant to innovation. The Voice of Small Business 
report talks of harnessing public procurement in the interests of professionalising the 
SME sector (Advisory Group for Small Business, 2011). These examples give some 
idea of how the SME-friendly agenda in public procurement has come about in 
tandem with more expansive, joined-up thinking on policy management.     
3.11.2 European Commission policy guidance 
The European Commission has also acted as a driver of procurement reform in 
Ireland. Ever since the creation of the Single Market the European Commission has 
been proactive in promoting SME-friendly public procurement among EU Member 
States. Support has come in the form of information and training provision for SMEs 
and the publication of guidance material for public buyers on how to ensure equality 
of opportunity in the procurement marketplace (European Commission, 1989, 1990, 
1992). In 2008 the European Commission published a European Code of Best 
Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts (European 
Commission, 2008c). Its purpose was to ‘provide Member States and their 
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contracting authorities with guidance on how to apply the EC legal framework in a 
way which facilitates SMEs’ participation in contract award procedures’ (2008:2). 
The imprint of the Code is unmistakable in Ireland’s own SME-friendly procurement 
policy initiatives. Most of the original recommendations made in the Code were 
subsequently incorporated into Facilitating SME Access to Public Procurement 
(Department of Finance, 2010). The European Commission’s policies and 
communiques over the last two decades have exerted institutional pressure – 
coercive, normative and mimetic - on Ireland and all other EU Member States to 
make their public procurement systems more accessible to SMEs. This has led to 
national public procurement systems becoming isomorphic with one another.  
3.11.3 Macroeconomic shock 
Unfavourable macroeconomic events have also been behind the emergence of SME-
friendly procurement policies. Resulting from the international financial crisis of 
2007 Ireland suffered a sharp reversal in its economic fortunes. GDP fell by over 8 
per cent, unemployment rose to almost 15 per cent, and the current account deficit 
grew to 5.7 per cent of GDP (Woods and O’Connell, 2012). The financial crisis and 
subsequent economic recession hit small firms the hardest. Between 2007 and 2010 
employment in Irish SMEs fell by 15 per cent, final output decreased by 18 per cent 
and SMEs’ overall economic contribution dropped from 53 per cent to 48 per cent 
(European Commission, 2011a). There was also a sharp drop in new enterprise 
creation and an unwelcome rise in the number of existing enterprises that ceased 
trading (Central Statistics Office, 2014). It was these less than propitious economic 
circumstances that catalysed efforts to reform public procurement and, in particular, 
to make it more facilitative of SME suppliers. Indicative of this turn of events, the 
then Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, referred to ‘the importance 
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of public contracts as a source of business for SMEs’ and stated that he was ‘anxious 
to promote their participation to the greatest extent possible under EU law’ (Dáil 
Éireann Debate, 2009). During this same time-period there was a spike in 
parliamentary debate on public procurement, as there was in media coverage of it 
(see Fig. 9-10). These can be taken as indicators of its political, economic and social 
salience in Ireland around this time. Having covered the research context, the chapter 
now turns to clarifying how the concepts in the study were operationalised and 
measured. The first of these is compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy.    
 
Fig. 9 Irish parliamentary debate on public procurement, 1990-2012
23
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 The number of times procurement was mentioned in parliamentary debate in each year 
between 1990 and 2012 is used as a proxy measure of political interest in public procurement.   
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Fig. 10 Print media coverage of public procurement, 1990-2012
24
 
 
 
3.12 A compliance index for SME-friendly procurement  
To measure compliance with SME-friendly procurement an index was created 
especially for the purposes of this study. Nothing of this kind existed in the literature. 
The index comprises all the recommendations or ‘positive measures’ contained in 
current Irish SME-friendly procurement policy
25
. A total of 19 individual 
recommendations make up the index. While not legally binding, Irish public buyers 
are expected to comply with these recommendations by giving effect to them in their 
everyday procurement practices. Previously averred to, the procurement policy 
landscape is relatively homogeneous across the EU. The policy recommendations 
that comprise the index are typical of those found in other developed economies. 
This is significant as it means that the index can, with some modifications, be used to 
test compliance with SME-friendly procurement in other EU Member States (see 
section 5.3.3). The 19 measures in the index are grouped into seven categories (see 
                                                            
24 The number of times procurement was mentioned in Irish Times articles in each year between 
1990 and 2012 is used as a proxy measure of media interest in public procurement. 
25 As at the end of 2014. 
181 
 
Table 12, pg. 182). Each of these corresponds to a facet of public sector tendering 
that SMEs are known to struggle with, including: opportunity awareness; access to 
competitions; bureaucracy; contract size; qualification criteria; liability of newness; 
and information deficits. These categories and their constituent measures are 
described in more detail in sections 3.12.1-3.12.7. 
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Table 12 Compliance index for SME-friendly procurement  
Making contract opportunities visible 
 Measure 1 Online advertising 
contracts for supplies and general services with an estimated value of €25,000 or more and works contracts with an estimated value of €50,000 
or more should be advertised on eTenders 
 Measure 2 Prior Information Notices (PINs) 
buyers should communicate long-term purchasing plans to the market as early as possible by publishing PINs 
Widening access to opportunities 
 Measure 3 Open tendering procedure 
buyers should use open (competitive) tendering for contracts worth up to €134,000 for goods and services contracts and €250,000 for works 
contracts 
 Measure 4 Qualification criteria 
buyers should use broadly defined qualification criteria in order to increase the number of eligible tenderers  
Alleviating the administrative burden 
 Measure 5 Self-declare financial capacity 
buyers should allow applicants to self-declare their financial capacity, and should seek evidence of capacity only in the event of the tenderer 
being short-listed or coming under consideration for the contract 
 Measure 6 Self-declare insurance cover 
buyers should allow applicants to self-declare their insurance cover, and should seek evidence of cover only in the event of the tenderer being 
short-listed or coming under consideration for the contract 
 Measure 7 Standard tender documents 
buyers should use standard documentation and tender templates  
 Measure 8 Online tender submission 
buyers should promote the online submission of tenders by suppliers as the norm 
Overcoming difficulties relating to contract size 
 Measure 9 Dividing contracts into lots 
buyers should consider dividing contracts into lots where appropriate and practical  
 Measure 10 Openness to SME consortium bidding 
buyers should be open to consortium bids by, for example, drawing attention to this possibility in the contract notice and/or by publishing PINs 
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 Measure 11 Framework agreements 
buyers are to ensure that, where possible, the terms of framework agreements facilitate the inclusion of small firms  
Proportionality in the use of criteria 
 Measure 12 Proportionate turnover requirements 
buyers should not set company turnover requirements at more than twice the estimated contract value for routine goods and services 
competitions  
 Measure 13 Proportionate insurance requirements 
buyers should only require types and levels of insurance that are proportionate and reasonable in the context of the contract (types and limits 
specified in policy guidance) 
 Measure 14 Flexible over proof of financial capacity 
buyers should be flexible over the type of proof of financial capacity they accept from tenderers  
Openness to new suppliers/solutions 
 Measure 15 Market analysis 
buyers should undertake market analysis prior to tendering in order to better understand the supply marketplace and what it can offer   
 Measure 16 Variants to specifications 
buyers should indicate where they are prepared to accept reasonable variants to the specifications of the goods/services sought 
 Measure 17 Life cycle costs 
buyers should take into account whole life-cycle costs associated with a purchase  
Addressing information asymmetries  
 Measure 18 Feedback for tenderers 
buyers should provide written feedback as a matter of good practice and in fulfilment of their obligations under the EU Remedies Directive 
2007/66/EC 
 Measure 19 Publication of award notices 
buyers are required to publish all contract award notices over €25,000 on eTenders    
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3.12.1 Making contract opportunities visible 
Identifying public sector contract opportunities is known to be problematic for 
SMEs. Difficulties have been expressed by them over lack of awareness of available 
opportunities and gaining entry onto approved supplier lists (Loader, 2005). The 
smaller the firm the more problematic these issues around contract identification 
appear to become (Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008). Irish policy prescribes two 
measures that are designed to make it easier for SMEs to identify contract 
opportunities relevant to their business. The first stipulates that public buyers should 
advertise supplies and works contracts above certain thresholds on eTenders. This 
measure is aimed at ensuring that contracts are visible, searchable and easily 
identifiable. It also means that there is a standard, consistent procedure for the 
advertising of public contracts. The second measure recommends that public buyers 
publish PINs on eTenders. The publication of PINs alerts the marketplace to the 
opportunities that are likely to arise in the near future with particular organisations. 
PINs are understood to give SMEs time to plan ahead, prepare their bid strategies or 
even form a bid consortium. Advance notification is hugely beneficial to SMEs 
because with their limited human resources they often struggle to compile a tender at 
short notice (Peck and Cabras, 2010).   
3.12.2 Widening access to opportunities 
As well as problems around contract identification SMEs do not always get the 
chance to compete for business with the public sector (Erridge, 1998; Loader, 2013). 
Restrictive tendering conditions set by the procuring organisation are a primary 
cause of this problem. A typical case would be stipulating that eligible tenderers 
must satisfy minimum requirements relating to experience and have a proven record 
of supplying public sector organisations. Two policy measures are aimed at 
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counteracting this problem. The first is for public buyers to use the open procedure 
of competitive tendering for supply contracts valued at below €134,000 and works 
contracts valued at below €250,000. Open tendering means that public buyers should 
not pre-qualify firms before issuing a request for tender. In this way all interested 
firms at least have the chance to compete for the contract on offer and be evaluated 
against the assessment criteria. The second measure relates to the qualification and 
assessment criteria used. Public buyers are requested not to unduly limit the field of 
potential suppliers by relying on a too restrictive set of criteria. Invariably, this 
militates against the prospect of small and newly established firms becoming 
suppliers. Notably, narrow bid specifications have been reported by firms as 
hindering their participation in the public procurement marketplace (Loader and 
Norton, 2015; MacManus, 1991).      
3.12.3 Alleviating the administrative burden 
The administrative burden associated with tendering can have a dissuasive effect on 
SMEs’ inclination to compete (Bovis, 1996; Fee, Erridge and Hennigan, 2002; Flynn 
et al., 2013). Lengthy form filling and documentation requirements are a drain on 
SMEs’ resources and come with an opportunity cost. Quantifying this effect, recent 
analysis suggests that it costs firms over £3200 to tender for a routine supply contract 
in the EU and considerably more in the UK (Centre for Economic and Business 
Research and Gatewit, 2013). Reducing the administrative burden of tendering is a 
critical part of facilitating greater SME involvement. Four policy measures are 
relevant in this regard. The first and second of these measures recommend that 
public buyers permit firms to self-declare their financial capacity and insurance 
cover respectively. Proof of same is only to be requested when the firm is in 
contention for the contract. The third measure recommends the use by public buyers 
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of standard tender templates
26
. The rationale for using standard templates is to both 
increase firms’ familiarity with what will be asked of them in the tendering process 
and reduce variability in the information sought by different public sector 
organisations. The fourth measure states that public buyers should direct firms to 
submit their tenders online as a matter of course. This is designed to reduce their 
transaction costs by making it quicker and easier to submit a tender.  
3.12.4 Overcoming difficulties relating to contract size 
The large size of public sector contracts is a major obstacle to SMEs’ chances of 
success in public procurement (European Commission, 1992; Kidalov, 2015; Loader, 
2013; Smith and Hobbs, 2001). The position taken here is that contract size is the 
biggest barrier to SME involvement in public procurement (see section 3.13). Many 
of the other commonly cited barriers, such as onerous qualification criteria and risk 
aversion on the part of buyers, stem from the disparity between the average size of a 
public sector contract and SMEs’ organisational capacity. As contract size reduces, 
these other barriers are also likely to reduce. Three policy recommendations are 
designed to address the problem of contract size for SMEs. The first is for public 
buyers to divide contracts into lots where at all feasible. The division of contracts 
into lots reduces contracts to a size more appropriate to the organisational capacity of 
SMEs, particularly micro-enterprises. The second recommendation requests public 
buyers to be open to SME consortium bids by, for example, stating this in the request 
for tender. Whereas lots focus on contract size, consortium bidding focuses on 
augmenting organisational capacity by combining the resources and expertise of two 
or more small firms. The third recommendation asks public buyers to structure 
                                                            
26 Standard tender templates are issued by the OGP.  
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framework agreements in such a way that SMEs still have the opportunity to tender 
for individual lots or, alternatively, act as sub-contractors to larger suppliers.  
3.12.5 Proportionality in assessment criteria 
Financial capacity and insurance cover thresholds that are misaligned to the value 
and nature of the contract is a recurring problem cited by SMEs (Ringwald et al., 
2009). Disproportionately high thresholds preclude smaller and newly established 
firms from competing. For this reason it is essential that thresholds are appropriate to 
the circumstances and risk profile of the contract. Three policy measures aim to 
uphold the principle of proportionality. The first recommends that public buyers 
should not set the ‘company turnover-to-contract value’ ratio at more than twice the 
estimated value in the case of routine supply contracts. For example, if a contract is 
valued at €50,000, company turnover of €100,000 should be sufficient to be 
considered eligible. The second measure specifies insurance indemnity limits for 
public buyers to defer to when purchasing routine goods and services. Employer’s 
liability should be set at €12.7 million and public liability set at €6.5 million. The 
third measure recommends that public buyers show flexibility over the type of proof 
of financial capacity acceptable in contract competitions. This is particularly relevant 
to new enterprises. By definition they will have a limited financial history. New 
enterprises can also incur significant start-up costs, which tend to give a misleading 
impression of their financial status. For these reasons public buyers are requested to 
be flexible and open-minded when adjudicating on proof of financial capacity.   
3.12.6 Openness to new suppliers/solutions 
Achieving value for money, by which is meant realising the most economically 
advantageous outcome, has become something of a mantra in public procurement. 
Suppliers complain that too much weighting is put on price to the detriment of 
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product/service quality and innovation (Georghiou et al., 2014; GHK, 2010; Small 
Firms Association, 2013). This, coupled with a culture of risk aversion and a 
perceived lack of purchasing professionalism, can adversely affect SMEs’ chances of 
success (Fee, Erridge and Hennigan, 2002; Procurement Innovation Group, 2009). 
For this reason public buyers are encouraged to become more knowledgeable about 
what the supply market can offer and more open to new suppliers and supply 
solutions. A more rounded interpretation of economic value is also promoted as part 
of moving away from a ‘lowest cost is best’ mentality (McKevitt, 2015). Three 
policy measures are relevant in this regard. The first is for public buyers to undertake 
market analysis prior to formally issuing their tender request. It is only by 
researching their marketplaces that public buyers can become familiar with the full 
gamut of supply solutions available. The second recommendation is that they should 
consider variants to the tender specification where appropriate to do so. This is 
intended to create the space for suppliers to suggest innovative and potentially more 
cost-effective solutions. The third recommendation is for public buyers to evaluate 
the life-cycle costs of their intended purchase. As well as making financial sense for 
the buying organisation, taking a more balanced and long-term assessment of value 
is likely to prove favourable to SMEs, as service quality and customer satisfaction 
are strong selling points for them.  
3.12.7 Addressing information asymmetries 
The reported experiences of small firms suggest that public sector tendering 
represents unchartered territory for them (Greer, 1999). The same author also spoke 
of a ‘cultural gap’ between the public and private sectors and poor appreciation of 
each other’s requirements. Suppliers have expressed a desire for more open channels 
of communication with public sector organisations (Cabras, 2011; GHK, 2010) and 
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for more and better quality information in both the pre- and post-tender phases of 
contract competitions (Erridge, Fee and McIllroy, 1999; Loader and Norton, 2015). 
The final two policy measures that comprise the index are geared towards addressing 
SMEs’ information asymmetries in tendering. Public buyers are recommended to 
provide written feedback to all unsuccessful tenderers. This is in addition to their 
obligations under the EU procurement law
27
. The purpose of providing feedback is 
to inform firms of their performance against the assessment criteria and educate them 
on where they can improve for future competitions. The evidence indicates that 
receiving feedback has a positive impact on the quality of suppliers’ subsequent 
tender submissions (Flynn et al., 2013). Public buyers are also requested to publish 
all contract award notices valued at €25,000 or above on eTenders. The purpose of 
this measure is to promote transparency by letting all interested parties know the 
final outcome of a competition, including the name of the successful bidder.   
3.13 Computing compliance index scores  
The previous section explained how an index for measuring compliance with SME-
friendly procurement policy was constructed. The computation of compliance scores 
is dealt with in this section. There were two stages in this process. The first involved 
operationalising compliance. The preferred approach was to treat compliance as a 
dichotomous variable. For each of the 19 measures compliance received a score of 1 
and non-compliance received a score of 0. The 19 measures were then summed to 
create a compliance score for each respondent
28
. Taking this approach was 
appropriate given the nature of SME-friendly procurement policy. It specifies actions 
that public buyers are expected to take when procuring goods and services on behalf 
                                                            
27 Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 11, 2007 
amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness 
of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts [2007] OJ L335/31. 
28 In cases where n values were missing, the final compliance score was made up of 19-n values.     
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of their organisation. To reiterate the first policy recommendation listed in table 12, 
public buyers are to advertise all contracts with an anticipated value of €25,000 or 
more on eTenders. To be compliant is to consistently adhere to this stipulation. Not 
to adhere on one or more occasions equates to non-compliance. Compliance, in this 
sense, is binary rather than something of degree. Hoejmose, Grosvold and Millington 
(2013) and Mansi (2015) utilised the same strategy in measuring sustainable supply 
chain management practices among firms in the UK and India respectively. Other 
scholars resile from treating procurement compliance as ‘either-or’, preferring to 
measure it in terms of degrees of behaviour (Hawkins and Muir, 2014; Gelderman, 
Ghijsen and Brugman, 2006; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013).   
3.13.1 Index weighting 
The second part to computing compliance scores was the weighting of measures. In 
constructing any index the question immediately arises as to whether the measures 
comprising it should be equally or differentially weighted. This is by no means an 
anodyne question and is liable to affect the outcome of any study (Blanc et al., 
2008). Weighting all measures equally assumes equivalence of impact. Some studies 
adopt this as a default stance due to uncertainty over the relative importance of their 
measures. Krause (2011), for example, compiled an index of environmentally–
friendly practices used by US municipalities in which impact was assumed to be the 
same in all cases. The disadvantage of equal weighting, as the same author conceded, 
is that the effect of individual policy measures and the effort required to implement 
them is unlikely to be uniform. The alternative is to differentially weight index 
measures. Implied by the name, differential weighting takes account of the varying 
impacts and relative importance of index measures. Differential weighting comes 
with its own set of challenges and researchers must have a sound justification for 
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applying a differential weighting system (OECD, 2008). Even with a defensible 
rationale, making some value-based judgement is unavoidable (Booysen, 2002). 
Owing to this element of subjectivity, transparency on the part of the researcher is 
crucial. The next two sub-sections describe the weighting system used to compute 
compliance scores for public buyers.        
3.13.2 Differential weightings: empirical evidence  
In line with best practice advice offered by Hsu, Johnson and Lloyd (2013) two steps 
were taken to decide on the optimal weighting system for the policy compliance 
index. The first involved a review and re-examination of all the available evidence 
on SMEs and public sector tendering. It revealed that the large size of public sector 
contracts is the most significant barrier facing SMEs. Evidence for this can be found, 
for example, in regression analysis undertaken on SMEs’ participation and success 
rates in the European market for public contracts (GHK, 2010). It is also a 
conclusion reached by prominent public procurement scholars. After performing a 
systematic literature review Loader (2013) identified contract size as the most 
frequently cited obstacle confronting SMEs in public procurement; and one likely to 
become more problematic in the future owing to aggregated purchasing trends. 
Morand (2003) highlighted contract size as the prohibitive factor for SME access to 
public contracts while Kidalov (2015) instanced contract bundling as a serious and 
unnecessary obstacle to SMEs’ participation in defence contract acquisition in the 
US. From this it follows that measures aimed at mitigating the contract size barrier 
are likely to have the most benefit for SMEs if acted on by public buyers. Three 
measures related to contract size feature in the index: dividing contracts into lots; 
encouraging consortium bids; and devising framework agreements so that they are 
inclusive of small firms.  
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3.13.3 Differential weightings: expert assessment  
After reviewing the empirical evidence the second step involved consulting with the 
same procurement practitioners that appraised the questionnaire instrument. 
Soliciting expert input on weighting decisions, which is standard in the social and 
natural sciences, improves the validity and peer acceptability of the index (Booysen, 
2002; Hsu, Johnson and Lloyd, 2013). Asked to rate the relative importance of the 
19 measures, the considered opinion of the practitioner experts was that the three 
aforementioned measures pertaining to contract size were likely to yield the greatest 
effect for SMEs in terms of access to public sector contracts. The other 16 index 
measures were assumed to be equivalent in their impacts. Thus, expert opinion 
corroborated the empirical evidence regarding size as the pre-eminent barrier to 
SME participation in public procurement. Having established a defensible rationale 
for the differential weighting of policy measures, it was then necessary to quantify 
their relative importance. Heeding the advice of the same experts, and adhering to a 
conservative approach, a double weighting was assigned to each of the three contract 
size measures. This meant that the magnitude of their effect was adjudged to be 
twice that of the other 16 measures. The end-outcome is a policy compliance index 
scaled 0 to 22 i.e. 16 measures x 0 or 1 + 3 measures x 0 or 2. This concludes the 
discussion on how compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy was 
operationalised, measured and computed. Section 3.14 explains how the predictors 
of policy compliance were operationalised and measured.  
3.14 Predictors of policy compliance 
The institutional factors used to predict compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy are set out here. First put forward by Oliver (1991), these factors constitute a 
predictive framework for institutional compliance. There are eight factors in all, 
which relate to the rationale for compliance (social legitimacy and economic gain); 
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institutional context (consistency of institutional rules and organisational dependence 
on rule setters); the content of the institutional pressures (compatibility of 
institutional pressures with organisational goals and the effects of institutional 
pressures on professional discretion); and the control mechanisms behind 
institutional pressures (coercive and mimetic). Each of the eight institutional 
predictors was operationalised by a single-item measure developed for the purposes 
of this study (see Table 13). Social legitimacy, for instance, was operationalised by 
putting the following proposition to respondents: ‘facilitating SME participation in 
contract competitions is important to my reputation as a public buyer’. Economic 
gain was operationalised by getting respondents to state their level of agreement with 
the following statement: ‘SME participation in contract competitions results in more 
competitive bid prices for my department or organisation’. A panel of academic 
experts and procurement practitioners was used to validate the operationalisation of 
the predictor variables (see section 3.8.3). All variables were measured on a 1-5 
Likert scale except for organisational dependence, which was treated as a 
dichotomous variable. The ‘greater dependency’ group consisted of central and local 
government authorities. The ‘lesser dependency’ group was made up of all other 
public sector organisation types.  
3.14.1 Single-item measurement  
Single-item measures of institutional pressures were deemed to be most appropriate 
and feasible for this study. Given that the eight predictive factors had to be newly 
operationalised, the use of single-item measures limited the potential for error. Any 
attempt to capture the eight factors using multiple-item measures would have proved 
more challenging from the perspective of upholding construct validity. Single-item 
measures also minimised the burden on respondents, which is conducive to 
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maximising response rates (Czaja and Blair, 1996). Had multiple-item measures 
been used for each of the eight institutional predictors the respondent burden would 
have been significantly greater. It may even have dissuaded respondents from 
participating in the research. Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen (2010) were of this 
same opinion when they decided to use a mix of multi and single-item constructs in 
their study of procurement compliance. Where purchasing-related studies have used 
multi-item measures to capture institutional pressures, the number of predictive 
factors has been limited to just three (Hoejmose, Grosvold and Millington, 2014; 
Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 2015; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2013). One final point is 
that the use of single-item measures lessened the threat that respondents answered 
questions in a repetitive and patterned way, which is always a risk when a high 
number of scaled questions are clustered together.  
Table 13 Institutional constructs and their operationalisation 
No. Factor  Operationalisation Measurement scale 
1 Social legitimacy Facilitating SME participation 
in contract competitions is 
important to my reputation as a 
public buyer  
Strongly disagree (1)-
strongly agree (5) 
2 Economic gain SME participation in contract 
competitions results in more 
competitive bid prices for my 
dept./organisation 
Strongly disagree (1)-
strongly agree (5) 
3 Institutional rule 
consistency  
Facilitating SME participation 
in contract competitions is 
compatible with optimising 
value for money and complying 
with EU law 
Strongly disagree (1)-
strongly agree (5) 
4 Dependence on 
institutional rule 
setter 
Type of public sector 
organisation:  
Central government; local 
government; state agency; 
semi-state/utility; education 
institution; all other types  
Dichotomous variable 
Greater dependency: 
central government 
and local government 
Lesser dependency:  
state agency; semi-
state/utility; education 
institution; all other 
types 
5 Compatibility of A procurement goal of my Strongly disagree (1)-
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institutional 
pressure with 
organisational 
goals 
dept./organisation is to 
facilitate the broadest 
participation of suppliers in 
contract competitions 
strongly agree (5) 
6 Constraints on 
professional 
discretion  
SME-friendly policy limits my 
discretion as a buyer 
Strongly disagree (1)-
strongly agree (5) 
7 Coercion There are consequences for me 
from not following SME-
friendly policy 
Strongly disagree (1)-
strongly agree (5) 
8 Diffusion of 
practices 
The majority of buyers I know 
take steps to facilitate SME 
participation in contract 
competitions 
Strongly disagree (1)-
strongly agree (5) 
 
3.15 Control variables 
In addition to the institutional factors set out in section 3.14, seven variables relating 
to the characteristics of public buyers and their organisations were included as 
controls in the predictive model. Table 14 (pg. 201) lists these variables and explains 
how they were operationalised and measured. They are: procurement experience; 
procurement involvement; procurement qualification; policy familiarity; organisation 
size; procurement structure; and procurement maturity. The first four relate to 
characteristics of the individual public buyer. The remaining three are to do with the 
organisational environment in which these individuals operate. With the exception of 
procurement maturity, each of the seven variables has previously been cited in the 
literature or empirically tested in respect of explaining procurement compliance. 
Procurement maturity was recommended for inclusion in the model by the review 
panel during the pre-testing of the survey instrument. It has not been previously 
controlled for in any model of procurement compliance. More detail on each of the 
seven control variables, including what foregoing scholarship has already 
conjectured or empirically observed of their effects on compliance behaviour, is 
given in sections 3.15.1-3.15.7.     
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3.15.1 Procurement experience 
Procurement experience is the first control variable. One view is that procurement 
experience is conducive to getting policy implemented. On-the-job experience leads 
to the accretion of purchasing skills and expertise in supply management. These are 
among the attributes that instil confidence in public buyers when transacting with 
suppliers, especially smaller, newer ones. With experience also comes greater 
awareness of the policy environment and an ability to manage policy expectations. 
Empirical evidence in support of such relationships exists. In an examination of 
compliance with rules governing the award of service contracts in the US Hawkins 
and Muir (2014) found that the experience of public buyers was a decisive factor. An 
opposing view is that procurement experience impedes the realisation of policy. 
Learned practices and routines derived from many years spent working in 
procurement are not easily changed; nor are experienced public buyers necessarily 
willing to embrace change (Karjalainen and von Raaij, 2011). As such, there is the 
possibility that experienced public buyers will be more resistant to change initiatives 
involving SME-friendly procurement in comparison with their relatively less 
experienced counterparts.   
3.15.2 Procurement involvement  
Public sector employees with responsibility for procuring goods and services are a 
heterogeneous group (Flynn et al., 2013). For some of them procurement forms a 
minor part of their habitual work activity. Their primary role will be something else, 
whether administrative, managerial or profession-specific in nature. For others, 
procurement constitutes their entire work role and they are employed exclusively to 
manage the supply chain needs of their organisation. There is reason to suppose that 
the extent to which procurement constitutes an employee’s work role – procurement 
involvement - influences compliance behaviour. Preuss (2011) implied that 
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‘devolved buyers’ i.e. those for whom procurement is only an ancillary part of their 
role were less dependable for implementing policy than full-time public buyers. 
Following on from this, Flynn and Davis (forthcoming) empirically demonstrated 
that procurement involvement drove SME-friendly policy compliance. Explaining 
this observed effect, the same authors posited that public sector employees for whom 
procurement constituted all or a major part of their work role had more time, 
resources, ability and career interest to conform to policy initiatives. Career interest 
and motivation have also been cited by other scholars as reasons to explain why 
public buyers give effect to policy recommendations (Georghiou et al., 2014; 
Murray, 2011).  
3.15.3 Procurement qualification 
Several studies assert that professional qualifications and/or professional 
accreditation engender compliance with public procurement rules and policies (De 
Boer and Telgen, 1998; European Commission, 2008c; Tukamuhabwa, 2012). 
Evidence has recently been forthcoming to support this contention, finding that 
trained public buyers exhibit higher levels of procurement rule compliance 
(Karjalainen and von Raaij, 2011; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; Sang and 
Mugambi, 2014). Professional training and certification can educate public buyers 
about the wider policy environment and equip them with the skills and acumen 
needed to reconcile the various institutional demands made of them by elected 
representatives (Coggburn and Rahm, 2005). The fact that public procurement is 
becoming more complex as a result of technological changes and its panoply of 
policies and regulations places a premium on professionalism (McCue and Gianakis, 
2001). A lack of procurement professionalism can undermine compliance. Morgan 
(2008) highlighted under-developed skill-sets among public buyers as one reason for 
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sustainable procurement policy not translating into practice. The same factor was 
mentioned by Glover (2008) in explaining public buyers’ risk aversion and a 
reluctance to transact with smaller and new suppliers. Unqualified buyers are also 
considered to be more likely to avoid or defy organisational procedures and engage 
in ‘maverick buying’ (Karjalainen, Kemppainen and von Raaij, 2009).   
3.15.4 Policy familiarity 
Internationally, policy familiarity has emerged as a necessary condition for policy 
compliance in public procurement contexts. The reasoning behind this relationship is 
straightforward. In order to be able to act on policy individuals must first be aware of 
its existence, familiar with its content and appreciative of the expectations it places 
on them. Sang and Mugambi (2014) found this to be the case among Kenyan public 
buyers where regulatory awareness had a positive influence on compliance with 
procurement law. Policy awareness was also the single most important factor 
explaining buyers’ adoption of sustainable purchasing practices in Malaysia in a 
study by McMurray et al., (2014). In another study by Flynn and Davis 
(forthcoming), public buyers’ familiarity with the content of SME-friendly policy in 
Ireland predicted their level of compliance with it. Similarly, familiarity with EU 
Procurement Directives among public buyers in the Netherlands was found to be 
significantly related to regulatory compliance by Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman 
(2006). To be expected, lack of familiarity with procurement policies and regulations 
reduces the prospect of public buyers conforming to them. Questioned about putting 
environmentally-sustainable procurement policies into practice, public buyers in the 
US claimed lack of policy awareness prevented them from doing so (National 
Institute of Government Purchasing, 2013).   
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3.15.5 Organisation size 
Firm size, measured by number of employees, was one of three organisation-related 
control variables included in the predictive model. Large firms are better equipped to 
respond to, and comply with, the demands made of them in their institutional 
environments (Teo, Wei and Benbasat, 2003). This is because they have more 
personnel, greater breadth of expertise, administrative slack, organisational capacity, 
financial resources and information technology capabilities. Public buyers within 
large organisations should be able to draw on these tangible and intangible resources 
when adjusting their purchasing practices to better facilitate SME suppliers. That 
said, studies to date have yet to empirically demonstrate that organisation size is 
significant in accounting for policy compliance (Flynn and Davis, forthcoming; 
Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). It could be that large organisation size and the status 
and power that comes with it has the effect of shielding public buyers from 
institutional pressures. While public buyers in large organisations are in a better 
position to comply with institutional demands relative to buyers in smaller 
organisations, they may experience less compulsion and pressure to do so.   
3.15.6 Procurement structure 
Procurement structure is relevant when accounting for policy compliance. In their 
case examination of a local government authority Flynn et al., (2012) showed that 
the transition to a centrally managed procurement function improved compliance 
performance. Along with advantage of economies of scale, procurement 
centralisation is associated with economies of process and economies of information 
and learning (Karjalainen, 2011; Trautmann, Bals and Hartmann, 2009). By 
economies of process is meant standard, consistent work practices that are used by 
individuals throughout the organisation. Having a standardised approach to 
procurement already in place makes it easier for SME-friendly policy to be 
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incorporated into organisational practices. Low levels of standardisation and a 
reliance on ad hoc approaches is less conducive to successfully embedding 
government policy in procurement practices. Economies of information and learning 
refer to the accumulation of knowledge and expertise by a particular unit or 
department within an organisation. This same body of knowledge can be diffused 
among employees in the interests of organisational effectiveness. Without a 
repository of expertise public buyers are likely to find it more difficult to navigate 
the regulatory and policy environment. The above contentions suggest that 
procurement centralisation is more conducive to the realisation of policy than 
decentralised structural arrangements.  
3.15.7 Procurement maturity 
Procurement maturity is the last of the seven control variables in the model. The 
assumption is that procurement maturity is correlated with policy compliance. 
Procurement maturity is understood by reference to four stages: passive, 
independent, supportive and integrative (Reck and Long, 1988). In the passive stage 
procurement is no more than a clerical function. In the independent stage 
procurement uses best-in-class techniques but operates in isolation of other 
organisational functions. The supportive stage sees procurement contributing to the 
competitive position of the organisation, although it falls short of underpinning 
organisational strategy. At the integrative stage procurement has reached full 
maturity and is recognised as critical to the successful realisation of business 
strategy. Where the procurement function is rudimentary and has low organisational 
status the ability and willingness of procurement personnel to act on SME-friendly 
policy will be limited. Chiefly, they will lack the requisite skills, motivation and 
organisational support to do so. Conversely, procurement personnel will be more 
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able and willing to respond positively to SME-friendly policy where the procurement 
function is more advanced and mature. Professionalism is likely to be higher, 
organisational support better and there will greater appreciation of how procurement 
compliance can bolster the legitimacy and effectiveness of the organisation in the 
eyes of internal and external stakeholders.    
Table 14 Operationalisation and measurement of control variables  
Variable Operationalisation Measurement 
Procurement 
experience 
How many years of experience do 
you have working in procurement?  
Number of years 
Procurement 
involvement  
In a typical week how much of your 
work time is spent on procurement-
related activity?  
0 per cent 
1-25 per cent 
26-50 per cent 
51-75 per cent 
76-100 per cent  
Procurement 
qualification 
Do you hold a procurement-related 
qualification? 
Yes 
No  
Policy 
awareness 
Are you familiar with the content of 
Circular 10/14: Initiatives to Assist 
SMEs in Public Procurement? 
Yes 
No 
Organisation 
size 
How many employees are in your 
organisation? 
1-9 employees 
10-49 employees 
50-249 employees 
250+ employees 
Procurement 
structure 
How is procurement managed in 
your organisation?  
On a centralised basis 
On a decentralised basis 
Procurement 
maturity 
(Reck and 
Long, 1988) 
Which option best describes the role 
of purchasing in your organisation?  
Stage 1: Purchasing is 
reactive and uses ‘quick 
fixes’ to solve problems 
Stage 2: Our purchasing 
techniques and practices are 
the best available 
Stage 3: Purchasing 
techniques and practices 
strengthen our competitive 
position 
Stage 4: Purchasing informs 
and helps to implement our 
strategy 
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3.16 Preliminary analysis of survey data  
Attention now turns to the screening and preliminary analysis of the data gathered 
during the primary research phase of the study. A total of 517 responses were 
received over the two-week survey period. As 3000 public buyers received the 
questionnaire, this yielded a response rate of 17.2 per cent. A comparison with recent 
surveys of procurement personnel shows this figure to be acceptable and in line with 
current trends. In some of these the response rate is lower than that secured here. 
Costa, Arantes and Tavares (2014) managed responses rates of 6.9 per cent and 15 
per cent for two consecutive surveys carried out in 2009 and 2010 among Portuguese 
public contracting authorities. Large and Thomsen (2011) achieved a 15 per cent 
response rate from a sample frame of 725 German purchasing managers. Brewer, 
Wallin and Ashenbaum (2014) achieved 16.3 per cent in their e-survey of 1700 
members of the Institute of Supply Management in the US. Marginally higher 
responses rates from public and private buyers have also been reported: 18.7 per cent 
by Eltantawy and Guinipero (2013); 20.5 per cent by Large (2005); 22.5 per cent by 
Meehan and Bryde (2014); 23 per cent by McMurray et al., (2014); and 24.3 per cent 
by Karjalainen and Von Raaij (2011). Questions around data screening and 
respondent profile are examined next.  
3.16.1 Data screening 
After calculating the response rate the dataset was screened for incomplete responses 
and anomalies. This was done in parallel to independent sample t-testing for 
respondent representativeness (see section 3.17). As part of screening process, 
frequency and descriptive tests were performed on the variables. Nothing emerged to 
give concern in relation to outliers or unusual response patterns. What the screening 
phase did reveal was that a sizeable proportion of respondents had prematurely quit 
the survey. High levels of ‘break-off’ are a common occurrence in e-surveying, 
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unfortunately (Lynn, 2008). Of the 517 questionnaires started, 168 did not contain 
sufficient data to allow for any further meaningful analysis. The elimination of 168 
substantially incomplete responses from the initial return of 517 left 349 usable 
responses. In terms of absolute numbers, 349 were more than adequate for 
conducting predictive tests. A widely accepted minimum response threshold for 
inferential testing is the sum total of predictive variables x eight + 50 (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2013). Fifteen predictor variables were used in the model, meaning that 
170 usable responses would have sufficed
29
. It was also at this stage that compliance 
scores were calculated for each public buyer (refer back to section 3.13). The final 
screening step involved coding and labelling all variables.  
3.16.2 Respondent profile 
A profile of the 349 respondents who returned usable questionnaires is contained in 
Table 15 (pg. 205). The extent of their involvement in purchasing varies 
considerably. Over half of respondents spend less than 25 per cent of their typical 
working week on purchasing-related activity and just over one in five spend between 
76-100 per cent of their time purchasing. What this tells us is that only a minority of 
respondents are majorly or exclusively involved in procurement. Consistent with the 
above, only 34 per cent hold a purchasing-related qualification. Average 
procurement experience is 9.5 years. Most respondents (72 per cent) are familiar 
with the content of SME-friendly procurement policy. Educational attainment is high 
among respondents. Over 90 per cent have a third level qualification, with 41 per 
cent qualified to postgraduate level. Respondents come from across the public sector 
spectrum. The highest percentage (25 per cent) is from the education sector. 
Approximately 44 per cent of respondents work in large organisations. Procurement 
                                                            
29 15 x 8 = 120 + 50 = 170. 
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is centralised in 54 per cent of cases. The four stages of procurement maturity are all 
present. Thirty per cent of respondents identify procurement in their organisation as 
being at stage two and a further 30 per cent identify it as having reached stage four, 
or full maturity. Taken together these descriptors provide a good snapshot of who are 
the survey respondents and how procurement is managed in their organisations.     
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Table15 Respondent profile 
Individual characteristics % 
Procurement involvement  
Less than 25 per cent   
26-50 per cent 
51-75 per cent 
76-100 per cent  
 
58.2 
10 
9.2 
22.6 
Procurement experience 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Median 
 
9.49 years 
8.02 
7 years 
Procurement qualification   
Yes   
No 
 
34.1 
65.9 
Policy familiarity 
Yes 
No 
 
72 
28 
Educational attainment 
Leaving Certificate 
Third level certificate 
Third level diploma 
Bachelor degree 
Master’s degree 
PhD  
 
5.4 
7.4 
11.5 
32.4 
41 
2.3 
Organisation characteristics % 
Organisation type 
Central government 
Local government 
State agency 
 
16.3 
10.6 
16.9 
206 
 
Semi-state/utility 
Education institution 
Other (incl. external consultants) 
10.7 
24.9 
20.6 
Organisation size 
1-9 employees 
10-49 employees 
50-249 employees 
250 or more employees 
 
11.2 
19.8 
24.4 
44.6 
Procurement structure  
Centralised 
Decentralised 
 
54.7 
45.3 
Procurement maturity 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
 
23.8 
30.1 
16.3 
29.8 
n = 349 
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3.17 Respondent representativeness  
Securing an adequate response rate is paramount in survey-based research (see 
section 3.7). The higher the response rate the more likely it is that survey estimates 
will be representative of the population (Dillman, 2007). The reality for most 
researchers is that only a minority of individuals selected to participate in a study 
will respond. In the domain of purchasing and supply chain management Melynk et 
al., (2012) calculated that the average response rate for survey-based studies 
published between 1990 and 2008 was 33 per cent. If non-response was completely 
random this would not be a problem (Hok, De Leeuw and Dillman, 2008; Moser and 
Kalton, 1985). Random non-response cannot be assumed as respondents can and do 
differ in statistically significant ways from non-respondents (Blair & Zinkhan, 2006; 
Lynn, 2008). When this happens the respondent cohort is not representative of the 
population from which it is drawn. Any attempt to generalise from the sample to the 
population is compromised as a result (Whitehead, Groothuis and Blomquist, 1993). 
For these reasons it is always advisable to test for non-response bias. Non-response 
bias tests are overviewed in section 3.17.1. Section 3.17.2 then explains the decision 
to choose the extrapolation test. The results from it are given in section 3.17.3. These 
indicate that the public buyer respondents are representative of the population from 
which they are drawn.     
3.17.1 Non-response bias tests  
Several methods are available to detect non-response bias. Among the most reliable 
of these is comparing survey data with known values for a population (Armstrong 
and Overton, 1977). In business surveys a standard scenario would involve 
comparing respondent characteristics against the already established characteristics 
of the population. Population data is not always available for more specific 
population groups. In such circumstances the extrapolation method pioneered by 
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Pace (1939) is the next best alternative. Extrapolation assumes that late respondents 
are proxies for non-respondents when testing for bias. It does so in the belief that the 
factors that explain non-response – no interest in the research topic, wariness over 
the intent of the survey, time availability – also explain delayed response. From this 
premise, late respondents and non-respondents are taken to be equivalent and 
therefore substitutable when testing for non-response bias. The extrapolation 
technique involves comparing the means of early and late respondents on pre-
selected characteristics. The absence of statistically significant differences between 
the two groups indicates that respondents are representative of their population, 
although it does not guarantee of it (Dalecki, Whitehead and Blomquist, 1993). The 
presence of statistically significant differences between early and late respondents 
points to a skewed respondent sample that is significantly different from the 
population.    
3.17.2 Non-response bias tests: extrapolation  
The extrapolation technique was used to test for non-response bias in this study. The 
decision to use extrapolation was determined by the lack of any viable alternative. 
No reliable external data on the public buyer population in Ireland existed at the time 
of the survey and so there was no benchmark against which to compare the 
characteristics of the respondent sample. Presented in a more positive light, 
extrapolation is commonly used in purchasing and supply chain management 
research (Brewer, Wallin and Ashenbaum, 2014; Gelderman, Ghijsen & Brugman, 
2006; Large, 2005; Meehan and Bryde, 2014; Miocevic, 2011; Sancha, Longoni and 
Gimenez, 2015). It is efficient from a resource perspective relative to other strategies 
for non-response testing, such as follow-up phone contacts with identified non-
respondents (Lynn, 2008). Comparing early and late respondents groups also made 
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sense for this study as there was a clear time demarcation between the former and the 
latter. The early respondent group submitted their questionnaire within 24 hours of 
initial contact being made. Ten days had elapsed before the individuals within the 
late respondent group submitted their questionnaire, and then only after receiving a 
reminder email notification. 
3.17.3 Representativeness test results 
The independent sample t-test is used to compare variables common to two separate 
groups (Brace, Kemp and Snelgar, 2009). Running the t-test in this study revealed 
there to be no significant difference between early and late respondents. Based on the 
principles of extrapolation this allows us to generalise our survey estimates to the 
Irish public buyer population. Details of the test are as follows. The early respondent 
group comprised the first 100 public buyers who submitted their questionnaires. The 
late respondent group was made up of the final 100 public buyers to submit their 
questionnaire. The two groups were compared across their individual characteristics 
and the answers they supplied on institutional pressures (see Table 16). The 
characteristics tested were procurement experience, procurement involvement, 
educational attainment and organisation size. Early respondents had marginally 
higher scores on procurement experience, procurement involvement and educational 
attainment compared to late respondents. Their organisations were also somewhat 
larger. These differences were not statistically significant (p >.05). Early and late 
respondents were also similar across institutional factors. On six out of the seven 
factors no statistically significant difference was observed (p >.05). Only on the 
question of the compatibility of SME-friendly policy with organisational goals did 
the early and late respondent groups differ (p <.10).  
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Table 16 Early versus late respondents* 
 Mean scores: 
Early 
respondents  
Mean scores:  
Late 
respondents 
Mean 
difference 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Characteristics 
Procurement 
experience (years) 
10.19  8.98 1.20 .297 
Procurement 
involvement 
(1-5 interval scale) 
2.95 2.71 .24 .189 
Educational 
attainment 
(1-6 interval scale) 
4.08 4.02 .06 .719 
Organisation size 
(1-4 interval scale) 
3.05 2.94 .11 .464 
Institutional factors 
(1-5 Likert scale) 
Social legitimacy 3.87 3.85 .02 .872 
Economic gain  3.76 3.54 .22 .104 
Consistency of rules 3.87   3.76  .11  .399  
Compatibility 4.06 3.83 .23 .065 
Constraints 2.61 2.51 .10 .442 
Coercion 3.36 3.15 .21 .169 
Diffusion of 
practices 
3.30 3.30 .00 1.00 
*Equal variances assumed in all cases 
3.18 Conclusion 
The verification of respondent representativeness brings this chapter to a close. The 
next chapter reports on the results of the descriptive and predictive statistical tests 
that were carried out on the data. Before moving on it is worth reminding ourselves 
of the main strands of the methodology. The initial sections clarified the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning the study and what these meant in concrete 
terms for researching SME-friendly policy compliance. While philosophical 
questions have proved hugely divisive in social science, researchers are advised to at 
least demonstrate some awareness of the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological import of their decision making (Seale, 1999a, 1999b). Thereafter, 
the chapter provided a step-by-step account of how the primary research phase was 
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managed. It began by justifying the choice of the survey-based method, before 
moving on to discuss issues around the design of self-administered questionnaires, 
effective survey measurement, identifying and accessing the population of interest, 
and survey distribution. Several sections were also devoted to the measurement and 
operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables in the study, namely: 
policy compliance, institutional factors and the control variables. Throughout the 
chapter rationales were offered in defence of choices made and actions taken. The 
weaknesses and limitations of the research strategy were also acknowledged where 
they were believed to exist. Paving the way for the main statistical tests in chapter 
four, a preliminary analysis of the dataset was undertaken in the latter sections of this 
chapter.  
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Chapter 4: 
Research findings 
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4.0 Overview of chapter four 
This chapter reports on the data findings, the preliminary screening aspects of which 
were covered in chapter three. Section 4.1 examines the extent of policy compliance. 
It provides key descriptive statistics surrounding public buyers’ compliance with 
SME-friendly procurement policy. An assessment of compliance with each of the 19 
individual measures that comprise the SME-friendly procurement index is also 
performed. Together these descriptive findings answer Research Question 1: to what 
extent are public buyers complying with SME-friendly procurement policy? Section 
4.2 focuses on the institutional predictors of policy compliance. It presents the results 
of a three-step hierarchical regression and identifies the predictor variables 
significant at each of the three stages. The institutionally-derived model is shown to 
be significant (p <.01), accounting for 27.3 per cent of the variance in policy 
compliance (Adjusted R
2
 = .273). Section 4.3 interprets the findings of the predictive 
model in light of the hypotheses set forth. Seven of the eleven hypothesised 
relationships between institutional pressures and policy compliance are supported. 
This yields the answer to Research Question 2: how does the institutional 
environment affect public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy? The chapter finishes in section 4.4 with a summary of the main findings. 
4.1 Extent of SME-friendly policy compliance 
Evidence on what is happening with SME-friendly procurement policy in practice is 
scant and, with a few exceptions (Flynn and Davis, forthcoming; GHK and 
Technopolis, 2007; GHK, 2010), most of what we know has emerged from case 
study insights that are not representative of the behaviour of national populations of 
public buyers (Cabras, 2011; Erridge and Hennigan, 2012; Loader, 2007, 2011; 
Preuss, 2009; Walker and Preuss, 2008). It is against this backdrop that determining 
the extent to which SME-friendly policy is being complied with is warranted. The 
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remainder of this section describes what the Irish population of public buyers is 
doing in the face of institutional policy pressures to make public procurement more 
inclusive of SMEs. Section 4.1.1 gives the key statistical descriptors for policy 
compliance. These indicate that SME-friendly policy is being complied with to a 
moderate extent. A breakdown of compliance for each of the 19 recommendations 
that comprise the SME-friendly procurement index is provided in section 4.1.2. 
Substantial variation in compliance is evident across the suite of SME-friendly 
‘positive measures’. Some measures are being put into practice by the majority of 
public buyers. Others are being acted on by only a minority. The final section 4.1.3 
draws the descriptive findings together in order to answer Research Question 1.  
4.1.1 Policy compliance scores 
Analysis of the policy compliance scores for public buyers reveals the following. 
The minimum compliance score is 5 (out of 22) and the maximum is 22 (out of 22), 
which gives a range of 17. The mean or average score is 14.54 (std. dev. 3.67). The 
95 per cent Confidence Interval for the estimated population mean is between 14.15 
and 14.93. The average Irish public buyer is complying with at least half of all the 
‘positive measures’ geared towards facilitating increased SME participation in public 
contract competitions. The median score is 15, which slightly exceeds the mean 
score. The most frequent score for public buyers (mode score) is also 15. The full list 
of statistical descriptors and their associated values is given in Table 17. To shed 
further light on public buyers’ compliance behaviour the distribution of index scores 
is depicted in Fig. 11 (pg. 217). As can be seen, there is a clustering of scores on the 
right-hand side of the compliance scale; confirmed by the negative standardised z-
score for skewness of -1.47. Apart from this, compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy appears to be quite normal in its distribution. A minority of 
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public buyers with low scores and high scores bookend the majority of the 
population found in the middle of the compliance scale.  
Table 17 Statistical descriptors for policy compliance 
Measure Statistic  Standard 
error 
Mean 14.54 .19 
95 per cent Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 
Upper Bound 
 
14.15 
14.93 
 
Standard deviation 3.67  
Median 15  
Mode 15  
Variance 13.5  
Minimum 5  
Maximum 22  
Range 17  
Skewness -.193 .131 
Skewness (standardised z-score) -1.47  
 
 
A quartile split was performed on the dependent variable to further disaggregate 
SME-friendly policy compliance. The bottom quartile of compliance scores goes 
from 5 up to 11. The second compliance quartile is in the range of 12 to 14 inclusive. 
The third quartile goes from 15 to 17 inclusive. The upper quartile contains scores of 
18 up to a maximum of 22. These four quartiles can be mapped on to the following 
compliance ranges: low compliance; low-medium compliance; medium-high 
compliance; and high compliance (see Table 18). All respondents are found to be 
complying with at least some of ‘positive measures’ recommended in official 
government policy. No single respondent is exhibiting outright defiance of SME-
friendly procurement policy. The bottom quartile extends as far as 11, which is the 
mid-way point on the scale. The second and third quartiles are more compressed and 
approximate to the compliance ranges of low-medium and medium-high 
respectively. At the upper end, less than one per cent of respondents are recorded as 
exhibiting perfect compliance i.e. scoring 22 out of 22. Still, one in four public 
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buyers claims to be doing almost all that is asked of them for facilitating SMEs in 
contract competitions, evidenced by their scores of 18 or higher.      
Table 18 Policy compliance ranges 
Quartile Compliance score  Compliance range 
Lower 5-11 Low 
2nd 12-14 Low-medium 
3rd 15-17 Medium-high 
Upper 18-22 High 
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Fig. 11 Distribution of policy compliance scores (n = 
349)  
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4.1.2 Compliance with individual policy recommendations 
At the aggregate level public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy has been established. We now move to look at compliance with the individual 
‘positive measures’ that comprise the index. Marked variation is evident among the 
19 measures (see Table 19, pg. 221). Compliance spans from a low of 40 per cent to 
a high of 88 per cent. At the high end of reported compliance are measures to do 
with proportionate insurance requirements (88 per cent), online advertising of 
contracts valued at €25,000 or more (87 per cent), providing feedback to 
unsuccessful tenderers (83 per cent), open tendering (78 per cent) and allowing 
suppliers to self-declare their financial capacity (78 per cent) and insurance cover (76 
per cent). More moderate levels of compliance are found on other measures, 
including: devising inclusive framework agreements (63 per cent), dividing contracts 
into lots (61 per cent) and using standardised tender documents and templates (61 
per cent). Lower levels of compliance are observable on several other measures, 
where only a minority of public buyers are acting as policy recommends. In this 
category are measures to do with accepting variants to specifications (40 per cent), 
publishing PINs (42 per cent), being flexible in accepting proof of financial capacity 
from tenderers (44 per cent) and conducting market analysis prior to issuing formal 
requests for tender (49 per cent).  
The assessment of compliance with individual measures reveals the inconsistent way 
in which public buyers are acting on SME-friendly policy. There is clear evidence of 
progress being made in some areas. In other areas progress is less obvious. We can 
illustrate this by way of some examples. Over seven in ten public buyers claim to be 
adhering to the two measures aimed at widening access to contract competitions. 
This bodes well in terms of smaller suppliers and firms new to public procurement 
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having at least the opportunity to participate. The same is true of reducing SMEs’ 
information deficit when tendering. Approximately eight out of ten public buyers 
stated that they are taking the appropriate steps in this regard by providing feedback 
and publishing contract award notices. Inroads are also being made in alleviating the 
administrative burden on small suppliers, particularly by the majority of public 
buyers deferring to the principle of self-declaration for financial capacity and 
insurance cover. The results for making contracts more visible to SMEs are mixed. 
While almost nine out of ten public buyers are advertising their contracts on 
eTenders, only four out of ten are publishing PINs. The latter are beneficial in 
alerting SMEs to the future demand requirements of their potential clients. 
Progress is less evident on the other three remaining dimensions of SME-friendly 
tendering: contract size; ensuring proportionate qualification criteria; and openness 
to new suppliers and supply solutions. The first of these three is notable for the fact 
that it is the single greatest impediment to SMEs’ participation in public 
procurement. Many of the barriers experienced by SMEs when tendering, such as 
public buyers’ reticence in engaging with atypical suppliers and demands to satisfy 
onerous financial turnover thresholds are the by-product of large contract size. In 
spite of their centrality to reform of public procurement, only between 50-63 per cent 
of public buyers are dividing contracts into lots, devising inclusive framework 
agreements or encouraging consortium bids. Adherence to measures around 
proportionality in the use of qualification and assessment criteria is also patchy. 
While almost nine out of ten are stipulating insurance cover requirements that are 
proportionate are to the circumstances of the contract, less than half show flexibility 
when it comes to accepting proof of suppliers’ financial credentials. Cultivating a 
procurement system in which public buyers proactively search for the best suppliers 
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and supply solutions also has some way to go. Seventy per cent take life-cycle costs 
into account, but only 49 per cent are researching their marketplaces and even fewer 
are willing to accept reasonable variants to tender specifications. 
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Table 19 Compliance with individual policy recommendations 
 Measures 1-19 Compliant 
% 
Non-
compliant 
% 
M
a
k
in
g
 c
o
n
tr
a
ct
 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
v
is
ib
le
 
 
Online advertising: advertise contracts for supplies and general services valued at €25,000 or 
more on eTenders  
87 
 
13  
Prior Information Notices (PINs): communicate long-term purchasing plans by publishing PINs 
on eTenders   
42 58 
W
id
en
in
g
 
a
cc
es
s 
to
 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s Open tendering procedure: use open (competitive) tendering for contracts worth up to €134,000 
for goods and services contracts  
78 22 
Qualification criteria: use broadly defined qualification criteria in order to increase the number 
of eligible tenderers 
72 28 
A
ll
ev
ia
ti
n
g
 
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
t
iv
e 
b
u
rd
en
 
 
Self-declare financial capacity: allow applicants to self-declare their financial capacity; seek 
evidence of same in the event of the tenderer being short-listed  
78 22 
Self-declare insurance cover: allow applicants to self-declare their insurance cover; seek 
evidence of same in the event of the tenderer being short-listed  
76 24 
Standard tender documents: use standard documentation and tender templates issued by the OGP  61 39 
Online tender submission: promote online submission of tenders by suppliers as the norm 63 37 
C
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
si
ze
 
 
Divide contracts into lots: divide contracts into lots where appropriate and practical  61 39 
Openness to SME consortium bidding: be open to consortium bids by, for example, drawing 
attention to this possibility in the contract notice and/or by publishing PINs 
50 50 
Inclusive framework agreements: ensure, where possible, that the terms of framework 
agreements facilitate the inclusion of small firms 
63 37 
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P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
a
li
ty
 Proportionate turnover requirements: do not set company turnover requirements at more than 
twice the estimated contract value for routine goods and services  
59 41 
Proportionate insurance requirements: request types and levels of insurance that are 
proportionate and reasonable in the context of the contract (types and limits specified in policy 
guidance) 
88 12 
Flexible over proof of financial capacity: be flexible over the type of proof of financial capacity 
acceptable from tenderers  
44 
 
 
56 
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Market analysis: undertake market analysis prior to tendering  49 51 
Variants to specifications: indicate where reasonable variants to the tender specifications are 
acceptable 
40 60 
Life cycle costs: take account of whole life-cycle costs associated with a purchase   70 30 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
a
sy
m
m
et
ri
es
 Feedback for tenderers: provide written feedback to all tenderers as a matter of good practice  83 17 
Publication of award notices: publish all contract award notices over €25,000 on eTenders 78 22 
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4.1.3 Answering Research Question 1 
Analysis of the survey data reveals that public buyers are complying with SME-
friendly procurement policy to a moderate extent – signified by the mean score of 
14.54 out of 22 on the compliance index. Policy recommendations are not being 
eschewed, but nor are they being fully and comprehensively adhered to and put into 
practice. The relatively normal distribution of compliance scores shows this to be the 
case. In many respects the response of public buyers resembles a compromise 
approach to facilitating SMEs in contract competitions. Individual assessment of 
compliance rates across the 19 individual policy recommendations that make up the 
index is informative. Some categories of measures are receiving solid support. Other 
measures are not. In the former is widening access to opportunities, addressing 
information asymmetries, alleviating the administrative burden of tendering, and 
publicly advertising contracts. In the latter is tackling contract size issues, using 
proportionate assessment criteria, and being open to new suppliers and supply 
solutions. These findings disclose the uneven and disjointed translation of SME-
friendly procurement policy into practice that has taken place to date. Without doubt, 
there is a gap between policy aspiration and its realisation in practice; between what 
government claims will happen and what is actually happening at organisation level 
to accommodate SMEs. These findings are situated within the wider literature on 
regulatory and policy compliance in public procurement in section 5.1.      
4.2 Predictors of SME-friendly policy compliance 
If the first section of this chapter described what public buyers are doing in relation 
to SME-friendly procurement policy, this section answers why they are doing it. It 
does so by testing a predictive model for policy compliance (refer back to Fig. 7, pg. 
131) using a three-step hierarchical regression technique, and then setting out the 
results. Before going into the detail on the model’s findings, two data tests are 
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performed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 respectively. The purpose of the first is to 
identify the inter-correlations between the variables tested in the model. It shows that 
several of the predictor variables are correlated with each other and with the 
dependent variable of policy compliance. The second test is to check for multi-
collinearity. This is where two or more of the predictor variables are so highly 
correlated as to make it difficult to distinguish their individual effect on policy 
compliance. There is no indication of multi-collinearity in the dataset. The remaining 
sections 4.2.3–4.2.6 are devoted to testing the model. The three-step hierarchical 
regression technique is outlined initially. The significant predictors of policy 
compliance at each of the three stages of model testing are then identified. 
Simultaneously, the predictive power of the model is reported at each of the three 
stages. 
4.2.1 Inter-correlations  
Prior to conducting predictive tests it is advisable to examine inter-variable 
correlations. The inter-variable correlations in this dataset, which include Pearson’s 
Correlation Coefficient values and their significance levels, are contained in Table 
20 (pg. 226). A number of statistically significant correlations can be observed. 
However, all observed correlations are in the low or moderate ranges and the highest 
value is .57
30
. This gives an initial indication that multi-collinearity is not a problem 
in the dataset. Procurement involvement and procurement qualification are correlated 
with all other control variables. Policy familiarity is also correlated with organisation 
size and procurement structure. Procurement experience does not appear to be 
related with any variable save for the aforementioned relationships to procurement 
involvement and procurement qualification. Five of the seven control variables 
                                                            
30 <.30 = low correlation. Between .30 and .70 = moderate correlation. >.70 = strong correlation.  
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correlate with the dependent variable of policy compliance (p <.01). The two 
exceptions are procurement experience and procurement structure. Pearson’s values 
for inter-correlations between the controls and policy compliance range from .22 to 
.36. Correlations are also observed between the control variables and the institutional 
variables, and between the institutional variables themselves. In reference to the 
latter, social legitimacy, economic gain, institutional rule consistency and 
compatibility variables are moderately correlated. Five of the eight institutional 
variables correlate with policy compliance (p <.05). The Pearson’s values for these 
relationships range from .10 to .22.   
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Table 20 Inter-correlations within the variable set  
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Experience 1                
Involvement .13** 1               
Qualification .19** .57** 1              
Policy familiarity .07 .41** .36** 1             
Org. size .08 .42** .30** .41** 1            
Procure. structure .03 .24** .13* .04 -.14** 1           
Procure. maturity .09 .20** .11* .11* .03 .03 1          
Legitimacy -.05 .09 .10* .06 -.06 .00 .10 1         
Economic gain -.02 .00 -.01 -.10 -.17** -.05 .04 .50** 1        
Rule consistency -.03 .00 .01 .04 -.06 -.06 .01 .51** .52** 1       
Dependency -.05 .08 .04 .17** .33** -.26** .01 .06 .03 .06 1      
Compatibility  .06 .20** .14** .20** .10** .07 .15** .39** .27** .35** .06 1     
Constraints .08 .13** .11* -.01 .00 .15** -.05 .14** -.17** -.16** -.06 -.07 1    
Coercion -.06 .12* .06 .14** .04 -.10 .11* .04 .03 .03 .12* .06 .14** 1   
Diffusion -.04 .15** .10 .03 -.01 .11* .10 .37** .29** .33** .02 .38** -.07 .05 1  
Compliance .08 .36** .33** .35** .27** .10 .22** .13* .00 .16** .18* .22** -.08 .10* .05 1 
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
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4.2.2 Testing for multi-collinearity  
High inter-variable correlations can pose problems when attempting to isolate the 
relative contribution of predictors in a statistical model – a problem referred to as 
multi-collinearity. Two diagnostic checks were performed on the dataset to test for 
multi-collinearity (Brace, Kemp and Snelgar, 2009; Field, 2000). The first of these 
looked at Tolerance Values. Tolerance Values are taken as an indicator of the 
correlation between predictor variables and are measured on a 0 to 1 scale. A 
variable with a Tolerance Value at or near 0 is closely related to other predictor 
variables. The lowest observed Tolerance Value in the dataset was .48. This 
provided the first evidence that multi-collinearity was not a problem. The second 
diagnostic check examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) associated with each 
predictor variable. VIF is the obverse of Tolerance Value. A high VIF score means 
that a predictor variable is closely related to one or more other variables. VIF is 
measured on a 1 to 10 scale. The highest observed VIF score was 2.05. The result of 
the second test confirmed what initially transpired through the Tolerance Values, 
namely: that the variables were not correlated with one another to the extent that they 
in any way compromised the predictive validity of the policy compliance model.     
4.2.3 Testing the predictive model of policy compliance  
The predictive model of policy compliance was tested using a three-step hierarchical 
multiple regression technique. The same approach has been used in recent studies on 
policy compliance and policy uptake in a procurement context (Hoejmose, Grosvold 
and Millington, 2013; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013; Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 
2015). In the first step the seven control variables were entered into the model 
(model 1). The second step saw the inclusion of the eight institutional predictor 
variables (model 2). In the third and final step the three moderator variables were 
added (model 3). In total 18 discrete variables were tested as part of the predictive 
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model of policy compliance
31
. The model was significant (p <.001) at each of the 
three stages (see Table 21). The significance of the final model reads as: F (18, 316) 
= 7.98, p <.001. The complete model explained 27.3 per cent of the variance in 
policy compliance (Adjusted R
2
 = .273). The variance attributable to the model at 
each of the three stages is reproduced in Table 22 (pg. 229). It shows that the 
predictive power of the model increased with the addition of the second and then 
third set of independent and moderator variables respectively. The Adjusted R
2 
figure, which measures variance in the dependent variable, went from .209 in model 
1 to .252 in model 2 and finally to .273 in model 3. What this demonstrates is that 
the institutional predictors and their interaction effects were significant in predicting 
policy compliance even after the characteristics of public buyers and their 
organisations were controlled for. More detail on each of the three test steps is 
provided in sections 4.2.4-4.2.7.   
Table 21 ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1016.414 7 145.202 13.627 .000
b
 
Residual 3484.421 327 10.656   
Total 4500.836 334    
2 
Regression 1285.052 15 85.670 8.498 .000
c
 
Residual 3215.784 319 10.081   
Total 4500.836 334    
3 
Regression 1407.025 18 78.168 7.984 .000
d
 
Residual 3093.811 316 9.791   
Total 4500.836 334    
a Dependent variable: Policy compliance 
b Predictors: (Constant) x 7 control variables 
c Predictors: (Constant) x 7 control variables & 8 independent variables 
d Predictors (Constant) x 7 control variables & 8 independent variables & 3 
moderator variables 
 
                                                            
31 For missing data, cases were excluded on a listwise basis. 15 of the 349 usable responses 
(cases) had one or more missing variables. As such, these were not analysed in the predictive model.   
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Table 22 Predictive power of the policy compliance model 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .475
a
 .226 .209 3.26431 
2 .534
b
 .286 .252 3.17503 
3 .559
c
 .313 .273 3.12898 
Dependent variable: Compliance 
a Predictors: (Constant) x 7 control variables 
b Predictors: (Constant) x 7 control variables & 8 independent variables 
c Predictors (Constant) x 7 control variables & 8 independent variables & 3 
moderator variables 
 
4.2.4 Model 1 
The first variable block entered into the hierarchical regression consisted of the 
seven control variables. This first model (model 1) was significant at F (7, 327) = 
13.63, p <.001. The percentage of variance explained was 20.9 per cent (Adjusted R
2
 
= .209). Five of the seven control variables emerged as significant predictors of 
public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly policy (see Table 23). The five 
variables were procurement involvement (p <.10); procurement qualification (p 
<.05); policy familiarity (p <.01); organisation size (p <.10); and procurement 
maturity (p <.01). The findings were consistent with a priori expectations regarding 
the likely effect of these five variables on policy compliance. Experience in public 
purchasing and the structure of the procurement function (centralised or 
decentralised) were not significant in predicting policy compliance at stage one. Of 
the five significant predictors, the first three relate to the attributes of public buyers. 
The latter two relate to organisation characteristics. All five predictors had a positive 
impact on policy compliance. Judged by the standardised coefficients, the strongest 
predictive effect belonged to policy familiarity (β = .195), followed by procurement 
maturity (β = .159), procurement involvement (β = .125), procurement qualification 
(β = .123) and organisation size (β = .10).  
230 
 
  Table 23 Co-efficients
a
 (controls) 
Model 1 Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta β 
 
(Constant) 9.529 .737  12.933 .000 
Experience -.003 .023 -.007 -.146 .884 
Involvement .339 .183 .125 1.853 .065 
Qualification .952 .473 .123 2.012 .045 
Policy 
familiarity 
1.596 .463 .195 3.444 .001 
Org. size .364 .203 .104 1.790 .074 
Procure. 
structure 
.427 .387 .058 1.104 .270 
Procure. 
maturity 
.505 .158 .159 3.192 .002 
a. Dependent Variable: Policy compliance 
 
4.2.5 Model 2  
The second variable block entered into the hierarchical regression consisted of the 
eight institutional predictor variables. This second model (model 2) was significant 
at F (15, 319) = 8.50, p <.001. The percentage of variance explained by model 2 was 
25.2 per cent (Adjusted R
2
 = .252), which was an increase of 4.3 per cent on model 
1. Three of the eight institutional variables were significant in predicting policy 
compliance (see Table 24). These were consistency of institutional rules in public 
procurement (p <.01); dependence on the institutional rule setter (p <.05); and the 
constraining effect of SME-friendly policy on professional discretion (p <.05). The 
significant effects in model 2 were in the direction hypothesised. Institutional rule 
consistency (β = .19) and dependence on the institutional rule setter (β = .135) had a 
positive impact on policy compliance. The constraining effect variable had a 
negative impact on compliance (β = -.10). The other five institutional predictors 
were not significant at this stage. Four of the five significant control variables in 
model 1 remained significant in model 2. These were procurement involvement (p 
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<.05); procurement qualification (p <.05); policy familiarity (p <.05); and 
procurement maturity (p <.01). Organisation size, which was significant in model 1, 
did not retain its significance in model 2 (p = .26). The previously non-significant 
control variable of procurement structure emerged as newly significant (p <.05), 
wherein a centralised configuration was found to be positively associated with public 
buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly policy.     
 
Table 24 Co-efficients
a
 (controls & independent variables) 
Model 2 Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta β 
 
(Constant) 8.695 1.559  5.578 .000 
Experience .004 .022 .009 .183 .855 
Involvement .374 .183 .138 2.050 .041 
Qualification 1.052 .463 .136 2.271 .024 
Policy familiarity 1.124 .466 .137 2.411 .016 
Org. size .235 .212 .067 1.109 .268 
Procure. structure .823 .397 .112 2.074 .039 
Procure. maturity .464 .156 .146 2.970 .003 
Legitimacy .072 .253 .018 .284 .776 
Economic gain -.354 .240 -.091 -1.478 .140 
Rule consistency .679 .246 .169 2.756 .006 
Dependence 1.106 .434 .135 2.552 .011 
Compatibility  .303 .234 .073 1.292 .197 
Constraints -.390 .197 -.100 -1.978 .049 
Coercion .086 .166 .026 .515 .607 
Diffusion -.339 .251 -.075 -1.354 .177 
a. Dependent Variable: Policy compliance 
 
4.2.6 Model 3  
The third and final variable block entered into the hierarchical regression consisted 
of the moderating or interactive effect variables. This third model (model 3) was 
significant at F (18, 316) = 7.98, p <.001. The percentage of variance explained by 
model 3 was 27.3 per cent (Adjusted R
2
 = .273), which represented an increase of 
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2.1 per cent on model 2. The three interactions were found to act as significant 
predictors of policy compliance. The moderating effect of procurement experience 
on the relationship between social legitimacy and policy compliance was significant 
at p <.10. The moderating effect of procurement involvement on the relationship 
between diffusion of SME-friendly practices and policy compliance was also 
significant at p <.10. The moderating effect of organisation size on the relationship 
between coercion and policy compliance was significant at p <.05. The results were 
as hypothesised. The first two moderator variables had a positive effect on policy 
compliance (β = .08, β = .08). As anticipated the third moderator variable had a 
negative effect on compliance (β = -.11). The three institutional variables significant 
in model 2 remained significant in model 3. These were institutional rule consistency 
(p <.01); dependence on the institutional rule setter (p <.01); and the constraining 
effect of SME-friendly policy on professional discretion (p <.10). In addition, a 
fourth institutional variable – compatibility of SME-friendly policy with organisation 
procurement practices – emerged as newly significant (p <.10). In line with 
expectations, its effect on policy compliance was positive (β = .10). The five control 
variables that were significant in model 2 remained significant in model 3. The 
output from model 3 is contained in Table 25.  
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Table 25 Co-efficients
a
 (controls, independent variables & moderators) 
Model 3 Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta β 
 
(Constant) 8.466 1.540  5.499 .000 
Experience .008 .022 .017 .356 .722 
Involvement .362 .181 .134 2.004 .046 
Qualification .999 .457 .129 2.184 .030 
Policy familiarity 1.123 .462 .137 2.434 .015 
Org. size .181 .210 .052 .863 .389 
Procure. structure .875 .392 .119 2.232 .026 
Procure. maturity .488 .154 .154 3.164 .002 
Legitimacy -.029 .251 -.007 -.116 .908 
Economic gain -.285 .237 -.073 -1.201 .231 
Rule consistency .680 .243 .169 2.791 .006 
Dependence  1.178 .432 .144 2.728 .007 
Compatibility  .420 .235 .102 1.786 .075 
Constraints -.346 .197 -.088 -1.759 .080 
Coercion .052 .165 .016 .316 .752 
Diffusion -.357 .250 -.078 -1.429 .154 
Interaction1 .279 .165 .081 1.693 .092 
Interaction 2 .308 .177 .086 1.743 .082 
Interaction 3 -.387 .167 -.111 -2.311 .021 
a. Dependent Variable: Policy compliance 
Interaction 1 = Procurement experience*Social legitimacy 
Interaction 2 = Procurement involvement*Diffusion of SME-friendly practices 
Interaction 3 = Org. size*Coercion  
 
4.3 Accepting or rejecting the hypotheses  
The results of the predictive tests lead to either acceptance or rejection of the 
hypothesised relationships between institutional predictors and SME-friendly policy 
compliance. The final determination on whether to accept or reject a hypothesis is 
made based on the significance values and regression coefficients in model 3. The 
proceeding sub-sections 4.3.1-4.3.5 take each hypotheses group in turn and reveal 
whether there is empirical support for them or not. Hypotheses 1a and 1b relate to 
the rationales for institutional conformity and policy compliance. There is no support 
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for either of these. Hypotheses 2a and 2b concern the institutional context and policy 
compliance. These hypotheses are supported. Hypotheses 3a and 3b focus on the 
content of institutional pressures and policy compliance. Support is also forthcoming 
in their case. Hypotheses 4a and 4b are to do with institutional control mechanisms 
and policy compliance. These hypotheses are rejected. Hypotheses 5a-5c group 
relate to moderated relationships and policy compliance. Support is found for these 
three predicted relationships. Section 4.3.6 then draws all the hypotheses results 
together in order to answer Research Question 2: how does the institutional 
environment affect compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. Some 
commentary on the impact of individual and organisation characteristics on policy 
compliance is offered in section 4.3.7. A summary of hypotheses outcomes is listed 
in Table 26 (pg. 240).         
4.3.1 Rationale for compliance 
The rationale for compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy has two strands 
to it. The first is social legitimacy. H1a predicted that the social legitimacy public 
buyers attached to SME-friendly procurement would have a positive impact on 
policy compliance. No support was found for this relationship (p = .908), which 
means rejection of H1a. Social legitimacy does have a positive impact on policy 
compliance when the moderating effect of procurement experience is taken into 
account. This will be returned to in section 4.3.5. The second rationale for 
compliance is economic gain. H1b predicted that the economic gain to be derived 
from SME participation in contract competitions would induce policy compliance. 
No support was returned for this relationship (p = .231), leading to the rejection of 
H1b. Contrary to hypothesised predictions, the two main motivators or rationales for 
conforming to institutional pressures – social legitimacy and economic gain – do not 
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appear to be significant in explaining public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy. Reasons for why this might be the case are explored in section 
5.2.3.    
4.3.2 Institutional context  
The institutional context of public procurement was expected to affect compliance 
with SME-friendly policy in two ways. The first was the consistency of the 
institutional rule set governing public procurement. H2a predicted that perceived 
consistency between facilitating SMEs, optimising value for money and adhering to 
EU procurement law would have a positive impact on policy compliance. There was 
strong support for this predictive effect (p <.01), leading to acceptance of H2a. What 
this tells us is that public buyers who interpret SME-friendly policy to be consistent 
with the other institutional demands made of them are more likely to comply with it. 
The second contextual factor related to organisational dependence on the 
institutional rule setters in public procurement. H2b predicted that organisational 
dependence would have a positive impact on policy compliance. Strong support was 
also received for this relationship (p <.01). H2b was accepted on this basis. As 
anticipated, public buyers in central and local government are more likely to comply 
with SME-friendly procurement policy compared to their counterparts elsewhere in 
the public sector. This is because of the former’s proximity to the apparatus of state 
administration, their resource dependence on it, and their comparatively lower 
autonomy and operating discretion.     
4.3.3 Content of institutional pressures  
Two main effects were also envisaged in respect of the content of SME-friendly 
procurement policy and eventual compliance with it. The first of these was its 
relationship to existing procurement practices and goals. H3a predicted that the 
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compatibility of SME-friendly policy with the pre-existing procurement goals and 
policies of the buyer’s department or organisation would have a positive influence on 
compliance with it. The result returned was significant (p <.10), thus lending support 
to H3a. Public buyers for whom SME-friendly policy enunciated at state level is 
congruent with their own organisation’s procurement goals and policies appear to be 
more disposed to it and willing to act on it. The second way in which the content of 
SME-friendly procurement policy was predicted to affect compliance behaviour was 
through its implications for professional discretion. H3b predicted that the perceived 
constraints on professional discretion associated with SME-friendly procurement 
policy would have a negative effect on compliance. Findings returned were in line 
with the projected relationship, being both significant (p <.10) and negative. H3b is 
therefore supported. To the extent that SME-friendly policy recommendations are 
seen to circumscribe discretion and flexibility in purchasing, public buyers are less 
likely to comply with them.  
4.3.4 Control mechanisms  
Two types of control mechanisms were deemed relevant to explaining compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy. Coercion was the first of these. H4a 
predicted that the perceived level of coercion behind SME-friendly procurement 
policy would positively impact compliance. The finding returned for this relationship 
was non-significant (p = .752). The regression coefficient (β = .01) confirmed that 
the effect of coerciveness on policy compliance was negligible. This leads to 
rejection of H4a. The second control mechanism related to what public buyers 
believed their peers were doing to facilitate SMEs and how this, in turn, might 
influence their own procurement behaviour. H4b predicted that perceived diffusion 
of SME-friendly procurement practices would also have a positive effect on policy 
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compliance. No support was returned for this relationship (p = .154), and so H4b is 
rejected. The regression coefficient was negligible and even negative (β = -.08). This 
was contrary to the assumed role that mimetic forces would play in engendering 
compliance with institutional standards and norms in public procurement. While 
neither of the control mechanisms had a direct effect on policy compliance, section 
4.3.5 will show that coercion and perceptions on the prevalence of SME-friendly 
practices did have an indirect effect on policy compliance when moderated by 
organisation size and procurement involvement respectively. 
4.3.5 Moderated relationships 
Three moderated or interactive relationships were also put forward for predicting 
policy compliance. The first of these involved social legitimacy and procurement 
experience. H5a predicted that procurement experience would positively moderate 
the relationship between the social legitimacy attached to facilitating SMEs in 
contract competitions and policy compliance. The findings supported this 
relationship (p <.10), leading to acceptance of H5a. This confirms that the social 
legitimacy rationale for policy compliance kicks in as public buyers become more 
experienced and tenured. The second effect concerned the diffusion of SME-friendly 
practices and procurement involvement. H5b predicted that procurement 
involvement would positively moderate the relationship between what public buyers 
believed their peers to be doing to facilitate SMEs and their own compliance 
behaviour. Support was returned for this moderated relationship (p <.10) and so H5b 
is accepted. The finding indicates that peer behaviour and industry trends drive 
institutional conformity in cases where individuals spend most or all of their work 
time on procurement. The third moderated relationship dealt with coercion and 
organisation size. H5c predicted that organisation size would negatively moderate 
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the relationship between the coerciveness of SME-friendly policy and compliance 
with it. In line with expectations, the result was significant and negative (p <.05). 
Organisation size has an attenuating effect on felt coercion for SME-friendly 
procurement and subsequent compliance with its policies.   
4.3.6 Answering Research Question 2  
How does the institutional environment affect public buyers’ compliance with SME-
friendly procurement policy? The answer to this question lies, firstly, in the factors 
that significantly impact policy compliance. These are the institutional context of 
public procurement and the content of SME-friendly procurement policy. In respect 
of the former, the consistency of SME-friendly policy with value for money and EU 
procurement law has a positive effect on compliance. So does dependence on the 
institutional rule setter in public procurement – elected government. In respect of 
policy content, the compatibility of SME-friendly policy with organisation 
procurement goals is conducive to compliant behaviour. As expected, the constraint 
which SME-friendly policy imposes on public buyers’ discretion produces the 
opposite effect. The other part of the answer to the question is the institutional 
factors that do not impact policy compliance, or at least not directly. These are the 
rationales for institutional conformity and the control mechanisms at play. Neither 
social legitimacy nor economic gain drives public buyers to comply with SME-
friendly procurement policy. Yet social legitimacy does have an indirect impact on 
policy compliance when moderated by procurement experience. Similarly, neither 
the coerciveness of SME-friendly policy nor perceptions around diffusion of SME-
friendly practices have a direct effect on policy compliance. The same variables do 
indirectly affect compliance when moderated by the variables of organisation size 
and procurement involvement respectively. Together these findings disclose how the 
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institutional environment conditions compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy. Their import is discussed in section 5.2.  
4.3.7 Significant control variables 
The role of individual and organisation characteristics in accounting for compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy cannot go without some further mention. On 
their own the seven control variables account for 20.9 per cent variance in the 
predictive model (Adjusted R
2
 = .209). Five of the seven variables are significant in 
the final iteration of the model (model 3). In terms of buyer attributes, the extent of 
procurement involvement in (p <.05), holding a procurement qualification (p <.05), 
and familiarity with the content of current Irish policy for the inclusion of SMEs in 
public procurement (p <.01) are significantly and positively related to compliance 
behaviour. Procurement experience is not related to compliance (p = .722). As 
referred to in 3.15.1, the literature is not altogether clear on whether procurement 
experience acts to promote or inhibit regulatory and policy compliance. From 
organisation characteristics, procurement structure (p <.05) and procurement 
maturity (p <.01) act as significant and positive predictors of policy compliance. 
These results were as expected. The size of the organisation had no effect on 
compliance (p = .389), which matches what has been reported in other studies. These 
findings have implications for practitioners, including policy makers and public 
sector managers, and will be explored further in section 5.4.             
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Table 26 Summary of hypotheses results 
Hypothesis Prediction Factor  Sig.  Outcome 
1a The social legitimacy attached to facilitating SMEs in contract competitions has a 
positive impact on policy compliance 
Social legitimacy .908 Not 
supported 
1b Economic gains from facilitating SMEs in contract competitions has a positive 
impact on policy compliance 
Economic gain .231  Not 
supported 
2a Perceived consistency between SME-friendly policy, value for money and EU 
procurement law has a positive impact on policy compliance 
Institutional rule 
consistency 
.006 Supported 
2b Organisational dependence on the state has a positive impact on policy compliance  Dependence on 
institutional rule setter 
.007 Supported 
3a The compatibility of SME-friendly policy with the existing procurement goals of the 
organisation has a positive impact on policy compliance 
Compatibility of 
institutional pressure 
with organisational 
goals 
.075 Supported 
3b Constraints on professional discretion associated with SME-friendly policy have a 
negative impact on compliance 
Constraints on 
professional discretion 
.080 Supported 
4a Coerciveness of SME-friendly procurement has a positive impact on policy 
compliance 
Coercion .752 Not 
supported 
4b Perceived diffusion of SME-friendly procurement practices has a positive impact on 
policy compliance  
Diffusion of practices .154 Not 
supported 
5a Procurement experience positively moderates the relationship between the social 
legitimacy attached to facilitating SMEs in contract competitions and policy 
compliance 
Interaction 1 .092 Supported 
5b Procurement involvement positively moderates the relationship between the 
perceived diffusion of SME-friendly practices and policy compliance  
Interaction 2 .082 Supported 
5c Organisation size negatively moderates the relationship between the coerciveness of 
SME-friendly procurement and policy compliance  
Interaction 3 .021 Supported 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter reveal much about public buyers’ compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy. In the first instance they tell us what public 
buyers are doing (Research Question 1). Based on their self-reported behaviours 
public buyers are, on average, neither rejecting nor acquiescing with government 
policy expectations. Their response is one of qualified compliance. Substantial 
variation is also evident in the extent to which individual policy measures are being 
implemented. This suggests that progress is being made on some dimensions of 
SME-friendly procurement - widening access to opportunities, for example - but less 
so on other dimensions, such as tackling mismatches between contract size and SME 
operating capacity. Important from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective, 
the findings specify the institutional conditions under which public buyers are more 
or less likely to exhibit compliance (Research Question 2). The institutional context 
of public procurement matters. So too does the content of SME-friendly procurement 
policy. The social legitimacy and economic rationales for institutional conformance 
are not significant; nor are the coercive and mimetic control mechanisms. Yet these 
same variables, excluding economic gain, indirectly impact policy compliance 
through their interaction with individual and organisation characteristics. Taken as a 
whole, the findings affirm the predictive validity of the institutionally-derived model 
of policy compliance (Adj. R
2
 = .273). The fifth and final chapter is given over to 
discussion of the empirical findings, their contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge on SME-friendly public procurement, and what they mean for future 
research.   
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5.0 Overview of chapter five 
The previous chapter presented the empirical findings on policy compliance. Now 
this chapter moves to discussing the findings in greater detail. The point of departure 
is how public buyers are responding to SME-friendly procurement policy. Their 
recorded responses are also compared and contrasted with what is already 
established in the literature. The discussion then moves on in section 5.2 to 
unpacking institutional dynamics in public procurement and their influence on policy 
compliance. Thereafter, the empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions 
that the study makes to the public procurement field are spelled out in section 5.3. 
On each of these dimensions the study helps to advance the research agenda by 
addressing key gaps and weaknesses. As well as its academic contributions the study 
yields a number of policy-practitioner implications. These are addressed in section 
5.4. If taken on board they will increase the probability that SME-friendly policy 
interventions will have their desired effect. A critical appraisal of the study is 
performed in section 5.5. This gives rise to recommendations in section 5.6 for how 
future inquiry on SME-friendly policy compliance can be strengthened and 
extended. Section 5.7 concludes the study with a summation of its main findings and 
a consideration of its future research prospects.   
5.1 SME-friendly procurement  
Section 4.1 described what Irish public buyers are doing in the face of institutional 
policy pressures to make procurement more SME-friendly. An in-depth discussion of 
these same descriptive findings is undertaken in this section. There are five strands to 
it. The first distils the essence of public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly 
policy. It explains that while compliance appears less than complete, the findings 
should not be interpreted in a too negative way as progress is being made. It also 
relates incomplete compliance to the idea of institutionalisation as an incremental 
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process. Section 5.1.2 examines the variation in rates of compliance across the 
individual policy measures and what this means for bringing about a SME-friendly 
public tendering system. The remaining sections situate the descriptive findings 
within the broader body of procurement and policy literature. To begin with, section 
5.1.3 compares the compliance rates documented here with international assessments 
of SME-friendly purchasing practices. Section 5.1.4 does the same, only this time in 
respect of environmentally sustainable procurement practices. Section 5.1.5 then 
weaves the findings into the wider public policy literature and its arguments around 
intended versus realised policy outcomes.           
5.1.1 Compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy 
For a variety of reasons institutional and political expectations around what public 
procurement should deliver are not always matched by public buyers’ practices 
(Prier and McCue, 2009). The findings presented in this study bear out this 
contention. Institutional prescriptions for SME-friendly purchasing are not being 
fully realised in the practices of public buyers. Evidently, saying SMEs should be 
better facilitated in public sector tendering is easier than making it happen in 
practice; sentiments that have previously been expressed in respect of SME-friendly 
policies generally (Bennett, 2008). Few public buyers in Ireland can be said to be 
fully complying with SME-friendly procurement policy: less than one per cent attain 
the maximum score on the policy compliance scale. Public buyers are, on average, 
exhibiting moderate or qualified compliance, indicated by the mean score of 14.54 
out of 22. They are acting on some but not all of the measures designed to facilitate 
greater SME participation in contract competitions. Their response approximates to 
the ‘compromise’ position identified by Oliver (1991) in her typology of institutional 
responses. While preferable to the ‘rejection’ or ‘avoidance’ of institutional 
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demands, it falls short of ‘acquiescence’. In the latter, policy is mirrored in practice, 
which is not the case here. There is, as Barley (1986) identified in his study on 
hospital practices, a gap between the institutional template and everyday 
procurement practice. The stance adopted by public buyers is redolent of ‘reasonable 
administrative behaviour’ (Van de Ven, 1983) or pragmatism as an institutional 
response logic (Seo and Creed, 2002). It also coincides with what we know about 
public buyers, which is that the majority are either ‘practical idealists’ or ‘adapted 
realists’ (Roman, 2015). 
 
The findings on policy compliance are not be interpreted in a wholly negative way. 
If it is true that public buyers are not fully living-up to policy expectations, it is also 
true that some effort is being made on their part to foster a more SME-friendly 
procurement system. For a start, few public buyers are assuming a defiant or 
rejectionist stance of the SME-friendly agenda. This is attested to by the fact that the 
minimum score is 5 and that 75 per cent of public buyers score 12 or higher (out of 
22) on the compliance scale. Imperfect as the translation process may be, policy 
recommendations for the benefit of SMEs are beginning to feed through to everyday 
procurement practices. As a corollary, some of the barriers understood to inhibit 
SMEs’ participation should diminish or even disappear. On this basis it can be 
claimed that progress is being made towards the avowed goal of having more SMEs 
compete for and win contract opportunities in the Irish public sector marketplace. At 
the very least, the situation that obtains now represents an improvement on what 
went before when SME-friendly procurement policy did not exist and public buyers 
had little in the way of official guidance or norms to orient their behaviour or spur 
them on.     
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There was an approximate four-and-a-half year interval between the official adoption 
of SME-friendly procurement policy in Ireland and measuring compliance with it for 
the purposes of this study. Four-and-a-half years would seem to be a sufficient 
timespan for public buyers to respond to the new policy dispensation and adjust their 
practices accordingly. That the effects of policy take longer to come to fruition is 
also possible. Observations made by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) are pertinent in this 
regard. They have argued that policy arrangements with a relatively short history 
tend to be only semi-institutionalised. While they may have attained a degree of 
normative acceptance, individuals will still remain sensitive to the relatively untested 
quality of new institutional rulesets and are inclined to actively monitor their 
effectiveness and acceptance by other actors. Only after this period of transition do 
new policy arrangements become fully accepted and taken-for-granted. SME-
friendly policy is, ultimately, about changing public buyers’ behaviour in the supply 
marketplace. Based on Tolbert and Zucker’s (1996) insights, this behavioural change 
is likely to be more evolutionary than instantaneous, as public buyers unlearn or 
jettison old habits and practices and gradually move towards conformity with a new 
set of institutional rules and expectations around how public procurement should be 
managed and whose interests it should serve.     
5.1.2 Compliance with individual SME-friendly policy recommendations 
At the level of the individual policy measure there is significant variation in self-
reported compliance behaviour. It ranges from a low of 40 per cent in the case of 
entertaining variants to specifications to a high of 88 per cent for adherence to 
government-advised insurance cover requirements, and much in between. Clearly, 
the extent to which public buyers are able or willing to display compliance varies 
according to the specific policy recommendation. For SMEs this will most likely 
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result in public procurement ameliorating in some respects but not in others, or at 
least not to the same extent. Gauged by buyers’ policy compliance behaviour, public 
procurement is changing for the better in the ease with which SMEs can locate 
contract opportunities and gain access to contract competitions. SMEs are also more 
likely to have a better understanding of the tendering process through the wider 
provision of feedback and incur lower transaction costs in compiling and submitting 
tenders. The same self-reported buyer behaviours indicate that less progress is being 
made when it comes to tackling the mismatch between contract size and SMEs’ 
organisational capacity, ensuring proportionality in the use of qualification criteria, 
and interacting with new suppliers and supply solutions. All this implies that while 
SMEs should find it easier to participate in public procurement in the coming years, 
success will still be beyond the reach of many.    
 
The variegated nature of policy compliance detected here was previously picked up 
on in a 2013 survey of SME-friendly procurement in Ireland by Flynn and Davis 
(forthcoming). The same authors found SME-friendly procurement to be of a 
truncated form: ‘low hanging fruit’ measures were receiving support from the 
majority of public buyers while the more impactful measures were not being 
embraced to the same extent. In this study it is noticeable that the policy measures on 
which compliance is strongest are also those requiring least exertion. For example, 
just over three quarters of all public buyers permit tenderers to self-declare their 
financial capacity and insurance cover at the initial phase of competition. Doing so 
does not necessitate any substantial time outlay or mental effort on their part. If 
anything, it reduces their administrative workload and streamlines the tendering 
process to their advantage. The same can be said of the online advertising of 
contracts valued at €25,000 or more, the use of open tendering for contracts valued at 
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up to €134,000, and the online publication of contract award notices; all of which 
have high compliance rates. The policy measures that require greater time 
investment and professional application, such as researching the supply marketplace 
and dividing contracts into lots, are also the ones that have lower compliance rates. 
5.1.3 Compliance in context: SME-friendly procurement policy  
It is instructive to compare the findings of this study to what we already know on 
SME-friendly procurement policy. The common theme in studies to date is that the 
translation of policies into practice has been imperfect and irregular. Such 
conclusions can reasonably be drawn from EU-wide surveys in which only a 
minority of public buyers were always or habitually dividing contracts into lots (38 
per cent), publishing PINs (10 per cent) or conducting market intelligence (41 per 
cent) (GHK and Technopolis, 2007; GHK, 2010). As with this study, these EU-wide 
surveys found SME-friendly procurement to be multi-faceted, with some measures 
being acted on more than others. The imperfect realisation of policy in practice has 
also transpired in nationally-focused studies: Flynn and Davis (forthcoming) in the 
case of Ireland; Murray (2011) in the case of Northern Ireland; and Glover (2008) in 
the case of England. The negative reported experiences of SME suppliers also 
underscore the gap between policy pronouncements and public buyers’ adherence to 
them (Flynn and Davis, 2015b; GHK, 2010). Summarising, we can state that what 
public buyers are recorded as doing in this study in the face of institutional pressures 
to facilitate SMEs is broadly comparable to what has emerged elsewhere in recent 
years; albeit with signs of progress being made as SME-friendly policy embeds itself 
in the procurement field or, more precisely, in the cognitive schemas of public 
buyers. 
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5.1.4 Compliance in context:  sustainable procurement policy  
The findings of this study can also be located within the literature on sustainable 
purchasing, as these two areas frequently overlap in research studies (Flynn et al., 
2012; Nijaki and Worrell, 2012; Preuss, 2009; Walker and Preuss, 2008). Like with 
SME-friendly procurement, policy-practice gaps are prevalent in sustainable and 
socially-responsible procurement. While the preponderance of research in this area is 
qualitative in form, it nonetheless indicates that policy expectations around 
sustainability – economic, social and environmental – are flattering to deceive 
(Coggburn and Rahm, 2005; Hasselbalch, Costa and Blecken, 2015; Morgan, 2008; 
Preuss, 2007; Thomson and Jackson, 2007; Walker and Brammer, 2009). Headway 
is being made, to be sure, but there is no getting away from the fact that the extent to 
which public buyers and their organisations feel motivated and empowered to 
purchase in a sustainable fashion typically falls short of policy aspiration. 
Tangentially, implementation deficits and policy-practice divides in sustainability 
are widely reported outside of public procurement (Krause, 2011; Nilsson, Eklund 
and Tyskeng, 2009; Pitt, 2010; Randhawa and Marshall, 2014). The problem, as 
such, is by no means unique to the procurement domain, but rather is symptomatic of 
a more wide-ranging phenomenon in which, for various reasons, sustainability-
related policies only partially translate into practice. 
5.1.5 Compliance in context: public policy  
The findings of this study are a salutary reminder that there is nothing inevitable or 
guaranteed about SME-friendly procurement policy translating into practice. Murray 
(2012) stated as much in a critique of recent commitments by the UK government to 
reform public purchasing and foster increased SME involvement. For SME-friendly 
procurement to become reality public buyers must act on it. It is they, after all, who 
are the ‘policy implementers’; the ones responsible for giving effect to political 
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objectives and goals (Beyer, Stevens and Harrison, 1983). While this may seem a 
prosaic point, it has failed to register as much as it should in academic debate on 
SME-friendly procurement. Yet among policy scholars, the crucial mediating role 
that individuals at the organisational level play in the successful realisation of 
policies and regulations has long been recognised (Berman, 1978; Elmore, 1979; 
Lipsky, 1980; Matland, 1995; Van de Ven 1983). For them public policy exists and 
comes to life only in so much as those in frontline positions accept it and 
subsequently enact it. Leading on, it is argued that the decisions public sector 
employees make and the courses of action they embark on in response to 
institutional pressures becomes de facto policy (Lipsky, 1980). Viewed in this way, 
the qualified compliance reported in this study is de facto SME-friendly procurement 
policy in Ireland as at 2015.   
5.2 Institutional determinants of SME-friendly procurement  
The previous section discussed what public buyers are doing to give effect to SME-
friendly procurement. This section moves the analysis up a level to discuss why they 
are doing it. Specifically, it examines the role of the institutional environment in 
driving or inhibiting policy compliance behaviours. The factors that have a direct 
and significant impact on policy compliance are assessed in sections 5.2.1-5.2.2. 
These encompass not only the institutional context of public procurement but also 
the content of SME-friendly policy as it relates to organisational goals and public 
buyer discretion. How the findings relate to and build on foregoing scholarship 
features prominently in these sections. The institutional factors found to have no 
direct influence on policy compliance, which include social legitimacy, economic 
gain, and coercive and mimetic control mechanisms, are examined in sections 5.2.3-
5.2.4. Reasons are given as to why these factors have no direct impact on policy 
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compliance but do have an indirect impact. Section 5.2.5 takes a panoramic view of 
the findings and what they tell us about the overall relationship between institutional 
pressures and public buyers’ propensity to comply with SME-friendly procurement 
policy. The final section 5.2.6 discusses individual and organisational characteristics 
and their role in enabling policy compliance.      
5.2.1 Institutional context of public procurement 
As hypothesised, consistency in the institutional ruleset governing public 
procurement directly and positively affects policy compliance. This finding accords 
with the tone of debate in contemporary public procurement research. A recurring 
concern flagged by scholars is that government makes multiple and oftentimes 
conflicting demands of public buyers (Astrom and Brochner, 2007; Bovis, 1998; 
Boyne, 2002; Erridge and McIllroy, 2002; Fee, 2002; Kidalov and Snider, 2011; 
Williams and Smellie, 1985). These institutional demands include not only 
optimising value for money and ensuring transparency and probity but, increasingly, 
supporting ‘horizontal policies’ for SME inclusion, environmental protection and 
social cohesion (Arrowsmith, 2010). Several case studies have probed how public 
buyers manage these demands (Cabras, 2011; Gelderman, Semeijn and Bouma, 
2015; Loader, 2007, 2011; Peck and Cabras, 2010; Preuss and Walker, 2011; Walker 
and Preuss, 2008). The indications are that where a prima facie conflict is perceived 
to exist, it is SME inclusion that invariably loses out to a lowest price imperative 
and/or observation of EU law. The flipside, as shown in this study, is that where 
public buyers interpret value for money, legal diktats and SME inclusion to be 
broadly consistent, reconcilable and not mutually exclusive SME-friendly 
purchasing practices are more likely to follow. In such circumstances the latter may 
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even be regarded as a prerequisite for achieving best value for money and effectively 
using organisational resources.   
 
In addition to how public buyers perceive and manage the interplay between 
institutional demands, the dependency relationship between government and public 
sector organisations acts to predict policy compliance. As expected, public buyers in 
central and local government authorities are more inclined to conform to the SME-
friendly purchasing agenda relative to buyers in other public sector organisation 
types – state agencies, semi-state and utility companies and education institutes. This 
can be understood as a function of the proximity and visibility of the former cohort 
to the legislative and executive branch of government. Central and local government 
authorities are more integrated into the administrative apparatus of the state than the 
other public sector types. As such, they are subject to greater political oversight and 
fiduciary scrutiny. High levels of oversight and scrutiny accentuate the pressures on 
organisations and their members to be institutionally compliant with procurement 
directives (Blount and Hill, 2015). Central and local government authorities are 
comparatively more resource dependent and less financially independent than the 
other public sector organisational types. This raises the costs for them of not 
exhibiting institutional compliance (Brint and Karabel, 1991; Tolbert, 1985). These 
effects filter down to the operational level and go some way towards explaining the 
actions that public buyers do or do not take to facilitate SMEs in contract 
competitions. 
5.2.2 SME-friendly policy content   
The compatibility between policy content and established organisational practice 
also has direct implications for public buyers’ propensity to be SME-friendly in their 
procurement decisions. Logically, public buyers working in organisations that are 
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committed to broadening their supply base and engaging with under-represented and 
atypical suppliers – SMEs, start-ups, ethnic minority-owned businesses – can be 
expected to receive SME-friendly policy recommendations in a positive light. 
Similar-type arguments have been made by Murray (1999, 2000 and 2001b), 
Pickernell et al., (2011) and Preuss (2007, 2009) in respect of an alignment between 
socio-economic development goals at organisation level and the facilitation of SMEs 
in public tendering competitions. The value-set of the organisation is also understood 
to have a conditioning effect on employees’ procurement behaviour (Hawkins, 
Gravier and Powley, 2011). For organisations aiming to facilitate the broadest 
participation of suppliers, there is a natural fit or compatibility between this espoused 
goal and what SME-friendly policy prescribes, namely: making it easier for small 
firms to compete for public contracts. SME-friendly policy should also serve to 
reinforce and guide their own efforts to manage the procurement function according 
to values of social responsibility, inclusiveness and equality of opportunity. Of 
course, commercial and competitiveness considerations are also likely to play a part 
in this process. EU policy has long promoted this as the primary reason why public 
buyers and their organisations should be encouraging of SME participation in the 
first place (European Commission, 1990, 1992).    
 
Apart from compatibility with existing organisation goals, the circumscribing effect 
of SME-friendly policy on public buyers’ discretion is important in explaining 
compliance behaviour. Institutional prescriptions rule in some ways of acting and 
rule out others so that a standardised mode of behaviour is established for individuals 
to follow (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 2008b). SME-
friendly procurement policy is no different from any other institutional prescription 
in this regard. Where SME-friendly policy is understood by public buyers as a threat 
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to their operating autonomy, support for its recommended practices is less 
forthcoming. In these circumstances public buyers are likely to resent SME-friendly 
policy for compromising their flexibility and adaptability; a point which Seo and 
Creed (2002) highlighted in relation to institutional responses generally. They may 
also feel, as Rowan (1982) and Meyer, Scott and Deal (1983) observed of school 
managers in the education sector, that institutional conformance deprives them of the 
professional discretion required to manage the idiosyncratic challenges they face in 
their supply environments. One does not have to look far to see possibilities for this 
occurring. If, for example, the organisational priority for public buyers is to 
maximise cost savings by aggregating purchasing requirements and instituting long-
term framework agreements with large suppliers, then SME-friendly policy starts to 
look like an encumbrance (Loader, 2007, 2011; Smith and Hobbs, 2001). SME-
friendly policy is a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach for purchasing. The public sector, by 
contrast, is heterogeneous as to its organisational priorities, purchasing practices and 
supply chain needs.  
5.2.3 Rationale for institutional conformance 
Sections 5.2.1-5.2.2 discussed the significant effects of institutional context and 
policy content on compliance with SME-friendly procurement. Now we turn to 
examine the non-significant institutional factors, starting with compliance rationales. 
Ideas around social appropriateness are central to institutional explanations of why 
individuals conform to rules, policies and prevailing societal norms (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Meyer, 1979; Parsons, 1956; Selznick, 1948, 1996). More so again, it 
is fear of reputational damage from not acting in socially appropriate ways that is 
said to compel individuals to exhibit compliance with institutional standards 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Given the undoubted political and 
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societal support for SME involvement in public procurement (Loader, 2013, 2014), 
legitimacy considerations were expected to drive compliance with SME-friendly 
policy. This proved not to be the case. Of themselves, they do not appear to make 
public buyers more likely to act on government recommendations. What is 
interesting is that when buyers’ experience is factored into the equation, social 
legitimacy becomes a significant driver of policy compliance. This makes sense from 
the perspective of experienced public buyers being more concerned with their 
reputation and, by implication, more likely to signal institutional conformity to their 
superiors and/or external stakeholders. The consequences for them from not doing so 
are likely to be greater than for individuals in the earlier stages of their public service 
careers and who have yet to fully establish their credibility and status in the 
organisation and beyond.   
It was also predicted that economic gains to the public buyer’s organisation or 
department from facilitating SMEs in contract competitions would act as an impetus 
for policy compliance. Other public procurement studies have shown that economic 
gains engender rule compliance (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010). Outside 
public procurement the connection between the competitiveness impact of 
regulations and norms on organisations and their subsequent adherence to them has 
also been confirmed (Goodstein, 1994). That no such effect was returned here 
implies that economic gain alone is insufficient to elicit public buyers’ compliance. 
It could be that public buyers have yet to make the connection between the 
competitive benefits of having more SMEs compete for contracts and the enabling 
role that government policy recommendations play in this process. Alternatively, 
public buyers might not be fully convinced that the trajectory of government policy 
is the best way to boost SME participation rates in contract competitions. Finally, 
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and notwithstanding the budgetary constraints that public sector organisations in 
Ireland are operating under, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the public sector 
context of the study is rendering the relationship between economic gain and 
institutional compliance tenuous. So while public buyers recognise that, in principle, 
having more SMEs compete in contract competitions works to their organisation’s 
economic advantage, they do not feel motivated or incentivised to take the necessary 
steps to make this a reality.  
5.2.4 Control mechanisms behind SME-friendly procurement policy  
As with the rationales for institutional conformance, control mechanisms are not 
directly significant in influencing policy compliance. The coerciveness behind SME-
friendly procurement, for one, does not cause public buyers to incorporate policy 
recommendations into their procurement practices. This runs contrary to what has 
transpired on the relationship between sanctions and procurement rule compliance in 
some studies (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 
2013; Sang and Mugambi, 2014). Yet it is consistent with what has emerged 
elsewhere concerning the non-significant effect of coercion on adherence to 
centralised framework agreements (Karjalainen and Von Raaij, 2011) and adoption 
of sustainable supplier development programs (Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 
2015). The moderating effect of organisation size on the coercion-compliance 
relationship offers some sense of what is going on. The effect is significant but 
negative, indicating that as organisation size increases, the impact of coercion on 
policy compliance starts to taper. This is consistent with recent findings by Blount 
and Hill (2015), which show a negative relationship between organisation size and 
adherence to executive orders for US public agencies to contract more with minority-
owned suppliers. It also needs to be seen in the context of claims that large 
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organisations are able to shield their operations from the vagaries of the institutional 
environment and even counteract coercive and normative pressures (Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby, Greenwood, and Cooper, 2007).  
The diffusion of SME-friendly purchasing practices throughout the public 
procurement field does not directly influence policy compliance, either. The starting 
assumption in proposing this hypothesis was that public buyers who believed SME-
friendly purchasing to be widespread among their professional peers would be led to 
mimic their behaviour. Other procurement-related studies have observed mimetic 
forces as significant in the decision of firms to adopt sustainable and 
environmentally-friendly purchasing practices (Hoejmose, Grosvold and Millington, 
2014; Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 2015; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2013). The 
institutional literature is also replete with instances of mimetic behaviour in 
everything from corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989) to 
TQM (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). While it may not have a direct impact, 
the diffusion of SME-friendly purchasing practices does have an indirect impact 
through procurement involvement. The latter refers to the extent to which 
procurement activity constitutes a public servant’s work role. Diffusion of practices 
as a driver of policy compliance becomes significant as procurement involvement 
increases. We can quite easily rationalise this relationship. Public servants who are 
heavily involved in procurement are more aware of their peer buyers’ behaviour and 
have a career interest in following sector and professional trends. If they see SME-
friendly purchasing practices to be commonplace, they too are more likely to support 
such practices. Conversely, individuals not majorly involved in procurement are less 
aware of and less interested in industry developments; and hence less prone to 
mimetic pressures.  
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5.2.5 Overarching assessment of institutional effects 
Undoubtedly, the institutional environment has a significant role to play in 
explaining compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. The factors that 
primarily make a difference are linked to the institutional context – rule consistency 
and organisational dependence on the rule setters – and the actual content of SME-
friendly procurement policy, both in its relationship to organisational goals and its 
effects on the professional discretion of individual buyers. These, rather than social-
economic fitness or control mechanisms, directly influence the ability and 
willingness of public buyers to translate government policy recommendations into 
everyday purchasing practices. Taken together, the institutional predictors of policy 
compliance coalesce  to form one crucial question, ‘how does the goal of facilitating 
SMEs in contract competitions play out against the various other obligations, 
mandates and pressures placed on public buyers and their organisations’? As with all 
new institutional demands SME-friendly procurement policy introduces an element 
of tension to the status quo: existing ways of behaving and thinking are challenged 
and new ways are put forward as being more legitimate and socially appropriate. The 
degree to which public buyers’ perceive and/or experience these tensions and how, if 
at all, they are able to manage them in ways that satisfy the expectations of both 
internal and external stakeholders is integral to explaining their compliance with 
SME-friendly policies.  
As mentioned above, what emerges from this study is consonant with foregoing 
empirical observations and commentary. Several studies have averred to tensions 
and contradictions in the institutional ruleset governing public procurement as 
among the main reasons why public buyers struggle to act on SME-friendly policy 
recommendations. This theme certainly comes to the surface in successive 
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investigations of UK public buyers by Loader (2007, 2010, 2011). In these the 
implementation of SME-friendly policy hinges on whether it is seen to support or 
compromise the overriding goal of cost minimisation. If it is the latter, policy 
implementation suffers irrespective of any good intentions that public buyers have 
towards small suppliers. As Peck and Cabras (2010) concluded, cost minimisation 
tends to be the least controversial and most expedient option for public buyers. 
Problems around external adaptation and institutional inconsistency, rather than 
individual motivation or organisational culture, have also been shown by Preuss and 
Walker (2011) to stymie the realisation of environmentally conscious procurement. 
Granted, the evidence is not uniformly negative and examples of public buyers 
successfully reconciling SME inclusion with value for money do exist (Erridge, 
2007; Erridge and Hennigan, 2012). There is, however, no avoiding the pervading 
sense that inconsistency among procurement policies, and friction between these 
same policies and organisational realities, militate against SME-friendly practices 
more than any other factor.      
5.2.6 Individual and organisational influences on policy compliance 
Quite apart from external institutional forces, the characteristics of public buyers and 
their organisations are important in explaining compliance behaviour. Public buyers 
are not a monolithic group. For some, purchasing is ancillary to their primary work 
role. Others spend most, if not all, of their work time involved in purchasing on 
behalf of their organisation. In this study those belonging to the latter cohort are 
more policy compliant. We should not be surprised by this relationship given that 
procurement involvement is associated with time, resources, ability and motivation 
to act on policy recommendations (Flynn and Davis, forthcoming; Prier and McCue, 
2009). In a similar way, procurement professionalism is a precursor to SME-friendly 
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purchasing. Qualifications and training are understood to be essential if public 
buyers are to act strategically and have the confidence to manage the legal and policy 
complexities of modern-day public procurement (Caldwell et al., 2005; McCue and 
Gianakis, 2001; Tassabehji and Moorhouse, 2008). Awareness of the detail of SME-
friendly procurement policy is also a prerequisite to compliance. In discussing 
responses to institutional policy pressures it is easy to assume that the public buyer 
population is universally familiar with what is expected of them. This is not always 
the case and familiarity, or lack of it, can have a decisive impact on the successful 
realisation of procurement policy at the organisational level (Gelderman, Ghijsen 
and Brugman, 2006; National Institute of Government Purchasing, 2013). 
The characteristics of the procurement function are also integral to explaining 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement. Having a centralised procurement 
structure is conducive to policy compliance to begin with. Procurement 
centralisation delivers greater control and co-ordination when managing institutional 
demands and initiating changes in purchasing practices across the organisation 
(Karjalainen, 2011; Trautmann, Bals and Hartmann, 2009). Centralisation also 
allows a critical mass of knowledge, capability and routines to build-up around 
purchasing. Public buyers can then draw on it to support and guide their efforts for 
SME-friendly purchasing. A mature and developed purchasing role that is integrated 
with other functions, as outlined by Reck and Long (1988), also promotes policy 
compliance. Procurement role maturity implies a degree of expertise when it comes 
to navigating the policy-political environment. It also suggests that there will be a 
more finely tuned appreciation over how SME-friendly purchasing can help to 
deliver corporate strategy as it concerns public interest goals. Identifying the impact 
that these individual and organisational characteristics have on policy compliance is 
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of scholarly interest. It is also of interest from a policy-practitioner perspective as it 
underlines the link between professionalising the procurement function and policy 
effectiveness. There is further discussion of this point in section 5.4. 
5.3 Research contribution 
Research at the intersection of SMEs and public procurement is still at a nascent 
state of development (Snider and Rendon, 2008). While progress is being made on 
various fronts, such as untangling the predictors of SMEs’ participation and success 
in tendering (McKevitt and Davis, 2013; Reijonen, Tammi and Saastamoinen, 2014; 
Temponi and Cui, 2008), there is still much that remains to be discovered and 
known. The outputs from this study help to close the knowledge gap as they make a 
number of important and timely contributions to SME-friendly procurement (see 
Table 27, pg. 270). These are detailed in the proceeding sections. Section 5.3.1 sets 
out the empirical contributions, namely: the comprehensive assessment of 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy and the factors that promote or 
inhibit it. Section 5.3.2 articulates the theoretical contributions. Featured here is the 
originality of using institutional theory in empirical research on SME-friendly 
procurement. Equally, highlighting public procurement as an institutional context 
and area of interest for institutional theorists is novel. The final section 5.3.3 clarifies 
the methodological contributions of the study. These include the construction of a 
compliance index for SME-friendly procurement policy, the development of a 
predictive model of policy compliance, the use of three-step hierarchical regression, 
and the utilisation of an innovative strategy for surveying public buyers.            
5.3.1 Empirical contribution 
Empirically, this study contributes to the public procurement field in a number of 
ways. Firstly, it sheds light on how public buyers are responding to institutional 
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pressures aimed at facilitating SME access to public procurement. For all the interest 
that has been generated around SME-friendly policies in public procurement, 
surprisingly little evidence has been adduced on the effectiveness of these policies 
and, before this again, on whether they are translating into practice (OECD, 2013). 
This led Flynn and Davis (2015b) to opine that we know more about the rhetoric of 
SME-friendly public procurement than we do about the reality. The findings to come 
out of this study help to bring us closer to the reality of SME-friendly procurement. 
On foot of them we are in a position to see beyond what public buyers are supposed 
to be doing and instead focus on what they are doing in practice. And what they are 
doing, on average, is adhering to some but not all of the specific recommendations 
intended to increase SME involvement in contract competitions - a reminder that 
there is nothing inevitable about policy, or the government pledges lying behind it, 
coming to actualisation. In essence, the study addresses the previously unanswered 
question of what happens after a government disseminates policy recommendations 
for the benefit of SMEs in public procurement. 
Arguably, this study makes an even more important empirical contribution by 
providing evidence on the predictors of compliance with SME-friendly policy. If 
there is a paucity of research on what public buyers are doing in respect of SME-
friendly policy recommendations, there is a near absence of investigation into the 
determinants of their behaviour. The reason for this is that scholarship has privileged 
descriptive-qualitative over predictive-quantitative methodological strategies. While 
in-depth and nuanced insights come courtesy of descriptive analysis as, for example, 
in Cabras (2011), Erridge and Hennigan (2012), McKevitt, Flynn and Davis (2014) 
and Walker and Brammer (2009), they reveal little about causative effects in the 
context of SME-friendly purchasing; at least little that can be extrapolated to the 
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population of interest. The findings of this study begin to explain public buyers’ 
actions in the face of institutional policy pressures to make procurement more 
accommodating of SMEs. By no means definitive, they nonetheless bring a level of 
explanatory sophistication to SME-friendly procurement that was previously missing 
from the literature. They also enable comparisons to be made with related lines of 
inquiry on regulatory compliance in public procurement (Blount and Hill, 2015; 
Gelderman, Ghijsen, and Schoonen, 2010; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013) and the 
adoption of sustainable procurement programmes (Hoejmose, Grosvold and 
Millington, 2014; Preuss and Walker, 2011; Sancha, Longoni, and Gimenez, 2015). 
Following on from the above, this study demonstrates in detail how the institutional 
environment shapes and moulds public buyers’ purchasing behaviour. Surprisingly, 
the impact of institutional forces on SME-friendly purchasing practices has gone un-
explicated up to this point. Prior to this study, neither public procurement scholars 
nor institutional theorists had tested the causative effects of institutional factors on 
public buyers’ ability and willingness to facilitate SMEs. The findings presented here 
can be seen as a timely and warranted corrective to this omission. They pinpoint the 
institutional factors, mainly to do with the context of public procurement and the 
content of SME-friendly policy, which have a significant impact on compliance 
behaviour. Just as important, they clarify the institutional factors that have no 
ostensible effect on compliance. Equally, they draw attention to the way in which 
some institutional forces affect compliance behaviour in interaction with individual 
and organisational variables. Resulting from these various findings we now have a 
more lucid and evidence-informed view of how exactly the institutional environment 
determines the likelihood of public buyers’ conforming to SME-friendly policy 
expectations. This provides a solid platform on which future inquiries can be 
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undertaken into institutional dynamics and their effects on SME-friendly purchasing 
in public sector contexts. 
5.3.2 Theoretical contribution 
The theoretical contributions of this study are manifold. At a most fundamental level 
it does something research studies on SME-friendly public purchasing have 
singularly neglected to do - it theoretically grounds its phenomenon of interest. This 
is done by taking an institutional perspective on SME-friendly purchasing and then 
hypothesising relationships between key institutional concepts and compliance 
behaviour. Although theories relating to principal-agent interactions, transaction 
costs and institutions have all been invoked in discussions on SME-friendly public 
purchasing (Erridge, 1998; Kidalov and Snider, 2011, 2013; Soudry, 2007; Yukins, 
2010), there has been no attempt to operationalise them. Where primary research has 
been conducted in this area, it has not been theoretically anchored (Fee, Erridge and 
Hennigan, 2002; Loader, 2007, 2011; MacManus, 1991). Against these two 
trajectories of untested theory and a-theoretical empirical inquiry, the hypothetico-
deductive approach taken here breaks new ground. It moves academic debate on 
SMEs and public procurement from ‘what’ questions that produce descriptive 
answers to ‘why’ questions that produce explanatory answers. As noted in section 
5.3.1, scholars have paid more attention to the former than the latter. A failure to 
fully engage with and exploit theory has made this inevitable. The application of 
institutional theory in this study directly addresses this deficiency. Like any good 
theory it untangles some of the complexity surrounding SME-friendly purchasing 
and offers a plausible story of public buyers’ compliance with it (Bacharach, 1989; 
Sutton and Staw, 1995). 
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Apart from the novel matching of institutional theory to SME-friendly purchasing, 
the way in which this study went about operationalising and testing institutional 
theory is significant. To identify institutional concepts pertinent to explaining 
compliance behaviour Oliver’s (1991) predictive framework was employed. While 
this same framework has already been used to investigate organisational responses to 
family-friendly work policies (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995), it had 
never been used in a public procurement context before this study. The strength of 
Oliver’s (1991) framework, and its value here, lies in its comprehensiveness. It 
encompasses not only rationales for exhibiting institutional conformance and the 
control mechanisms for bringing about conformance, but also the context of the 
institutional setting and the content of institutional pressures. In other procurement-
related studies institutional theory has been conceptualised and operationalised by 
reference to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures (Sancha, Longoni and 
Gimenez, 2015; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2013). Their approach represents a less 
exhaustive way to capture institutional forces compared to Oliver’s (1991) 
framework, although researchers should remain open-minded about using it in future 
inquiries (see section 5.6.5). Altogether, the positive findings returned in this study 
confirm the suitability and validity of Oliver’s (1991) framework for predicting 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy.  
Operationalising and testing institutional theory also benefits the wider field of 
public procurement. At a general level it strengthens its theoretical underpinnings. 
More specifically, it introduces and makes the case for greater exploitation of 
institutional perspectives in public procurement research. An on-going issue in the 
public procurement domain is the under-exploitation of theory. In a review of public 
procurement research published since 2001 Flynn and Davis (2014) determined that 
266 
 
the field was under-theorised compared to affiliated disciplines such as operations 
and supply chain management, with less than one in three published articles being 
theoretically framed. The same authors also commented on the dearth of studies 
employing institutional theory perspectives. Their observations and resulting 
concerns were not the first to be aired on this issue. Earlier, Snider and Rendon 
(2008) criticised the lack of theorising on policy in a public procurement context. 
Other scholars have also alluded to the need for greater theoretical application in the 
interests of understanding, explaining and predicting contemporary procurement 
phenomena (McCue and Prier, 2008; Snider, 2006; Yukins, 2010). Therefore, using 
an explicit theoretical frame of reference, as this study does, helps to advance public 
procurement as a sub-discipline within management science and strengthens its 
scholarly credentials. It also makes it more likely that research will end up yielding 
valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners (Dimitri, 2013). This latter 
aspect will be subject to further discussion in section 5.4.  
The accent on the discussion thus far has been on what institutional theory brings to 
our understanding of SME-friendly procurement. It is just as valid to see this 
relationship in reverse. Public procurement is an ideal context for examining 
institutional forces in action. It is shaped by political forces more so than market 
forces; and supra-national rules and conventions, national policies, and societal 
norms and expectations all combine to influence the ‘rules of the game’ (Baily, 
1978; Rainey and Bozeman, 2000; Snider et al., 2013). In spite of its obvious merits 
as a research context and its economic weight – 16 per cent of EU GDP - it has not 
yet piqued the interest of institutional theorists. By contrast, the education, health 
and financial sectors have been the subject of extensive investigation by them since 
the emergence of ‘new institutionalism’ three decades ago (Galvin, 2002; Meyer, 
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Scott and Deal, 1983; Meyer, Scott and Strang, 1987; Rowan, 1982; Scott et al., 
2000; Suddaby, Greenwood and Cooper, 2007; Tolbert, 1985). In moving beyond 
these traditional research foci and emphasising public procurement, this study helps 
to stretch the boundaries of institutional theory. It apprises theorists on how 
institutional forces take effect in the idiosyncratic public procurement environment. 
It also gives pause for thought over how institutional pressures are understood and 
modelled generally. For instance, it reveals that the effect of institutional forces on 
compliance behaviour is not always direct and can be moderated by the 
characteristics of the individuals and organisations subject to them.    
5.3.3 Methodological contribution 
Several valuable methodological and research design contributions also arise from 
the study. The theoretically-informed model advanced for predicting public buyers’ 
compliance is original and represents a first in SME-friendly procurement. 
Limitations notwithstanding, it provides the basis for future research to be carried 
out. As one possibility, scholars can re-test the model in different contexts and 
compare their results to those produced here. Alternatively, they may wish to adjust 
or revise some of its predictors before testing it among their country’s population of 
public buyers. In recent years attempts have been made to explain public buyer 
behaviour, resulting in the development of predictive frameworks. Examples include 
Preuss and Walker’s (2011) model of psychological barriers to sustainable 
purchasing and Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman’s (2006) theoretically eclectic 
model of public buyers’ adherence to EU Procurement Directives. The policy 
compliance model presented in this study complements these earlier efforts and even 
builds on them. It takes cognisance not only of the direct effects that independent 
variables (institutional factors) can have on policy compliance outcomes, but also the 
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indirect or interactive effects. This is reflected in the use of a three-step hierarchical 
regression technique to test the model, which is another first-time addition for 
research at the intersection of SMEs and public procurement.        
Central to this study is the creation of a composite measure or index of compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy. Previously no such index existed. Its design 
and use here is novel and innovative. The index itself is comprehensive, 
encompassing no fewer than 19 measures that are individually and collectively 
designed to facilitate SME access to public contract competitions. Inter alia, these 
are aimed at increasing the visibility of contract opportunities, making it easier to 
access contract competitions, tackling contract size barriers and alleviating the 
administrative burden associated with tendering. The measures are derived from 
Irish government policy as it concerns SMEs in public procurement (Department of 
Finance, 2010; Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2014). Irish policy is 
itself derived from EU policy in this area, most recently the European Code of Best 
Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts (European 
Commission, 2008c). The same can be said of other EU Member States. Owing to 
the similarities in SME-friendly procurement policies across the EU it is eminently 
feasible for the index to be used as a research instrument internationally. Of course, 
adjustments to such measures as financial thresholds for the open advertising of 
contracts and insurance cover requirements will likely be required. Issues around 
‘localisation’ aside, the public procurement research community now has at its 
disposal a comprehensive instrument to measure compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy.    
A third methodological contribution made by this study relates to its innovative 
approach to data collection. Accessing public buyers in survey-based investigations 
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poses a perennial challenge for researchers. Indeed, it is surely among the reasons 
why comparatively few population-wide surveys of public buyers have been 
produced to date. The issue stems from the fact that many public sector organisations 
do not have a dedicated purchasing officer or purchasing unit and responsibility for 
purchasing is often diffused throughout the organisation (Thai, 2001). Identifying a 
survey contact point and key informant is made difficult in these circumstances. This 
study exemplifies how the ‘data capture’ that results from public buyers migrating to 
e-procurement can help researchers to overcome this impediment. In addition to 
making the public purchasing system more efficient, e-procurement has the extra 
benefit of documenting and tracking individual public buyers. Such population 
information is invaluable for survey purposes, assuming that researchers can secure 
access to it. It was successfully exploited in this study to survey the Irish population 
of public buyers. The financial cost incurred was negligible, the labour effort was 
minimal, and all responses were gathered within two weeks. Even more importantly, 
the total number of responses received was sufficient and no problems were detected 
with respondent representativeness. Given these many positives, researchers should 
emulate this approach when looking to survey public buyers or even suppliers.   
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Table 27 Summary of research contribution 
 Action Contribution Significance  
E
m
p
ir
ic
a
l 
   
Measures the extent to which the Irish 
population of public buyers is complying 
with SME-friendly policy 
recommendations 
 
Operationalises and tests (institutional) 
predictors of compliance with SME-
friendly procurement policy 
 
Among the most comprehensive 
assessments of compliance with SME-
friendly procurement policy performed to 
date 
 
First survey-based evidence on how the 
institutional environment affects 
compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy 
Demonstrates that public procurement policy 
does not always translate into practice as 
intended and that policy-practice divides exist 
 
 
Identifies the institutional factors that are 
significant in promoting and inhibiting 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
policy 
T
h
eo
re
ti
ca
l 
   
Takes an institutional theory perspective 
in examining public buyers’ responses to 
SME-friendly policy 
 
Operationalises Oliver’s (1991) 
conceptual framework in order to predict 
and then test policy compliance 
 
 
Highlights public procurement as a 
relevant but under-explored context for 
institutional theory perspectives  
 
The first application of institutional theory 
(or any theory) to SME-friendly 
procurement 
 
First time Oliver’s (1991) conceptual 
framework has been operationalised in 
public procurement and/or SME-friendly 
procurement 
 
Among the few institutionally-focused 
studies that have researched public 
procurement issues  
Helps to move research on SME-friendly 
procurement beyond description and towards 
prediction and explanation  
 
Oliver’s (1991) conceptual framework is 
shown to have validity in predicting 
compliance with SME-friendly procurement 
 
 
Public procurement has received scant 
attention in institutional studies. Results 
indicate that it is a fruitful context for testing 
and developing institutional theory  
M
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
  
Devises a predictive model of compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy  
 
 
 
First theoretically-informed model of 
compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy 
 
 
Focuses on the antecedents of policy 
compliance in public procurement. 
Complements existing predictive models on 
regulatory compliance and sustainability in 
public procurement 
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Creates a compliance index for SME-
friendly procurement  
 
 
 
Uses a three-step hierarchical regression 
technique to examine predictors of 
compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy 
 
Exploits Ireland’s public procurement 
web-portal to survey the public buyer 
population  
First index of this kind 
 
 
 
 
First use of multiple regression technique 
in research on SME-friendly procurement 
 
 
 
Among the first nationally representative e-
surveys of public buyers  
Enables compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy to be measured in a 
systematic and standardised way across EU 
Member States 
 
Inferential statistical analysis of public buyer 
behaviour is limited 
 
 
 
Overcomes the hurdles associated with 
accessing public buyer populations for survey-
based inquiry 
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5.4 Policy-practitioner implications 
Apart from its academic contributions the study has value in the realm of policy 
making and public administration. Coming out of it are several avenues for the 
relevant stakeholders - legislators, policy makers and public sector managers - to 
explore with a view to advancing the SME-friendly procurement agenda. 
Theoretically-informed scholarship, after all, should not only contribute to scientific 
knowledge but also illuminate business practice and lead to better organisational and 
economic outcomes (Litchfield, 1956; Palmer, 2006; Van de Ven, 1989). Producing 
research results that are not only scientifically valid but also actionable and relevant 
to practice also exemplifies the critical realist philosophical outlook (Hammersley, 
1992), which underpins this study. The first five implications of this study concern 
policy making. Section 5.4.1 is a reminder for elected representatives that policy is 
not self-executing and taking its implementation for granted is ill-advised. Section 
5.4.2 addresses the importance of overseeing institutional consistency and not 
confusing public buyers with a farrago of policies. Section 5.4.3 questions the 
efficacy of having a generic SME-friendly procurement policy for the entire public 
sector, and tentatively proposes a more sector-based strategy. The need to regularly 
monitor SME-friendly policy implementation and create metrics of public buyer 
behaviour is highlighted in section 5.4.4. Section 5.4.5 presses the case for 
professionalising public purchasing by having more full-time, accredited buyers. The 
sixth and final point is directed at senior public sector managers. It exhorts them to 
promote value-adding, strategic roles for purchasing within their organisations. 
5.4.1 Policy management 
Public policy is not self-executing but depends on organisations and their employees 
to make it a reality (Beyer, Stevens and Harrison, 1983). SME-friendly procurement 
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policy is no exception to this maxim, as procurement scholars have recently noted 
(Georghiou et al., 2014; Murray, 2012). Legislators and senior public administrators 
would do well to take this on board in their attempts to bring about a more SME-
friendly public procurement system. The act of formulating policy and subsequently 
disseminating it to public sector organisations and their employees does not 
automatically solve the problem of SMEs’ under-representation in public 
procurement. It is only a first step in bringing about procurement change; and change 
takes time, effort and the making available of additional resources and supports as 
required (Austen and Seymour, 2009). Simply assuming that policy translates into 
practice is complacent and increases the prospect that gaps will appear between what 
is intended and what is actually realised in organisational practice (Berman, 1978; 
Elmore, 1979; Lipsky, 1980). What is more, political representatives have to resist 
the temptation to treat public procurement as some sort of a panacea or ‘silver bullet’ 
for socio-economic goals, be they in relation to SME competitiveness (Nicholas and 
Fruhmann, 2014), innovativeness (Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010) or anything else. 
Political expediency and short-termism of this type is neither in the interests of 
public sector organisations nor the SME suppliers whom policy is designed to 
empower.   
5.4.2 Institutional rule consistency  
The effectiveness of any institutional prescription is contingent on the ability and 
willingness of individuals to act on it (Oliver, 1991). As demonstrated in this study, 
ability and willingness are influenced by prevailing institutional conditions. The 
onus is on legislators to ensure that institutional conditions are conducive to the 
realisation of SME-friendly procurement policy. Essentially, this means preserving 
balance and consistency in the rules and norms governing public procurement at 
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national level. Too often legislators have been guilty of making multiple, conflicting 
demands of public buyers (Boyne, 2002; Erridge and McIllroy, 2002; Gelderman, 
Semeijn and Bouma, 2015; Matthews, 2005). The objective of having more SMEs 
competing for and winning public sector contracts has been undermined as a result 
(Loader, 2007, 2011). Part of the problem has been a failure to adequately evaluate 
and model how exactly new policies or initiatives will play out against the pre-
existing policy framework. To prevent this from happening in future legislators are 
advised to assess the impact of any new proposal before adopting it. Policy content 
should be scrutinised for any obvious inconsistency between it and current goals and 
policy trajectories. Illustrative of how good intentions can produce unforeseen 
problems, Baden, Harwood and Woodward (2011) found that the use of ‘green’ and 
socially responsible criteria by purchasing organisations added to the administrative 
burden on small suppliers. Emphasis is increasingly placed on integrating 
procurement policy with overarching socio-economic goals (Arrowsmith, 2010; 
Erridge, 2009). It is imperative that this does not come at the expense of internal 
coherency in the institutional rule set governing public procurement.   
5.4.3 Sector-specific policies  
In endeavouring to promote the involvement of small firms in public contract 
competitions the Irish government has come up with a single policy for all public 
sector organisations. SME-friendly purchasing policy is, in this sense, ‘one-size-fits-
all’ with no distinction made between the different public sector categories.  This 
mirrors the stance adopted in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2011) and in the EU 
(European Commission, 2008c). The advantage of the universal approach lies in its 
simplicity. A single suite of policy recommendations is communicated to public 
buyers. SMEs and their representative groups also know that there is a common 
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standard expected of public buyers. The disadvantage is that it is insensitive to the 
heterogeneous character of purchasing across the public sector. Regardless of their 
supply requirements or procurement strategies, all public sector organisations are 
presented with the same set of SME-friendly guidelines. Yet as implied in other 
studies (Pickernell et al., 2011) and as attested to by recent profiling of government 
departmental spend in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2013), the scope for contracting with 
SMEs varies throughout the public sector. The recommendation here is to explore 
options for bespoke, sector-specific SME-friendly procurement policies. Loader and 
Norton (2015) recently made the very same recommendation, positing that generic 
SME-friendly policy should be complemented with sector specific initiatives and 
that public buyers should be afforded latitude to adapt policies as the situation 
dictates. In line with opinion offered elsewhere, public buyers need to be involved in 
and consulted with on this issue (McCue and Roman, 2012; Rendon and Snider, 
2010). Not only will this engender buy-in and a sense of ownership at organisational 
level, it will also lead to more achievable and effective policies. 
5.4.4 Monitoring policy  
In a recent review of its members’ public procurement policies the OECD (2013) 
expressed concern at the low level of monitoring and assessment of SME-friendly 
measures - indicative of public administrators not following through on their 
commitments and being myopic (see section 5.4.1). The contention here is that SME 
involvement in public procurement stands to benefit appreciably from improved 
policy oversight. Evidence from elsewhere attests to the contributory role that 
monitoring and assessment plays in procurement regulatory compliance 
(Hasselbalch, Costa and Blecken, 2015; Mwakibinga and Buvik, 2013). In practical 
terms, monitoring could involve collating data on the number of SMEs competing 
276 
 
for contracts, which is one proxy measure of procurement inclusiveness. Reporting 
could also include outcome variables, such as the number and value of contracts 
awarded to SMEs. This will not only reinforce desired behaviours for SME-friendly 
procurement among buyers, it will also furnish policy makers with valuable data on 
the effectiveness of their initiatives at local level (Blount and Hill, 2015; Martin, 
Berner and Bluestein, 2007). Positive steps have been taken in Ireland of late to 
analyse the profile of procurement spend at the macro level (Office of Government 
Procurement, 2015), as they have in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2013). The 
recommendation made here for continuous monitoring of SME-friendly policy 
would supplement these initiatives while supporting more evidence-based policy 
making going forward.  
5.4.5 Professionalisation 
The case for professionalising public procurement has been made repeatedly 
(Caldwell et al., 2005; McCue and Gianakis, 2001; McKevitt et al., 2012; Prier, 
McCue and Behara, 2010; Tassabehji and Moorhouse, 2008). Among these and other 
scholars there is a consensus that the increasing complexity of supply chain 
management demands highly professional public buyers. If procurement is to realise 
its potential as a strategic function, then it must be staffed by competent individuals 
with the requisite mix of commercial acumen and regulatory-policy awareness. 
Skills and competency development is also high on the agenda of professional and 
industry bodies, evident in the emergence of a Global Standard for Procurement and 
Supply (Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, undated2). As with 
foregoing studies and reports (Coggburn and Rahm, 2005; Hasselbalch, Costa and 
Blecken, 2015; Morgan, 2008; NERA Economic Consulting, 2005), the findings 
presented here point to the criticality of professionalism as a lever for procurement 
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reform. In particular, they underline the importance of holding a relevant 
qualification and working predominantly in procurement as factors that support 
SME-friendly behaviours. The message for policy makers is unmistakable: the 
success of any initiative is heavily dependent on having a cadre of full-time, 
qualified public buyers. Efforts ought to be directed at increasing the number of 
dedicated public buyers and, at the same time, encouraging and materially 
supporting those currently involved in procurement to pursue professional 
qualifications and accreditation. The chances of SME-friendly policy, or any other 
procurement policy, translating into practice can only stand to benefit as a result.     
5.4.6 Senior management support 
The final policy-practitioner implication relates to the role of senior public sector 
managers. It is clear from the study’s findings that the structure and maturity of the 
procurement function is significant in explaining policy compliance, as it is in 
delivering value for the organisation (Reck and Long, 1988). These aspects of 
organisational functioning are under managerial prerogative. By acting as advocates 
for a more centralised and strategically positioned procurement function within the 
organisation hierarchy, senior managers can play their part in making sure that 
policy translates into practice. Senior managers can champion procurement so that it 
is professionally staffed, properly resourced, integrated with all other organisational 
functions and capable of delivering on corporate objectives (Snider, 2006). Out of 
this comes an enhanced organisational ability to proactively manage policy 
expectations and match them to existing procurement goals. In policy studies the 
evidence points to the critical role that ‘policy champions’ play in driving the 
adoption of environmentally sustainable structures and practices (Krause, 2011). 
Examples can also be found of top management support being indispensable when 
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making the transition from an operational to a more value-adding procurement 
function (Flynn et al., 2012) and driving socially responsible procurement 
(McCarthy, 2006; Nijaki and Worrel, 2012; Thomson and Jackson, 2007). While the 
Irish government has already instigated procurement reform initiatives at 
organisational level, more can be done through training, advocacy and material 
support to assist senior public managers in this regard.  
5.5 Limitations  
From the vantage point of critical realists all social inquiry is fallible (Seale, 1999a). 
This study is no exception. Even with its empirical, theoretical and methodological 
contributions and practitioner benefits it contains limitations. Some of these have 
been touched on in earlier chapters, such as in the discussion on fixed research 
designs and the data collection strategy, but are re-assessed here in light of the 
findings. Attending to this or any study’s limitations is always to be recommended. 
Firstly, it exemplifies the critical realist ideals of transparency and openness in social 
inquiry. Secondly and relatedly, it allows readers to make a balanced judgement on 
the calibre of the study. Thirdly, it indicates where future research can be improved 
and made more scientifically robust based on lessons learned and the benefit of 
hindsight. The limitations identified here cut across the study. The first two, which 
are dealt with in sections 5.5.1-5.5.2, relate to the research focus and the theoretical 
lens used. The remainder, which are methodological in nature, are interrogated in 
sections 5.5.3-5.5.6. These include the drawbacks inherent to surveying, the 
transferability of the research findings, the reliance on public buyers as sole 
respondents, and the operationalisation and measurement of the independent and 
dependent variables. A summary of limitations as well as ways through which they 
can be rectified is provided in Table 28 (pg. 290).      
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5.5.1 Research focus 
Emerging from this study is new evidence on public buyers’ compliance with SME-
friendly procurement policy. What the study does not provide is evidence on 
outcomes for SMEs. Policy compliance rather than SME participation and success 
rates is the object of interest and, for the purposes of statistical analysis, the 
dependent variable. This can be viewed as a limitation. Expanding on this point, the 
study does not answer the question of whether policy compliance is associated with 
SMEs’ participation and success rates in contract competitions. Some may argue that 
it is these performance outcomes that are of most consequence in the debate over 
SME involvement in public sector contracting. What is more, with a few exceptions 
(Pickernell et al., 2011; Qiao, Thai and Cummings, 2009), there is little in the way of 
reliable, survey-based evidence or theorising on public buyers’ propensity to use 
SMEs as suppliers. Having said this, caution needs to be exercised when attempting 
to link policy compliance to SMEs’ performance in the marketplace. As explained in 
section 1.7, the objective of public procurement policy in Ireland and throughout the 
EU is to ‘create a level playing field’ on which firms of all sizes can compete 
(Department of Finance, 2010; European Commission, 1990, 1992 and 2008c). 
While legislators envision that a ‘level playing field’ will precipitate greater SME 
involvement and success, there is no guarantee that this will actually happen.     
5.5.2 Theoretical lens 
The institutionally-derived model used in this study accounts for just over 27 per 
cent of the variance in compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy. This level 
of predictive power stands up well against figures that have been reported in 
comparable studies: Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman (2006) achieved 12.5 per 
cent; Flynn and Davis (forthcoming) 16 per cent; Hawkins and Muir (2014) 32 per 
cent; and Mwakibinga and Buvik (2013) 33 per cent. The significance of the model 
280 
 
notwithstanding, it still means that 73 per cent of the variance is attributable to 
unspecified factors and relationships inside or outside of the institutional 
environment. Institutional theory has utility for explaining why public buyers 
comply with SME-friendly institutional pressures. It is not the definitive explanation, 
though, and should rightly be thought of as one piece in a bigger puzzle. The limits 
to its predictive power are likely found in its reification of the external environment 
at the expense of individual power and its all-encompassing attempt at explaining 
organisational behaviour (David and Bitekine, 2009; Scott, 1987, 2008a). In aiming 
for breadth it inevitably loses a degree of explanatory depth and precision. Reducing 
high-level institutional concepts to operational measures is also an on-going 
challenge for researchers and may account for a certain dissipation of predictive 
power. These criticisms do not by any means undermine its validity for explaining 
compliance behaviour, but they do expose some of its constraints.      
5.5.3 Research context  
Selecting Ireland as the research context was apposite given the avowed commitment 
of successive Irish governments to better facilitate SMEs in public procurement. 
Ireland is typical of other EU Member States and OECD countries in its efforts to 
promote SME growth and competitiveness through public procurement (European 
Commission, 2011d; OECD, 2013). Moreover, SME-friendly procurement policy in 
Ireland mirrors that found in other EU Member States. However, as pointed out in 
recent scholarship on sustainable purchasing, institutional pressures are not invariant 
across countries and do differ in how they manifest themselves (Hoejmose, Grosvold 
and Millington, 2014; Sancha, Longoni, and Gimenez, 2015). The same observation 
on the specificity of institutional context and the varying power of rules and norms 
between countries and regions has also been made by leading theorists (Scott et al., 
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2000). Neither can it be assumed that institutional pressures are experienced in the 
same ways by national populations of public buyers. Public administration systems 
and the governance culture are likely to condition public buyers’ responses to them. 
McMurray et al., (2014) made a similar assertion in drawing attention to the role of 
religious beliefs as an influence on sustainable purchasing practices in Malaysia. 
These observations beg the question as to how similar institutional dynamics around 
SME-friendly procurement in Ireland are to other countries. In the absence of 
internationally comparable data there is no way of satisfactorily answering this 
question and so it remains moot. This constitutes another limitation of the study. 
5.5.4 Public buyers as research respondents  
Public buyers were used as informants in this study. Given that the research 
objective was to investigate compliance with SME-friendly procurement policy, they 
were an obvious and justifiable choice. There is also a well-established precedent for 
using public buyers when researching procurement rule compliance and the adoption 
of progressive purchasing practices (Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011; Murray, 2011; 
Preuss and Walker, 2011). Reliance on public buyers as sole respondents is not 
without its own drawbacks. In the absence of comparable input from a second 
respondent cohort – senior organisational managers or SME suppliers, for instance – 
there is no way of corroborating how faithfully public buyers have reported their 
habitual behaviours; no way of triangulating the data (Jick, 1979). We must simply 
take their responses at face value. It also means that the voices of other internal and 
external procurement stakeholders – end users, SMEs, elected representatives - are 
excluded. There is, according to Murray (2009b), an over-dependence on public 
buyers as respondents and a corresponding lack of attention to all other actors. The 
research design of this study does nothing to redress this imbalance. Lastly, in 
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surveying any population of public buyers it is inevitable that, in some cases, there 
will be two or more respondents from large organisations. In an anonymous e-survey 
there is very little that can be done to detect and control for this occurrence. The 
effect of organisation context goes unaccounted for here as a result.   
5.5.5 Measurement of variables 
Accuracy and validity were of paramount importance in designing and executing the 
primary research component of the study. Alas, how the independent and the 
dependent variables were measured is not beyond criticism. We will take the 
independent variables first. The factors identified by Oliver (1991) as germane to 
predicting institutional compliance, including social legitimacy and economic gain, 
were operationalised purposely for this study. While the newly operationalised 
concepts were scrutinised and validated by a panel of reputable international scholars 
and procurement practitioners, it would have been preferable had pre-tested 
measures been available. For reasons set out in section 3.14 the same independent 
variables were operationalised by single-item measures. Multi-item measures are 
typically recognised as a more statistically robust method of operationalising 
theoretical concepts. The measurement of policy compliance is also worth 
commenting on. Like the stance adopted by Hoejmose, Grosvold and Millington 
(2013) and Mansi (2015), compliance was treated dichotomously. Not all scholars 
concur with this stance. Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman (2006), for instance, 
advocated treating compliance in terms of degrees of behaviour. Finally, the 
differential weighting system used in constructing the compliance index is open to 
critique. While empirical evidence and expert opinion informed the decision to 
double weight three measures associated with the barrier of contract size, 
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acknowledgement must be made that weighting is never an exact science (Booysen, 
2002; Hsu, Johnson and Lloyd, 2013).   
5.5.6 Survey research design 
The study and its results are not exempt from the limitations inherent to survey-
based research design, particularly its ‘hard science’ take on social investigation 
(Marsh, 1982; May, 1997). The survey is cross-sectional in form and represents a 
snapshot of public buyer behaviour at a single point in time; and some four-and-a 
half years after SME-friendly procurement policy was first circulated by the Irish 
government. In this or in any other survey the influence of temporal and/or 
environmental factors is not picked up on (Schwarz et al., 2008). Typical of any 
survey (Hakim, 2000), it does not drill down into the deeper meanings that public 
buyers ascribe to their institutional responses or the contextual complexity 
surrounding SME-friendly procurement practices. As a result, qualitative insights, 
illuminating vignettes and a more granular depiction of events are all sacrificed at 
the expense of measuring, controlling and predicting policy compliance. 
Additionally, the use of the survey method automatically precludes identifying any 
SME-friendly practices on the part of public buyers that fall outside the scope of 
questionnaire instrument. In effect, it confines SME-friendly procurement and its 
predictors to the a priori expectations and theorising of the researcher. There is no 
space for unanticipated but significant factors, relationships or ways of acting to 
insinuate themselves into the research findings. There is with inductive research 
strategy, which is capable of letting the phenomena of interest emerge organically 
(LeCompte and Goetz, 1982; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1984).       
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5.6 Recommendations for future research  
As a result of this study we now have a more evidence-based, theoretically-informed 
understanding of policy compliance and SME-friendly procurement. Still, more 
remains to be known and discovered on this topic. In this vein, six recommendations 
are made to guide future research and to build on the progress that has been made 
here (see Table 28, pg. 290). These recommendations have been formulated in direct 
response to the limitations of the study. They are intended not only to refine the 
predictive model of policy compliance but also to orient researchers towards 
methodological and theoretical alternatives capable of yielding new insights into 
SME-friendly procurement and its associated policies. The first recommendation in 
section 5.6.1 is for researchers to examine the relationship between policy 
compliance and the number and value of contracts awarded to SMEs. Recommended 
in section 5.6.2 is the substitution of institutional theory with alternative theoretical 
lenses, including principal-agent theory and the expectancy theory of motivation. 
The four remaining recommendations in sections 5.6.3-5.6.6 focus on 
methodological aspects of inquiry. They advocate taking the following actions: 
replicating the study in other jurisdictions and conducting comparative research; 
triangulating public buyers’ reported behaviour with other informant or data sources; 
trialling different measures of institutional pressures and policy compliance; and 
displaying openness to qualitative research designs.    
5.6.1 Policy effects  
Policy scholars are interested not only in questions around policy compliance but 
also around the effects, foreseen or otherwise, of policy initiatives (Beyer, Stevens 
and Harrison, 1983). Due to the paucity of prior empirical research this study laid its 
emphasis on the former. Going forward, it is recommended that scholars probe not 
only policy compliance per se but also the effects of compliance. The focus, in 
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particular, should be on substantiating if policy compliance acts as a predictor of 
SMEs’ participation and success in public contract competitions. Irrespective of 
national context SME-friendly policy is designed to address the under-representation 
of small firms in the public sector marketplace (Anglund, 1999; Beaver and Prince, 
2004; Bennett, 2008; Storey, 1994). Empirical evidence is needed to ascertain if 
SME-friendly policy is helping to correct market failure in public procurement and 
engender more inclusivity. Proxy measures of policy effects could include the 
average number of SMEs competing for a typical supply contract, the total number 
of contracts awarded to SMEs, and the percentage value of annual procurement 
spend going to SMEs. Admittedly, this is no easy task (see section 3.8.2). Public 
buyer respondents are unlikely to have such detailed data readily to hand when 
completing a questionnaire. This could cause them to skip the question altogether or 
to offer a crude approximation of what they believe the answer to be. Either way the 
integrity of the results is threatened. Researchers will have to think carefully about 
how best to obtain reliable and valid measures of these outcomes. 
5.6.2 Alternative theoretical perspectives 
Institutional theory is one way of looking at compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy. There are other ways and researchers are encouraged to explore 
them. Possibilities include economic utility theories, public choice theory, 
psychological theory and socialisation theories (Erridge, 1998; Gelderman, Ghijsen 
and Brugman, 2006). Two theoretical alternatives are flagged here as having 
particular promise. The first is principal-agent theory. Concerned with how 
principals attempt to impose their mandates on subordinate entities (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), principal-agent theory readily lends itself to any 
investigation of government-driven efforts for procurement reform. It has been used 
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to good effect in research on procurement regulatory compliance (Mwakibinga and 
Buvik, 2013; Soudry, 2007) and on sustainability initiatives in local authority 
purchasing (Gelderman, Semeijn and Bouma, 2015). It can just as easily be applied 
to SME-friendly policy. It also enjoys the advantage of being one of the most 
frequently cited theories in public procurement research (Flynn and Davis, 2014). 
The second is Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory of motivation, which provides an 
explanation of workplace motivation. The core postulate is that the motivation to 
perform a task is a function of the expectation that effort will result in a (valued) 
outcome. It has possibilities for unfurling public buyers’ proclivity to act on SME-
friendly policy recommendations. While psychological theory has featured in public 
procurement research (Maser and Thompson, 2013; Ntayi, Ahiauzu and Eyaa, 2011; 
Preuss and Walker, 2011), its potential has yet to be fully tapped.    
5.6.3 Comparative research  
In examining institutional dynamics and their effects on policy compliance Ireland 
acted as the research context. To advance knowledge on SME-friendly procurement 
comparable investigations should be carried out in other EU Member States. If 
circumstances permit, researchers should simultaneously survey public buyer 
populations across two or more countries. By doing so international comparisons can 
be made between the institutional drivers of SME-friendly policy compliance. For 
example, is institutional rule consistency a significant predictor of policy compliance 
in all national contexts? Likewise, does the perceived constraining effect of SME-
friendly policy on professional discretion militate against compliance in all national 
contexts? There is an impressive comparative body of literature on the barriers that 
SMEs experience when competing in the public sector marketplace, encompassing 
findings from the US (MacManus, 1991), Australia (Purchase, Goh and Dooley, 
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2009), the EU (GHK and Technopolis 2007; GHK, 2010), the UK (Loader, 2005; 
Ringwald et al., 2009), Northern Ireland (Erridge, Fee and McIllroy, 1999) and 
Ireland (Bovis, 1996; Greer, 1999). It points to commonalities in barriers that 
transcend national context. The same level of engagement needs to take place with 
the factors that promote or impede the realisation of SME-friendly procurement 
policy. The ubiquity of e-procurement systems makes this more viable than at any 
time previous, and, as artfully demonstrated in this study, can be exploited for the 
purposes of fast, economical and effective surveying of national public buyer 
populations.   
5.6.4 Cross-validating responses 
Getting public buyers to self-report their behaviours is among the most common and 
accepted strategies for gathering data in public procurement research. One caveat of 
this approach is that some buyers may engage in a form of impression management 
in formulating their responses, particularly if questions pertain to compliance 
behaviour. Best practice questionnaire design, as followed in this study, can help to 
counter this threat to validity (Fowler, 1995). To reduce the threat still further the 
recommendation here is for future studies to cross-validate or triangulate data 
obtained from public buyers with second informants (Jick, 1979). Possibilities in this 
regard include senior managers and end-service users within public sector 
organisations. The same advice is proffered by Gelderman, Ghijsen and Brugman 
(2006) and Hasselbalch, Costa and Blecken (2015). Alternatively, validation of 
SME-friendly policy compliance on the part of individual buyers could be sought by 
analysing their historical tender documentation - an unobtrusive strategy ideally 
suited to sensitive research projects (Garavan and MacKenzie, 2015). Researchers do 
need to be mindful of the additional resource demands and access hurdles that come 
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with cross-validation attempts. Away from public sector perspectives consideration 
could be given to investigating policy from the vantage point of its intended 
beneficiaries – SMEs. Their experiences are another valid means of evaluating 
policy compliance and its impacts. Early indications are that SMEs are negative in 
their assessments (Flynn and Davis, 2015b). Even more interesting would be to 
simultaneously survey public buyers and small suppliers on the translation of SME-
friendly policy into practice and then compare the results.   
5.6.5 Parsimonious modelling  
The model of policy compliance devised in this study contains no less than eight 
institutional factors. Breadth over depth is an advisable strategy when there is little in 
the way of empirical precedent to go on. But having verified the explanatory power 
of institutional theory in relation to SME-friendly procurement, researchers may 
wish to proceed with a more refined model with fewer variables. As one example, 
recourse could be made to coercive, normative and mimetic institutional pressures to 
predict compliance behaviour. These three institutional factors have already been 
operationalised, tested and validated across a variety of contexts, ranging from 
information technology adoption (Teo, Wei and Benbasat, 2003) to sustainable and 
environmentally-friendly supply chain practices (Sancha, Longoni and Gimenez, 
2015; Zhu, Sarkis, and Lai, 2013). Comparisons could even be made between the 
eight-factor institutional model used here and the three-factor institutional model in 
terms of their respective abilities to predict compliance. Future studies may also wish 
to re-visit the treatment of policy compliance. The preferred stance in this study was 
to capture SME-friendly procurement policy in its totality. This produced a 19-item 
index. Conceivably, fewer items could be used to construct the index while still 
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embodying the essence of SME-friendly procurement. If significantly fewer items 
are used, then measuring compliance on a Likert scale becomes practicable.  
5.6.6 Qualitative research design 
The preceding five recommendations entail various refinements or extensions to the 
predictive model used in this study. The sixth and final recommendation represents 
something different altogether. Rather than measuring and predicting compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement, researchers might wish to consider qualitative 
research designs. Inter alia, this could involve exploring the meanings that public 
buyers attach to their SME-friendly procurement behaviour; empathising with the 
decisions they make; and situating SME-friendly procurement is its wider 
organisational and social milieu. In practical design terms this requires direct 
engagement with research subjects through interviewing, document gathering and 
workplace observation over a sustained period of time so as to produce in-depth case 
descriptions (Eisehhardt, 1989b). Several such in-depth cases of SME facilitation by 
public buyers already exist in the literature, which can be used as a compass to guide 
future investigations into policy compliance (Cabras, 2011; Erridge, 2007; Loader, 
2007, 2010, 2011; McKevitt, Flynn and Davis, 2014; Walker and Brammer, 2009). 
Qualitative research should not be thought of as antagonistic to survey design, but as 
complementary to it. It offers the prospect of more fine-grained analyses of what 
public buyers are doing and why they are doing it. These insights can then be used to 
inform model building and theory testing. They can also be interleaved with existing 
survey findings to produce more holistic accounts of SME-friendly procurement in 
the public sector. 
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Table 28 Summary of limitations and future recommendations  
Dimension Limitation Recommended action 
Research focus The relationship between policy compliance and SMEs’ 
participation and success in contract competitions is not examined 
 
Measure outcome variables for SMEs (as reported on by 
public buyers): (i) number of SMEs tendering for 
contracts (ii) number of contracts awarded to SMEs (iii) 
percentage value of annual procurement spend awarded 
to SMEs  
 
Test policy compliance as a predictor of the above 
variables  
Theoretical 
perspective 
The institutionally-derived model accounts for 27 per cent of the 
variance in policy compliance, meaning that the majority of 
variance is beyond its explanatory power  
Take an alternative theoretical lens – principal-agent 
relationships, expectancy theory of motivation – to 
explain and predict policy compliance. Compare its 
predictive power against institutional theory’s 
 
Use institutional theory in conjunction with a second 
theoretical lens; preferably one that focuses on internal 
drivers of policy compliance  
Methodology  
(comparative 
research) 
While there are strong institutional commonalities in public 
procurement regimes across EU Member States, it is moot as to 
whether the institutional dynamics captured in this study are the 
same in other national contexts. Conceivably, public buyers 
elsewhere react differently to SME-friendly policy pressures 
 
Replicate the study in another EU Member State and/or 
simultaneously survey public buyer populations in two 
or more EU Member States using the same or a similar 
predictive model to that used in this study and compare 
the findings  
Methodology 
(cross-
validation)  
The study relies on public buyers’ self-reported policy compliance 
behaviours 
 
 
 
Cross-validate data obtained from public buyers with 
input from other organisational actors such as senior 
managers. Alternatively, source objective measures of 
public buyers’ compliance behaviour by, for example, 
analysing historical tender documentation  
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Policy compliance is not investigated from the perspective of small 
firms – who are the intended beneficiaries of SME-friendly 
procurement policy 
Survey a population of SMEs active in public 
procurement to ascertain the extent to which they are 
experiencing policy implementation    
Methodology 
(modelling and 
measuring)  
The predictive model of policy compliance emphasises breadth 
over depth 
 
 
 
Policy compliance in understood in binary terms. It does not allow 
for the possibility that compliance might be something of degree 
rather than either/or  
Consider reducing the number of institutional factors in 
the predictive model from eight down to three - coercive, 
normative and mimetic pressures – and operationalise 
them using multi-item measures  
 
Consider reducing the number of measures comprising 
the compliance index (dependent variable) and then 
measure them on a 1-5 Likert scale  
Methodology  
(research 
design) 
The survey research design privileges measurement and prediction 
over meaning and empathising. Specifically:   
 
The findings give a snapshot of policy compliance at a particular 
point in time  
 
 
The meaning that public buyers attach to their behaviours is not 
probed; nor is the context in which their procurement decisions are 
made  
 
SME-friendly actions by public buyers that fall outside official 
policy recommendations are not detected 
Use alternative to survey research design. Specifically: 
  
 
Employ a longitudinal, case-based research design in 
order to examine policy compliance over a longer time 
period e.g. 12+ months   
 
Use qualitative forms of research engagement, including 
semi-structured interviews and workplace observation, 
to produce ‘thick descriptions’ that are context specific    
 
Use qualitative research designs - as above 
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5.7 Conclusion  
Government policies to promote SME involvement in the public sector marketplace 
are now standard across developed economies (OECD, 2013). The advent of SME-
friendly procurement policies in the public sector has, in turn, stimulated debate 
among scholars as to their desirability, utility and likely impact (Kidaloav and 
Snider, 2011; Loader, 2013; Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014; Preuss, 2011). What has 
been missing from the debate up to this point is evidence on compliance with these 
same policies. Whether this has been due to misapprehensions around policy 
automatically translating into practice, ambiguous policy objectives or more prosaic 
issues to do with securing access is debatable. The effect, in any case, has been to 
leave SME-friendly procurement without a strong evidential foundation or 
theoretical framing – neither of which is satisfactory from a research perspective. 
This study represents an attempt to move beyond this point; beyond the political 
rhetoric of SME-friendly procurement and towards its everyday reality (Flynn and 
Davis, 2015b). It ranks as among the first accounts of how public buyers are 
responding to SME-friendly policy and the institutional factors conditioning their 
responses. While it does not claim to have all the answers to questions on this topic, 
it does constitute a substantial and original contribution to the public procurement 
field. To bring this study to a conclusion its three main findings will now be re-
capitulated.  
Firstly, public buyers are complying with SME-friendly policy to a moderate extent. 
Their behaviour, on average, is analogous to taking a compromise approach to 
institutional compliance (Oliver, 1991) or engaging in a form of administrative 
satisficing (Van de Ven, 1983). We can infer from their reported behaviours that 
some progress is being made towards enabling greater levels of SME participation in 
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public contract competitions. By the same token, there is an undeniable gap between 
what is espoused by elected representatives versus what is happening in practice. A 
more micro analysis shows that public buyers are more able and/or willing to put 
some policy measures into practice than others. This a la carte approach to policy 
implementation implies that some barriers to SME participation will dissipate while 
others will persist. Progress towards a more SME-friendly tendering system is likely 
to be uneven and disjointed as a result. It is a truism that public policy does not 
seamlessly or automatically translate into practice (Lipsky, 1980). Public 
procurement policies are no exception to this rule based on the results presented 
here. In the final analysis, SME-friendly procurement is easier said than done; a 
conclusion that finds resonance in the wider literature on SMEs (Bennett, 2008; 
Storey, 2003). Scholars and policy makers alike would do well to remember this 
proviso when discussing and proposing solutions to the longstanding problem of 
SMEs’ under-representation as suppliers to public sector organisations.  
Secondly, forces within the institutional environment are significant in determining 
public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly policy. This is in line with theoretical 
predictions on the role of the institutional environment in shaping behaviour within 
public sector organisations (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2008b; Zucker, 1977, 1987). The institutional factors that matter 
are rule consistency in public procurement, compatibility between SME-friendly 
policy and organisation procurement goals, organisational dependence on the state, 
and the constraining effects of SME-friendly policy on professional discretion. The 
first of these three factors promote policy compliance. The fourth inhibits it. The 
findings lend credence to the view held by many procurement scholars that a 
multiplicity of goals and policies in public procurement, as well as tensions and 
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conflicts between political aspirations and organisational realities, has a major 
bearing on whether SME-friendly procurement takes effect or not (Bovis, 1998; 
Erridge, 2007; Fee, 2002; Loader, 2007; Schapper, Veiga Malta and Gilbert, 2006). 
The institutional factors that do not directly affect compliance are social legitimacy, 
economic gain and the coercive and mimetic control mechanisms at play in the field. 
Moderated by procurement experience, procurement involvement and organisation 
size these same factors, excepting economic gain, do affect policy compliance. The 
observed interactive effects provide a glimpse of the complex and multi-layered 
nature of institutional dynamics in public procurement.  
Thirdly, individual and organisational characteristics matter in any explanation of 
policy compliance in a public procurement context. Previous scholarship has 
alighted on the characteristics of public buyers and their organisations that are 
germane to explaining procurement rule compliance (De Boer and Telgen, 1998; 
Karjalainen and von Raaij, 2011; McCue and Gianakis, 2001; Sang and Mugambi, 
2014). The results presented here add to and even extend what is already known. 
They confirm that individuals for whom procurement constitutes a major part of their 
occupational role exhibit higher levels of compliance with SME-friendly policy. The 
same is true of public buyers who hold a recognised qualification in procurement or 
a cognate area. As expected, familiarity with SME-friendly policy content is a 
prerequisite for individuals subsequently acting on it in practice. At organisational 
level centralising procurement operations is conducive to the SME-friendly policy 
translation. The maturity of the procurement function and its status in the 
organisational hierarchy is also associated with higher levels of policy compliance. 
Empirical confirmation of the role these characteristics play is not only valuable for 
future research and model testing in public procurement. It also serves to remind 
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elected representatives and senior public administrators on the need to 
professionalise public purchasing in the interests of successful policy 
implementation.  
Writing over a decade ago Thai (2001) expressed his frustration at academic 
indifference towards public procurement. In the intervening decade and a half 
scholars have worked assiduously to rectify this situation. Thanks to their efforts the 
profile of public procurement is now higher than at any time previously and the field 
boasts an international and fast growing community of interest. This study plays its 
part in extending the boundaries of public procurement by shining the spotlight on 
the much discussed but little researched SME-friendly policies. The results of the 
study mark the beginning rather than the end of a conversation involving both 
researchers and practitioners on what happens when governments attempt to 
institutionalise SME-friendly procurement. For example, it remains to be seen 
whether policy compliance delivers the outcomes for SMEs that elected 
representatives desire, namely: their increased participation and success in contract 
competitions. Questions such as these are not purely of academic interest. Policy in 
the domain of procurement has ramifications for effective public administration, 
public sector accountability, public finances, SME growth and even national 
economic competitiveness. In other words, they should not be taken lightly but 
instead deserve our sustained commitment and engagement. As researchers this is 
our challenge and our tremendous opportunity going forward.          
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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the role of theory in public procurement 
research. Theoretical rigour is integral to management science, yet little is 
known on the extent and form of theory in public procurement. With the field 
starting to mature, addressing this issue is timely. From conducting a 
systematic literature review we find that 29 percent of articles are 
theoretically grounded, with the incidence of theory having increased in 
recent years. Economic, sociological, psychological, and management 
theories are all in evidence, but micro-economic theories predominate. Our 
findings also show that survey reporting and case studies account for almost 
half of all studies; procurement research is focused on organizational-level 
aspects more than regulatory-policy issues or public buyers; and studies to 
date have largely emanated from the North American and European regions. 
The contribution of this paper lies in clarifying the theoretical underpinnings 
of public procurement. Out of this we highlight the need for greater 
theoretical rigour, point to the under-use and even absence of theories that 
could have high validity and utility, and suggest a narrowing of research foci.  
INTRODUCTION 
Writing over a decade ago Thai (2001) drew attention to the 
academic neglect of public procurement. In spite of its centrality to 
public service delivery and its long history in public administration, 
public procurement resided on the periphery of management science. 
In the years since much has happened to redress this imbalance so 
that public procurement has moved closer to the mainstream. Its 
research remit continues to expand as scholars of management, 
public administration, finance, law, supply chain and logistics 
management, mathematics, and information technology apply 
themselves to the study of public procurement. In turn, this has 
opened up promising lines of inquiry on topics as diverse as e-
procurement (Lee, 2010; McCue & Roman, 2012; Schapper et al., 
2006), small suppliers (Flynn et al., 2014; Qiao et al., 2009; Withey, 
2011), and buyer professionalization (McCue & Gianakis, 2001; 
McKevitt et al., 2012; Prier et al., 2010). The progression of the 
public procurement field is just as evident outside academia. In 
political and policy arenas public procurement is now linked to 
concerns over economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental 
sustainability (Arrowsmith, 2010; McCrudden, 2007). In particular, 
pressures on public finances since the 2007 global financial crisis 
have forced a reappraisal of the role of public procurement, with 
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some arguing that it should be leveraged for domestic economic 
growth and job creation (Murray, 2009). Whatever perspective one 
takes, it is clear that the profile of public procurement is greater than 
at any time previously.  
Central to the upward trajectory of public procurement has been 
two-way communication between research and practice. While there 
has been a regrettable trend in many disciplines to divorce 
themselves from the everyday concerns of business practitioners and 
privilege theoretical and methodological rigour over all else 
(Hambrick, 2007; Gunther McGrath, 2007), public procurement has 
made a virtue out of constructively engaging with practitioners and 
addressing their interests. Contemporary studies attest to an 
emergent nexus between academic research and issues of direct 
organizational and professional concern. Among recent examples of 
such practitioner-focused inquiry include a framework to support 
buyers in managing the challenges associated with e-procurement 
adoption and implementation (Roman, 2013), a model for quantifying 
the organizational benefits of migrating to e-procurement (Gardenal, 
2013), and a tool for assessing the contribution that buyers make 
during the procurement of consultancy services (Schiele, 2005). 
Procurement professionals are also making an impact. Their insights 
on topics ranging from environmental impact assessments (Van 
Valkneburg & Nagelkerke, 2006) to procurement strategies in post-
disaster situations (Atkinson & Sapat, 2012) are helping to 
disseminate best practice, stimulate debate, and inform scholarship. 
This intersection of research and practice is creating a solid platform 
on which public procurement can develop into the future. 
Notwithstanding the undoubted progress that has been made in 
fostering a community of interest in public procurement research 
(Grimm & Thai, 2011), there are still areas that have yet to be fully 
addressed. In particular, the role of theory in public procurement 
research is deserving of greater attention. While it is clear that 
practitioner concerns have featured prominently, it is less clear as to 
what role theory has played in advancing our knowledge of 
purchasing in public sector contexts. This raises important questions 
over just how rigorous is public procurement research. Having 
answers to these questions is necessary if we are to make informed 
assessments of how far we have come and how far we still have to go 
to establish public procurement as a credible management sub-field. 
Where scholars have engaged with the question of theory, the 
recommendation is that we need more of it. In their discussion of 
public procurement policy Snider & Rendon (2008, p. 311) were 
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minded to say that “….scholars have yet to give sufficient efforts to 
the sort of conceptual theorising about policy that will lead to ordering 
devices and approaches that can help researchers and students 
make sense of its complexity, uses and limitations.” Previous to this, 
Snider (2006) hinted at a tendency towards introspection in 
contemporary public procurement research and a failure to relate it to 
more overarching theoretical perspectives. Other contributors have 
also averred to the desirability of using theoretical lenses, as when 
McCue & Prier (2008, p. 2) called for more theory if “one wants to 
explain, predict, and understand behavior concerning the intent, 
purpose, and actual use of cooperatives in procurement.” Thus, while 
the role of theory has not been interrogated in any systematic fashion 
up to this point, there is reason to believe that practitioner relevance 
has taken precedence over theoretical rigour.   
When deliberating on the role of theory in public procurement 
research, there are a number of factors worth bearing in mind. Firstly, 
the entry of public procurement into the academic ranks is a relatively 
recent occurrence (Matthews, 2005). The fact that public 
procurement was still spoken of by Prier et al., (2010) in terms of the 
“birth of profession” as recently as 2010 is further indication of its 
newness. Secondly, public procurement is said to suffer from 
definitional ambiguity and porous field boundaries, making the 
application of theory problematic in comparison to mature fields that 
operate within strict parameters (Prier & McCue, 2009). These 
caveats aside, we believe that an examination of the role of theory in 
public procurement research is warranted. It is our contention that 
public procurement is fast reaching the point at which diligent and 
judicious application of theory is required if momentum is to be 
maintained. Importantly, theoretical rigour need not come at the 
expense of practitioner relevance. If anything, the effect of more 
emphasis on theory is likely to be salutary. Dimitri (2013, p. 152) 
captured this sentiment best in stating that “…daily procurement 
design can benefit from the more robust theoretical findings, while 
practice can fruitfully feed academic research with new problems, 
suggestions and intuitions.” In this way the application of existing 
theories to current practitioner challenges has the potential to 
generate new insights and possible solutions to these same 
challenges, while research endeavor can generate the data for 
developing new concepts, models and even field-specific theories.     
The purpose of this article is to examine the role that theory has 
played in public procurement research. In particular, it aims to 
answer the following research questions.  
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RQ1: What percentage of public procurement research is theoretically 
grounded? 
RQ2: What are the main theories used in public procurement 
research? 
Related to the theoretical underpinnings of any field are questions to 
do with its coherency and its trajectory. This led us to pose three 
additional research questions.  
RQ3: What type of papers characterise public procurement research?      
RQ4: What are the main research foci in public procurement?  
RQ5: What geographical regions is public procurement research 
associated with? 
To answer the five research questions we conducted a systematic 
review of articles published in the Journal of Public Procurement. This 
was done in order “….to map and to assess the existing intellectual 
territory” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 208). The review covered a 13 
year time period and took in 172 articles, after exclusions were 
made. Our findings have important implications for public 
procurement scholarship, and are set out in greater detail in a later 
section. Before this, we examine the role of theory in management 
science. We then describe our methodology, paying particular 
attention to coding issues. The findings of the review are then 
reported, including the extent and form of theory in public 
procurement research, the type of papers that characterise public 
procurement research, the focus of public procurement research, and 
the geographic regions from which it emanates. In the last section we 
discuss the implications of our findings in respect of the emergence 
of public procurement as a research domain, as well as its future 
prospects.   
THEORY IN MANAGEMENT 
Theory is central to the scholarly credentials of any discipline. 
Within the public procurement field little is known of the role that 
theory has played to date. This situation stands in contrast to the 
related field of supply chain management wherein theory is widely 
debated (Ketchen & Hult, 2011, for example). Moreover, supply chain 
management has been subject to a number of systematic literature 
reviews of late, including Harland et al., (2006), Defee et al., (2010) 
and Chicksand et al., (2012). Coming out of these three reviews are 
insights, though not always consistent, on the extent to which theory 
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is used and the form that it takes. Harland et al., (2006) detected 
some signs of theoretical development in supply management; Defee 
et al., (2010) suggested the need for more theory and noted the 
desirability of constructing theory particular to supply chain and 
logistics management; and Chicksand et al., (2012) concluded that 
supply chain management is relatively under theorised, lacking in 
disciplinary coherence and still waiting for a dominant paradigm to 
emerge. Comparable evidence on the extent and form of theory use 
in public procurement is currently lacking. This is a gap that needs 
addressing, both to inform future research trajectories and to build on 
gains that have been made in the public procurement field over the 
last ten years (Grimm & Thai, 2011). Before doing so, we first make 
the case for why theory is integral to social scientific research, 
examine what is meant by theory, and critique the ascendancy of 
theory within management science.  
Theory has undoubtedly assumed greater prominence as 
management science has matured, largely in consequence of 
decisions taken over fifty years ago to strengthen its scientific 
underpinnings (Bailey & Ford, 1996). Reviews of premier 
management journals have shown that the number of articles making 
a theoretical contribution, either through theory testing or theory 
building, increased steadily between 1963 and 2007 (Colquitt & 
Zapata-Phelan, 2007). Management-specific theories have 
proliferated over this same period and are now used alongside the 
more established psychological and economic theories for studying 
organizations and markets (Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007). These 
developments reflect a near universal consensus over the criticality of 
theory in management research. As researchers, theory enables us to 
organise our thoughts and knowledge, formalise our predictions, 
generate coherent explanations of real world phenomena, develop 
hypotheses, and integrate knowledge (Hambrick, 2007; Miller, 2007). 
That is, theory provides us with logical structures for explaining and 
predicting individual and social phenomena. It is how we make sense 
of, disaggregate, and rationalise the complex phenomena we are 
interested in revealing. Ultimately, theory leads us to a more 
comprehensive understanding of our phenomena of interest than 
would ever be possible in its absence.  
In addition to strengthening the scientific foundations of 
management, theory has a contribution to make to organizational 
practice and management. In the ideal sense theories should have an 
acceptable degree of validity, by which is meant enabling 
understanding and prediction, and a corresponding degree of utility 
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for practitioners (Miner, 1984). As Van de Ven (1989, p. 486) 
remarked, good theory not only “advances knowledge in a scientific 
discipline” but also “guides research toward crucial questions, and 
enlightens the profession of management.” To the extent that they 
are based on empirical regularities, theories help managers to better 
understand their present circumstances and make predictions as to 
the outcome of likely future events (Christensen & Raynor, 2003; 
McGahan, 2007). Knowledge generated through academic 
investigations can be transformed into decision making tools for 
dealing with real world business problems. Pioneers in the field of 
management research envisaged the role of theory in just this way. 
Herbert Simon (1967) outlined several decades ago his belief that 
the success of business research and education depended on its 
ability to synthesise knowledge from scientific conceptions of 
management with insights from the real world of organization 
management. Put simply, theory fosters understanding not only in the 
academic realm but also in the everyday management of 
organizations.     
The prominence of theory in management research has brought 
its own challenges, however, and uneasiness exists over what 
purpose and whose interest it now serves. A number of scholars have 
expressed concern with the privileging of theoretical sophistication 
over practical relevance. Hambrick (2007, p. 1351) criticised a 
“hyper-commitment to theory” within management research which 
stymies the emergence of interesting facts; Ghoshal (2005) opined 
that teaching, practice and knowledge integration have all suffered 
because of a fixation on scientism; and Gunther McGrath (2007) 
spoke of an identity crisis within management research that has 
resulted from subordinating practical relevance to theoretical purity. 
This “hyper-commitment to theory” is viewed by some as an 
impediment to progress. It led Miller (2007, p. 179) to complain of 
interesting and novel empirical findings being straitjacketed with a 
particular theory, linked to meretricious explanation, or couched 
dishonestly in explanations that were formulated post hoc. In a 
similar vein Tushman & O’Reilly (2007, p. 770) have argued that 
“self-imposed distance from the phenomena we study reduces the 
quality of our field’s research, undermines the external validity of our 
theories, and reduces the overall relevance of the data used to test 
theories.” In the eyes of many, we now have “too much of a good 
thing” when it comes to theory in management research (Hambrick, 
2007, p. 1346) and have jettisoned “pragmatic science” in favour of 
“pedantic science” (Anderson et al., 2001).  
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A second major issue surrounding theory in management is its 
definition. An anomalous situation exists where consensus on the 
importance of theory is not matched by agreement on what we 
understand theory to be, or how it ought to be used. According to 
DiMaggio (1995), theory is variously understood as a set of covering 
laws that explain and predict social phenomena, as a detailed and 
plausible account of a social process, or as a form of enlightenment. 
While some scholars and schools of thought define theory by its 
ability to explain variance in a criterion of interest, others see theory 
in terms of detailed narratives and accounts (Colquitt & Zapata-
Phelan, 2007). These different understandings of theory are not 
mutually exclusive, and many of the best theories incorporate 
elements from all three perspectives (DiMaggio, 1995). Irrespective 
of its precise definition, Whetten (1989) proposed that any theory 
contains four essential elements. Firstly, a theory must have 
variables, constructs, or concepts that explain the social phenomena 
of interest. Secondly, it must specify how these variables, constructs, 
or concepts are related to one another. After this, there must be a 
rationale associated with the selection of factors and their causal 
relationships. Finally, all theories should have contextual and 
temporal boundaries that set the limits of generalizability for its use. 
We can relate Whetten’s (1989) disaggregation of the fundamental 
components of theory to our earlier articulation of it being a robust 
system capable of explaining and predicting individual and social 
phenomena.       
Inverting what Whetten (1989) had to say on the constitution of a 
theory, Sutton & Staw (1995) reasoned that if agreement on a 
standard definition of theory is proving illusive, we can at least be 
clear on what theory is not. In their estimation references, data, 
variables, diagrams or hypotheses do not qualify as theory. Among 
their criticisms, they noted the all too frequent tendency of simply 
referencing an existing theory without any attempt to set out its 
causal logic, describing empirical regularities without proper 
explanation as to why they are occurring, listing concepts without 
justifying their causal connections, and creating diagrams without 
explicating the mechanisms believed to be at play. While concurring 
with Sutton & Staw’s (1995) basic argument, Weick (1995) urged 
caution over what we discount as theory. For him theory is not just a 
finished product. It is equally a process, a work in progress. He 
reasoned that even if references, data, variables, diagrams and 
hypotheses are not theoretical of themselves, they are integral to the 
process of theory construction. In reporting data patterns, listing 
9 
 
variables or constructing diagrams – all activities that form part of the 
“interim struggle” of theory development - Weick (1995) surmised 
that researchers are oftentimes making their way towards some form 
of theoretical contribution, albeit tentatively and imperfectly. 
Evidently, discussion on the role of theory in management research 
raises as many questions as it answers. Different interpretations over 
what theory is and what purpose it should serve persist, with some 
schools of thought adhering to a standard scientific view and others 
preferring something bespoke to the social sciences. What is more, 
achieving consensus on these issues appears a long way off. 
The issues raised in the preceding paragraphs are just as 
germane to public procurement. Like management generally, greater 
theoretical application can enable more scientific explanations of 
public sector purchasing (McCue & Prier, 2008; Snider & Rendon, 
2008). The judicious use of theory can help to foster mutually 
reinforcing ties between academia and practitioners, thereby 
enhancing the utility of research outputs (Dimitri, 2013). At the same 
time, public procurement cannot escape many of the challenges 
associated with theory in management science. The diversity of the 
public procurement field, while beneficial in supporting the cross-
pollination of ideas and perspectives, leaves it vulnerable to 
becoming too diffuse through the use of multiple theories, 
methodologies, and research foci. Pfeffer (1993) highlighted this very 
problem in relation to management research generally. How exactly 
do we “…embark on a more truly synergistic research enterprise, one 
in which we might perform work that is rigorous and relevance at 
once” (Gulati, 2007, p. 778) is also a challenge for public 
procurement researchers. Given that the pendulum in management 
science is said to have swung from too little theory to “compulsive 
and mindless theorizing” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 329), this is no easy 
undertaking. It requires, as Aram & Salipante (2003, p. 189) have 
stated, a “reasoned relationship between the particular and the 
general.” The next section describes the methodology used to 
examine the role of theory in public procurement research. Our 
primary objective was to determine the extent of theory use (RQ1) 
and what theories are used (RQ2). In addition, the type of papers that 
characterise public procurement research (RQ3), its main research 
foci (RQ4), and the geographic regions with which it is associated 
(RQ5) were also subject to investigation.  
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METHODOLOGY 
To answer the five research questions we conducted a systematic 
review of public procurement research. Our approach was informed 
by best practice guidance offered by Tranfield et al., (2003) for 
planning, conducting, and reporting on a literature review. This covers 
such aspects as the development of a review protocol, considerations 
for the identification of research, and methods for the synthesis of 
data. In searching the field we limited our review to the Journal of 
Public Procurement. Reliance on one journal has its limitations. 
Principally, our approach meant that public procurement research 
published elsewhere is excluded from our analysis. Our reliance on 
one journal can be contrasted with three journals selected by 
Chicksand et al., (2012) and five journals selected by Defee et al., 
(2010) in their respective reviews of supply chain management. 
Against this, the Journal of Public Procurement is the only scholarly 
journal dedicated to public procurement research [1]. By comparison, 
there are a number of scholarly journals dedicated to supply chain 
management. Furthermore, the Journal of Public Procurement has 
established itself as the primary outlet for researchers interested in 
public sector purchasing and has become the centre of debate on 
myriad issues in the public procurement domain. 
Our experience led us to believe that scholarship on public 
procurement is concentrated within the Journal of Public 
Procurement and that the quantity of articles appearing elsewhere is 
not substantial to the degree that it would significantly affect our 
findings. As such, we felt justified in limiting our review to the Journal 
of Public Procurement as it represents a reliable and comprehensive 
gauge of what has been researched over the last decade. We also 
noted that reviews based on the content of a single journal have been 
previously undertaken. For example, Taylor & Taylor (2009) 
performed a thematic analysis of operations management research 
using only the International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management. Our sample timeframe starts in 2001, the year in 
which the Journal of Public Procurement was launched, and ends in 
2013 [2]. It takes in 13 years of public procurement research, 
encompassing the time period both before and after the global 
financial crisis of 2007. As is standard with literature reviews, we 
excluded editorials and president letters, symposium introductions, 
practitioner corner articles, U.S government reprints, and book 
reviews as these were deemed extraneous to the objectives of the 
research. This left 172 articles which were published in the Journal of 
Public Procurement between 2001 and 2013.   
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Each of the 172 articles constituted a unit of analysis. A system 
was employed (Table 1) to ensure that all 172 articles were analyzed 
in a comprehensive and transparent way, which is a hallmark of the 
systematic review procedure (Tranfield et al., 2003). To begin with, 
descriptive details for each paper were recorded. These included year 
of publication, volume number, article title, and author details. Each 
article was then tested against pre-specified criteria, discussed 
further on, to determine if it was theoretically grounded. Articles were 
coded zero if they were adjudged theoretical and one if non-
theoretical. Where applicable, the actual theory employed was also 
recorded. A list of major theories was devised in advance of the 
coding process to allow easier identification, coding and 
categorisation of theoretical articles. This list, reproduced in Table 3, 
was compiled based on the authors’ pre-existing knowledge of the 
field and from skimming a sample of papers from each publication 
year. 
 
Table 1 
System for Reviewing Articles 
Title Theoretical Theory 
Code 
Theory 
Group 
Type of 
Paper 
Level of 
Analysis 
Region 
Dispelling 
fear… 
Yes All Other Psychology Conceptual Organizational US 
Design and 
build  
No n/a n/a Survey Organizational Europe 
Public 
policy… 
No n/a n/a Survey Organizational US 
An 
appraisal… 
Yes Institutional Sociology Survey Macro Africa 
Best 
value…. 
No n/a n/a Technical Organizational n/a 
Unwritten 
ground… 
Yes Principal-
Agent 
Economics Case study Macro Asia 
A model… No n/a n/a Survey Organizational Europe 
An 
empirical… 
Yes Principal 
Agent 
Economics Survey Macro Africa 
 
As well as investigating theoretical content, our review sought to 
determine paper type, research focus, and geographic origin. 
Previous reviews in fields such as operations management have 
adopted similar lines of inquiry (Taylor & Taylor, 2009, for example). 
In the case of paper type, a list of seven categories and their 
definitions was compiled (Table 2). Again, this list was based on the 
authors’ pre-existing knowledge of the field and from skimming 
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sample papers from each publication year. Each of the 172 articles 
was coded as conceptual, survey, case study, technical & simulation, 
policy & literature review, positional, or development of measurement 
tool. The research focus of each article was recorded verbatim at first. 
Thereafter, each article was assigned to one of three research 
categories: characteristics and motivations of public sector buyers; 
procurement as an organization-level phenomenon; and macro policy 
and regulatory issues. Finally, where applicable the regional focus of 
the article was identified and coded as one of: United States & 
Canada, Europe, Asia & Oceania, Africa, all other regions, and no 
geographical context.     
 
TABLE 2 
Pre-Specified List of Paper Types and their Definitions 
Paper Type Description Code 
Survey A paper that is based on the systematic examination 
of a particular topic and reports on its quantitative 
findings e.g. a survey of the professional skills and 
abilities of public sector buyers   
1 
Case study A paper that focuses on a particular case or issue, 
using documentary evidence, interviews, 
quantitative data in reporting its results e.g. a case 
study of procurement reform in local authority 
organizations   
2 
Conceptual A paper that focuses on concept development 
and/or makes a theoretical contribution (non-
empirical)  
3 
Development of 
measurement 
tool 
A paper that describes the development/application 
of a measurement tool in respect of an aspect of 
procurement e.g. an instrument that measures the 
impact of e-procurement on compliance with 
purchasing policies   
4 
Positional A paper that offers an opinion on a particular issue 
or topic e.g. the pros and cons of set-asides for small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)  
5 
Policy & 
literature review 
A paper that reviews a policy area associated with 
public procurement or that reviews literature 
relevant to a certain topic e.g. the growing use of 
environmental criteria in the selection of suppliers  
6 
Technical & 
simulation 
A paper that deals with a technical problem or 
challenge e.g. optimising weighting criteria for 
tender evaluations/ A paper that simulates or 
mathematically models certain scenarios e.g. the 
effect of bundling contracts on bid prices  
7 
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To test if an article was theoretical two criteria were applied 
(Figure 1). The first criterion stated that the article must include 
something approximating to the standard definition of theory, namely: 
a structure capable of explaining and predicting individual and social 
phenomena (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Hambrick, 2007). For 
example, institutional theory explains how organizations come to 
resemble one another in their structural and behavioural 
characteristics by reference to the impact of institutional forces, and 
predicts the conditions under which this is more or less likely to 
happen (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Absent of 
having such a systemised structure capable of explaining and 
predicting individual and social phenomena, the article was not 
judged theoretical. While this point may seem obvious, it is 
nonetheless important as the conflation of concepts, frameworks, 
hypotheses, data and references with theory is a common mistake 
made by researchers (Sutton & Staw, 1995). An alternative approach 
would have been to count the number of times “theory” appears in 
the text body of the article, or if “theory” features in a section heading 
(Hambrick, 2007). For the former, the frequency of mentions could be 
taken as indicating if the article is theoretical in substance, with 
perhaps a minimum frequency threshold used to separate theoretical 
from non-theoretical articles. The presence of theory in a section 
heading is also suggestive of a theoretical article. However, as we 
show below, it is no guarantee that an article is theoretical in 
substance. 
The second criterion stipulated that where a theory is specified 
within an article it must be used to frame the research. It is not 
sufficient for an article to superficially employ a particular theory, 
thereby purporting to be more scientific than it actually is. The use of 
this second criterion allowed for the exclusion of any article that only 
pays cursory reference to a theory or simply name-checks a 
theoretician. Hence, in the interests of producing a reliable indicator 
of theory in public procurement research there had to be a 
demonstrable link between the logic of a cited theory and the 
research content of the article. No definitive rule exists for making 
such a determination and the depth and sophistication of application 
can be expected to vary across published research. In addition, 
differences in theoretical application are to be expected on the basis 
that some articles will use theory to deduce hypotheses for empirical 
testing while others will seek to build on, or revise, a particular theory. 
But either way, the theory or theories that appeared in the article had 
to be used in a substantive way for it to be judged theoretical. A good 
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example of theoretical application is found in Thai (2001). He used 
general systems theory to explain how policy and regulatory forces 
impact procurement practices across the public sector and how these 
same practices, in turn, act back on political and policy calculations, 
resulting in a system defined by interaction and inter-dependence.   
 
FIGURE 1 
System for Coding Articles as Theoretical 
 
 
Our chosen methodological approach had both advantages and 
disadvantages. It was not as objective, transparent or systematized 
as mechanically searching for “theory” in the text body or section 
headings of articles. Against this, we did proceed with a clear 
definition of theory and consistently applied this definition in testing 
whether a particular article was theoretical or not. Our approach also 
required two reviewers to scrutinise each of the 172 articles and to 
make their categorizations on this basis. This ensured that a reliable 
determination was made on the presence or absence of theory, and if 
this same theory had been applied to a satisfactory degree. An 
example is useful in demonstrating why our methodological approach 
proved more effective than mechanical content analysis. Among the 
reviewed articles was an investigation of “design and build” 
procurement strategies by Lesniak & Zima (2013). As part of their 
literature review, Lesniak & Zima included a section headed 
“theoretical background”. However, closer inspection revealed that 
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this section contained no theory. Had our approach solely relied on 
detecting the presence of “theory” or “theoretical” in section 
headings, Lesniak & Zima’s article, and others besides, would have 
been incorrectly recorded as theoretical.     
The coding process proceeded in two stages. In the first stage 
each article was examined by two reviewers working independently of 
one another. Tranfield et al., (2003, p. 217) referred to this as the 
process of “double extraction”. Using two reviewers is a 
recommended strategy for improving the quality of qualitative 
research and helps to underpin the reliability of the review and its 
findings (Seale, 2000). Upon completion of the first stage the results 
of each reviewer were cross-compared. In over 90 percent of cases 
the reviewers independently arrived at the same determination on the 
presence of theory and the particular theory in question. The 
classification of paper type, research focus and geographic region 
resulted in few discrepancies as it involved coding according to a pre-
specified list in the case of paper type and coding verbatim in the 
case of both research focus and geographic region.  
In the second stage the two reviewers worked together and dealt 
with the small number of articles over which there were initial 
differences in coding decisions or where some element of uncertainty 
existed. In the former instance this involved deciding whether an 
article had met the two qualifying criteria for it to be judged 
theoretical. In other words, was there an identifiable theory and did 
the same theory frame the research study. In the latter instance it 
required identifying theories where they were not made explicit, a 
difficulty which Defee et al., (2010) also experienced. For example, 
Ntayi et al., (2011) described, explained and modelled the 
relationship between psychological wellness and organizational 
anomie to ethical procurement behaviour. Out of this we inferred self-
determination theory, a meta-theory for framing motivational studies, 
even though Ntayi et al., (2011) did not explicitly refer to this theory. 
Similarly, Hommen & Rolfstam’s (2009) invocation of interactive 
learning and evolutionary perspectives on innovation processes led 
us to the conclusion that innovation theory was being used. Our two-
stage approach resulted in the coding of 172 articles along a number 
of dimensions and the generation of a large dataset. Thereafter, a 
synthesis of the data was undertaken. The results from this are 
described in the next section.    
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RESULTS 
The first question involved determining the extent to which public 
procurement research is theoretically grounded. Out of analysing 172 
articles published in the Journal of Public Procurement between 
2001 and 2013, exactly 50 contained an identifiable theory that was 
used to frame the study or discussion. This translates to 29 percent 
of all reviewed articles. To further investigate the theoretical 
character of public procurement, we disaggregated research into four 
distinct time periods: 2001-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010, and 
2011-2013. We then examined the incidence of theoretical articles in 
each period (Figure 2). Statistical testing using Pearson’s Chi Square 
led to a rejection of the null hypothesis that theory use and time 
period were independent. Instead, we found a statistically significant 
relationship between the use of theory and the time period in which 
an article was published (p<.05). The strength of this association is 
low-moderate, as indicated by a Cramer’s V of .21. More fine grained 
analysis revealed that theoretical articles were more prevalent in the 
two most recent time periods, 2008-2010 and 2011-2013. This 
reflects an upward trend in theory use in public procurement 
research. So while nine of the forty-four articles (20%) published 
between 2001 and 2004 and five of the thirty-two articles (15%) 
published between 2005 and 2007 were found to be theoretical, this 
rises to seventeen of forty-seven articles (36%) between 2008 and 
2010 and nineteen of forty-nine articles (39%) between 2011 and 
2013.  
Having established that 29 percent of articles had a theoretical 
grounding, the second question investigated what theories were 
used. Our results, listed in Table 3, show that theory of auctions & 
competitive bidding is the most singularly used theory in public 
procurement. The next most used theory is principal-agency theory 
and, after this, transaction cost economic theory, contract theory and 
general systems theory. Seven of the fifty articles used a combination 
of theories. Among these were five articles that combined two 
theories; for example, Glock & Broens (2013) integrated organization 
behaviour theory with contingency theory. Two articles used four 
major theories; for example, Apte et al., (2011) used principal-agent 
theory, transaction cost economic theory, contract theory and supply 
chain management theory. Sixteen of the fifty theoretically grounded 
articles used theories that were not contained in our pre-specified list 
and were assigned to the “all other theories” category. Included here 
was a broad theoretical range, including theory of professions, theory 
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of leadership, social network theory, fuzzy set theory, theory of lean 
and theory of self-determination.        
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Theoretical Articles between 2001 and 2013 
 
 After identifying the most frequently used theories we turned our 
attention to the underlying disciplines on which public procurement 
research is based. For the purposes of this analysis each theory is 
said to have its antecedents in one of four distinct social scientific 
disciplines. These are economics, psychology, sociology and 
management. Each of the 50 theoretical articles was attributed to 
one of these four categories. In the case of articles using a 
combination of theories, attribution was made on the basis of the first 
listed theory appearing in the article. 
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TABLE 3 
Individual Theories and their Frequency 
Theory Frequency 
Theory of auctions and competitive bidding 8 
Principal-agent theory  5 
Contract theory 3 
Transaction cost economic theory 3 
General systems theory 3 
Institutional theory 2 
Organization behaviour theory 2 
Supply chain management theory 1 
Combination of theories 7 
All other theories   16 
Total 50 
 
In the majority of cases the matching of an individual theory to 
one of the four foundational disciplines was a straightforward 
process. Theory of auctions and competitive markets, principal-agent 
theory and transaction cost theory are recognisable as economic 
theories. Leadership theory and self-determination theory belong to 
psychology. Social constructivism and institutional theory are 
sociological in character. Organization behaviour theory and supply 
chain management theory are associated with management. In the 
case of general systems theory, which is multi-disciplinary, we believe 
it is synonymous with the sociological discipline and coded it 
accordingly.  
The results, which are contained in Table 4, show that economics 
has been the most prominent discipline informing public procurement 
research. It accounts for over half of theory-based articles. Twenty-
eight of the fifty theoretically grounded articles (56%) have their 
antecedents in economic theory. Examples include theory of auctions 
and competitive bidding, principal-agent theory, transaction cost 
economic theory and contract theory. The sociology discipline 
accounts for nine of the theoretically grounded articles (18%), with 
examples including general systems theory, institutional theory and 
social constructivism. The management discipline also accounts for 
nine articles (18%), with organization behaviour theory, theory of 
innovation and theory of lean relevant here. Lastly, theories with a 
psychological basis were found in four articles (8%), and include 
theory of self-determination and leadership theory.  
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TABLE 4 
Disciplinary Influences in Public Procurement Research 
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Economics 28 56% Theory of auctions & competitive bidding 
Principal-agent theory 
Transaction cost economic theory (including 
in combination with other theories) 
Contract theory (including in combination 
with other theories)  
Fuzzy set theory 
Game theory (including in combination with 
other theories)  
Classic economic theory 
New institutional economic theory 
Sociology 9 18% Institutional theory  
General systems theory 
Social constructivism 
Social exchange theory 
Social network theory  
Theory of professions 
Management  9 18% Organization behaviour theory (including in 
combination with other theories)  
Supply chain management theory 
Healthcare management theory 
Organization learning theory 
Theory of innovation  
Theory of lean 
Psychology 4 8% Leadership theory 
Process theory (of trust) 
Theory of self-determination 
Total 50 100%  
 
Further analysis of the impact of the four different disciplines on 
public procurement research over the last decade is revealing (Figure 
3). It shows that economic-based theories were dominant between 
2001 and 2004 before sharply decreasing in frequency between 
2005 and 2007. They increased again between 2008 and 2010 and 
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this has continued right up to the most recent time period of 2011-
2013. The pattern of use of sociological and psychological theories 
has remained relatively stable over the four time periods, with each 
discipline showing incremental increases. In contrast, management 
science theories were absent between 2001 and 2004 and again 
between 2005 and 2007. The number of articles using a 
management theory increased to four between 2008 and 2010 and 
reached five between 2011 and 2013. The situation is one in which 
economic theory still predominates but management theory is 
increasing in use.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Disciplinary Influences between 2001 and 2013 
  
 
The third question focused on paper type within public 
procurement research. By this is meant the form that each article 
assumed, whether survey, case study, policy & literature review, 
technical & simulation paper, positional paper, conceptual paper, or 
development of measurement tool. Each of the 172 articles was 
assigned to one of these seven categories. In instances where an 
article encompassed two or more of the above forms, categorisation 
is based on the dominant thrust of the article. To illustrate, in a 
literature review that incorporates interviews with subject matter 
experts, as is the case with Patil & Moleenar (2011), the article was 
coded as policy & literature review. The results, which are displayed in 
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Figure 4 show that case studies are the most common paper type, 
closely followed by survey-based articles. Together, case studies and 
surveys accounted for half of all paper types (50.6%). Next are policy 
& literature reviews and then, in descending order, technical & 
simulation papers, positional papers, conceptual papers, and papers 
dedicated to the development of measurement tools. Additional 
analysis indicated a statistically significant relationship between 
paper type and the presence of theory (p <.05). Theoretically 
grounded articles were concentrated among conceptual, technical & 
simulation, case study, and survey paper types. All but one of the 
conceptual articles and approximately one out of every three 
technical & simulation, case study and survey articles were found to 
be theoretically grounded. Conversely, theory was found to be all but 
absent in policy & literature reviews, positional papers, and 
development of measurement tool papers. Only three of the twenty-
eight policy & literature review papers employed a theoretical lens.     
FIGURE 4 
Paper Type in Public Procurement Research 
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Trends in paper type are discernible over time (Figure 5). Articles 
which report on survey data featured prominently over the time 
period as a whole. Between 2001 and 2004 there were eleven such 
articles, dropping to three in 2005-2007, and rising to thirteen and 
fifteen in the two subsequent time periods. A similar pattern is 
repeated with case studies. There were thirteen case study articles in 
2001-2004, twelve in 2005-2007, seven in 2008-2010, and thirteen 
in 2011-2013. The number of conceptual papers increased in the two 
most recent time periods, going from just a single conceptual paper 
in each of the 2001-2004 and 2005-2007 periods to five papers in 
2008-2010 and four in 2011-2013. A reversal of this trend applies to 
positional papers, which went from five in 2008-2010 to one in 2011-
2013. Articles that review policy & literature are consistently present 
between 2001 and 2013. Technical & simulation papers show a 
strong increase, going from three in 2005-2007 to seven in 2008-
2010 and ten in 2011-2013. Summarising, case studies and surveys 
have been the dominant paper types throughout the period under 
investigation, with policy & literature reviews maintaining a steady 
presence, and technical & simulation papers latterly increasing in 
frequency.  
 
FIGURE 5 
Trends in Paper Type between 2001 and 2013 
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Question four examined the focus of public procurement 
research. First, the topic of each of the 172 articles was recorded 
verbatim; for example, “the impact of e-procurement on 
organizational performance.” Next, articles were divided into one of 
three categories. The first category comprised research on the 
individual characteristics and motivations of public buyers 
(individual). The second category was made up of research that treats 
public procurement as an organizational process or that in some way 
relates to organizational decision making and organizational 
management (organizational). The third category consisted of 
regulatory and policy research in public procurement (macro 
perspective). The third category also included articles that discussed 
the development of the public procurement field. Results from this 
analysis are contained in Table 5. They show that research on the 
characteristics and behaviours of public buyers is low. Only 13 of the 
reviewed articles (7.5%) had a micro level of focus. Research that 
took a macro lens to public procurement is more common, with 55 
articles (32%) falling into this category. This means that 
approximately 60% of research is oriented towards investigating the 
organizational dimensions of public procurement. No significant 
change in research focus is discernible between the four time 
periods. To demonstrate, two articles focused on the individual 
characteristics of public buyers in 2001-2004 and this was repeated 
in 2011-2013; twenty-six articles assumed an organizational lens in 
2001-2004 and thirty-two did likewise in 2011-2013; and there were 
sixteen articles that took a macro-level perspective in 2001-2004 and 
fifteen in 2011-2013.   
Studies that assume an organizational level of analysis are 
diverse. They range from e-procurement impacts to sourcing suppliers 
and from designing procurement competitions to optimising tender 
evaluation systems. To assist our analysis and in the interests of 
clarity we broke down all articles with an organization-level focus into 
11 sub-categories. These are also listed in Table 5. Research at the 
technology-procurement interface is the most prominent line of 
inquiry among all organization-focused public procurement studies. 
Issues surrounding contract administration, risk management, and 
contract performance collectively constitute the second major line of 
inquiry. After these, research foci are evenly spread among supplier 
management, organizational ramifications of contracting-out the 
provision of public services, configuration and management of the 
procurement function, costing & pricing models, and designing 
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procurement competitions. To a lesser extent tender evaluation 
systems and sector-specific procurement strategies form research 
clusters. Logistics and project management have a marginal and 
singular presence respectively.      
 
TABLE 5 
Public Procurement Research Foci 
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Individual (characteristics & motivations of public buyers) 13 7.5% 
Organizational 
1. Technology-procurement interface  
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2. Contract administration/risk management/ 
performance management 
14 
3. Suppliers 10 
4. Contracting-out/outsourcing 10 
5. Organization/management of procurement function 10 
6. Costing & pricing models 10 
7. Procurement competition design 10 
8. Tender evaluation systems 7 
9. Sector-specific procurement strategies 7 
10. Logistics 3 
11. Project management  1 
Total  104 60.5% 
Macro perspective (regulations & policies) 55 32% 
Total 172 100% 
  
The fifth and final research question investigated the regional 
origins of public procurement research. Where applicable, the country 
or region referred to in the article was initially recorded. Eighty-six 
percent of the total number of articles was associated with some 
country or region. Individual countries or regions were grouped into 
five major regions of the world: United States & Canada, Europe (incl. 
Turkey), Africa, Asia & Oceania, and all other regions. As shown in 
Figure 6, the United States & Canada has been the primary source of 
public procurement research, accounting for seventy-two (42%) of the 
total number of articles. Europe has been the second most important 
region. It accounts for forty-three articles (25%). Africa comes third 
(8%), followed by Asia & Oceania (6%) and all other regions (4%). The 
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latter includes Central & South America, Russia and inter-regional 
studies.  
 
FIGURE 6 
Regional Origins of Public Procurement Research 
 
Additional analysis indicates that a gradual transition in the 
origins of public procurement research may be under way (Figure 7). 
United States & Canadian articles, while still dominant, have fallen 
from a high point of thirty between 2001 and 2004 to sixteen 
between 2011 and 2013. In contrast, articles originating in Europe 
have increased from five between 2001 and 2004 to fifteen between 
2011 and 2013. Similarly, articles of African provenance have grown 
from just one between 2001 and 2004 to nine between 2011 and 
2013. There is less change detectable in research from Asia & 
Oceania. Central & South America, Russia and the Middle East 
remain peripheral in terms of article contributions.   
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FIGURE 7 
Regional Origins of Research between 2001 and 2013 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper has sought to elucidate the role that theory has played 
in public procurement research in recent times. While theory is 
recognised as integral to disciplinary development in management 
science (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; DiMaggio, 1995; Hambrick, 
2007; Whetten, 1989), little is known of its use in the public 
procurement field. With public procurement moving out of its 
formative phase, this gap in our knowledge is becoming less 
acceptable. As a research community we have reached the point at 
which evidence-based understandings of the extent and form of 
theory use are needed. The objective of the paper was to provide 
evidence and bring clarity to the question of theory’s use in public 
procurement research. The results point to a relatively low level of 
theoretical application in public procurement research. Only 29 
percent of reviewed articles were found to be theoretically grounded. 
To get a better sense of this figure it is instructive to compare the 
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extent of theorising in adjacent fields. In supply chain management 
the percentage of published research that is theoretical in form is 
estimated to be 37 percent by Chicksand et al., (2012) and 53 
percent by Defee et al., (2010). Ostensibly, public procurement is 
under-theorised and has some way to go before it attains parity with 
supply chain management.  
Before reading too much into these comparably higher figures, 
some caveats need to be introduced. Firstly, public procurement is 
not as established as supply chain management. Its acceptance as a 
management sub-field and its emergence as a profession are only 
recent occurrences (Matthews, 2005; Prier & McCue, 2009). It is to 
be expected that public procurement is less theoretically developed 
than supply chain management. Secondly, supply chain management 
is undergirded by a large and long established community of interest. 
The number of dedicated journals in the supply chain field can be 
taken as a proxy of its academic embeddedness. Again, it seems 
intuitive that the breadth and depth of supply chain management 
compared to public procurement should correlate with a higher 
incidence of theory. A third caveat centres on how theory is defined 
and measured. Depending on one’s definition of theory, the results of 
a literature review can produce markedly different outcomes. 
Chicksand et al., (2012) made this same observation when noting the 
higher percentage figure of theoretically grounded articles reported by 
Defee et al., (2010) compared to their own. Thus, our determination 
that 29 percent of public procurement research is theoretically 
grounded is not strictly comparable with foregoing results on the 
extent of theory use in supply chain management or related fields.   
Caveats aside, it is evident that most public procurement 
research is not theoretical; if by theoretical we mean the presence of 
a system that is capable of explaining and predicting individual and 
social phenomena. The challenge becomes one of increasing the 
number of theoretically grounded articles and striking a better 
balance between academic rigour and practitioner relevance. There 
are encouraging signs that this may be simply a matter of time, a 
matter of field maturation. Extrapolating from trends in our analysis, 
the frequency of theoretically grounded articles appears to be 
increasing with time. At the end of 2004 and 2007 theoretically 
grounded articles numbered 20 percent and 15 percent respectively. 
By 2010 this figure had reached 36 percent, and by 2013 it had 
climbed to 39 percent. If this upward trajectory is to continue apace, 
public procurement will strengthen its credentials and affirm its 
status as an important sub-field of management. It is important that 
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the continuation of this positive trend is not viewed as inevitable. As a 
research community we must guard against complacency and be 
proactive in consolidating the gains already made. It behoves all of us 
acting in various capacities – researchers, reviewers, editors - to 
seriously consider how theory can be deployed in ways that explicate 
our phenomena of interest. In the early, exploratory period of the 
public procurement field a laissez-faire attitude to theory may have 
been permissible. Now we are entering a phase where more diligence 
and rigour is both expected and required.  
This leads us to contemplating what theories have been used in 
public procurement research. It also prompts us to reflect on what 
theories are notable by their omission. On the first point, we begin by 
acknowledging that public procurement is theoretically eclectic, 
reflective of input from across a diverse range of fields and 
disciplines. With different academic backgrounds come different 
theoretical perspectives, different methodological preferences, and 
different research interests. At the same time it is clear that theories 
belonging to the economics discipline, micro-economics specifically, 
have predominated. Micro-economic theories such as competitive 
auctions & bidding, principal-agent theory and transaction cost 
economic theory account for over half of all theoretical articles. Their 
prevalence signals a particular interpretation of public procurement: 
as a decision-making process that requires optimisation, as an 
impersonal and rule-bound transaction between two or more 
economic parties, and as something that is rational and amenable to 
quantification. While not all researchers will be comfortable with this 
interpretation or wish to adopt a micro-economic lens, the high 
incidence of articles using the same or similar micro-economic 
theories is helping to build a critical mass of knowledge. This is 
precisely what public procurement needs if further progress is to be 
made.           
Theories that have their antecedents in sociology, psychology and 
management are also to be found. Their application is symbolic of 
other ways of seeing public procurement. Sociological and 
psychological lenses enable researchers to grapple with the human 
dimension of public procurement and address questions over the 
characteristics of public sector buyers and the factors that explain 
why they exhibit particular behaviours in response to organizational 
and environmental stimuli. Out of the four disciplines under which we 
categorise all listed theories, psychology is the least used. This 
corresponds to another finding, discussed below, that studies on 
public sector buyers themselves are comparably few. Sociological 
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theories appear in greater number and speak not only to the policy, 
governance and societal dimension of public procurement research 
but also to issues of organizational functioning and even public buyer 
characteristics. Management science theories have become more 
widely used in recent years. Whereas no management theory was 
detected for the first two time periods of our analysis, this had 
changed in the third and fourth periods so that management theory is 
now second only to economics. The utility of management theories 
can be seen, inter alia, in relation to the role and position of 
procurement within the organization. Indicative of its potential in this 
regard is the application of a theory of lean by Waterman & McCue 
(2012) and Schiele & McCue (2011) to explain efficiency imperatives 
in public sector purchasing. The observed preference for 
management theory in more recent years could be the result of a 
number of factors, including more management researchers 
engaging with public procurement or heightened awareness of the 
strategic potential of purchasing. Whatever the reasons, 
management theory is indispensable if we are to arrive at a more 
complete understanding of public procurement.   
In the main, the theories identified throughout the review are as 
anticipated. More surprising are the theories, historical and 
contemporary, that do not feature at all, or that do so only to a limited 
degree. In the former group we note the absence of stakeholder 
theory as pioneered by Edward Freeman (1984), dynamic capabilities 
theory articulated by Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997) and the much 
earlier bureaucratic management theory synonymous with Max 
Weber (1978). These by no means represent an exhaustive list of 
omitted theories, nor do we offer them as theoretical panaceas. 
Rather, we highlight them as among some of the more obvious 
omissions from public procurement scholarship to date. Taking just 
the first of these three examples, stakeholder theory lends itself to 
explaining why it is that public sector purchasing across jurisdictions 
increasingly concerns itself with accommodating small suppliers, 
fostering equality of opportunity and social cohesion, and 
safeguarding the natural environment. For public procurement 
research, the use of stakeholder theory would allow for a more 
forensic examination of how and under what circumstances various 
stakeholder interests are represented in national policies and 
organizational procurement practices.  
The limited application of major theories is also noteworthy. Two, 
in particular, stand out for us. The first is supply chain management 
theory. It features only once in the 172 articles reviewed. Gianakis & 
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McCue (2012) used it to make sense of transformative procurement 
practices across four organizations. This is surprising given the 
overlap between procurement and supply chain management 
disciplines. The second is institutional theory. We identified only two 
instances of its application. Akenroye (2013) attempted to explain the 
emergence of social criteria in supplier selection decisions in terms of 
institutional forces bearing on organizations. Dickens-Johnson (2008) 
applied institutional theory’s ideas on the structuration of 
organizational fields as a lens through which to understand public 
sector outsourcing trends. This is surprising as institutional theory 
has potential to inform public procurement research by explaining 
and predicting structural and behavioural isomorphism among 
organizations (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983), organizational avoidance 
of regulatory and policy pressures (Oliver, 1992), the 
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of norms and operating 
standards (Hirsch, 1985), and the evolution of institutional fields 
(Hoffman, 1999). These are just t two instances of theories that have 
yet to be fully exploited in public procurement research. There are 
many more besides. Greater awareness needs to be shown over how 
these theories can be deployed so as to enhance the validity and 
utility of public procurement research in the years ahead.  
In addition to theory we examined three additional indicators of 
disciplinary development. The first of these related to paper type. Our 
findings reveal that case studies and surveys are dominant, with the 
frequency of both spiking in recent years. Similar patterns have been 
reported for operations management (Taylor & Taylor, 2009) and 
supply chain management (Chicksand et al., 2012). Policy & 
literature reviews, technical & simulation papers, positional papers, 
conceptual papers, and papers devoted to the development of 
measurement tools appear in order of descending frequency in our 
review. The range of paper types is testament to the catholic nature 
of public procurement research and its ability, up to this point, to 
accommodate plurality. Whether this is sustainable in the long-term is 
moot. Pfeffer (1993) has long argued that diversity and 
permissiveness in management research militates against its 
disciplinary development. Researchers in public procurement must 
also be alive to this potential pitfall. The finding that theory is 
clustered among conceptual, technical & simulation, case study and 
survey papers suggests that it is these which are deserving of 
greatest future attention. The corollary is paper types that do not use 
theory - policy & literature reviews, positional papers and 
development of measurement tools - should be deemphasised. As 
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the field grows these issues could act to resolve themselves whereby 
policy & literature reviews and positional papers are subsumed into 
empirical papers, as one possibility.  
As with paper type, the focus of research in public procurement is 
arrayed from psychological motivators for public buyers lying at one 
end of the spectrum to international regulatory frameworks at the 
other. In their respective ways these individual and macro 
perspectives each constitute promising lines of inquiry and usefully 
serve as focal points for future research. The former is deserving of 
more attention than has been the case up to this point. While the 
public procurement field has received criticism over its ill-defined 
boundaries (Prier & McCue 2009), these two areas embody promising 
and clearly marked-out avenues for on-going inquiry. Between the 
individual buyer and the macro policy poles resides research that 
focuses on the organizational dimension to public procurement. If the 
aforementioned poles are relatively self-contained and coherent, the 
latter is less so. Accounting for 60 percent of all articles, it includes 
the procurement-technology interface, the design of procurement 
competitions, costing & pricing models, supplier engagement issues, 
and the structure and operation of purchasing departments, among 
other topics. It is at this organizational level that the diffuse nature of 
public procurement research is evident. It is also at this level that we 
see the various ways in which the foundational disciplines of 
economics, sociology, psychology and management are all brought to 
bear. Drawing on the work of Harland et al., (2006, p. 736), there is 
little evidence of an “explicit discipline debate” within public 
procurement. Instead, there are numerous lines of inquiry, some 
more productive than others. In the interests of coherency and 
disciplinary advancement, we suggest that the focus of future 
research is narrowed to fewer topics, preferably ones unique to our 
field. Promising lines for future inquiry include technology-
procurement, contract management, and the design of procurement 
competitions and tender evaluation systems. 
Finally, it is worth commenting on the geographic origins of public 
procurement research. There is no doubt that studies to date have 
originated mainly from the United States and Europe, with these two 
regions accounting for two out of every three articles reviewed. Public 
procurement is no different from management science in having a 
Western-centric character. Our trend analysis suggests that United 
States & Canadian input is plateauing while European and African 
input is rising. Looking into the future, we expect that contributions by 
academics and practitioners in developing countries will increase as 
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their economies grow and their systems of public administration and 
policy making evolve. At the same time, lesser developed regions 
stand to gain from the past experience, both good and bad, of 
countries and regions currently at the vanguard of public 
procurement. In this sense the more international the debate the 
better.    
CONCLUSION 
Our paper is a timely contribution to the debate on theory in 
public procurement. It also serves to complement previous field 
reviews, such as Thai’s (2001) impressive history of public 
procurement policies and practices in the United States. It is not 
without its limitations, however. Firstly, our review is not exhaustive 
as we confine our search to a single journal. As a consequence, 
published research that appears in other scholarly outlets escapes 
our analysis. Future attempts at reviewing the theoretical base of 
public procurement may consider widening their search and take in 
three-five journals, as per Chicksand et al., (2012) and Defee et al., 
(2010), or even search a selection of the major academic databases 
so as to capture all published research. A word of warning, however; 
in embarking on such a task one should be mindful of the varied 
nomenclature that surrounds public procurement – public 
purchasing, public contracting, sourcing, procuring – and the 
difficulties this poses when undertaking any systematic literature 
review. Secondly, any theoretical review is immediately confronted 
with the quite vexing question of what is theory. We adhere to a 
standard and universally accepted definition of theory as a 
systemised structure capable of explaining and predicting individual 
and social phenomena (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Hambrick, 
2007). We acknowledge that in adhering to this definition we exclude 
what Weick (1995) has termed the “interim struggles” that go into 
making up a theory, such as the reporting of empirical patterns or the 
construction of frameworks and models. Future reviews may opt for a 
more malleable interpretation and definition of theory in which 
theoretical “works in progress” are included. Thirdly, methods to 
analyze the content of a large body of scholarly work are rarely 
flawless and invariably have some small degree of inaccuracy (Taylor 
& Taylor, 2009). Our review is no exception in this regard. Some 
articles had more than one research foci, which required us to make 
a judgement call on the dominant thrust of the article. Limitations 
notwithstanding, our paper is among the first to systematically 
analyze public procurement scholarship over the last decade.  
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The role of theory in public procurement research has gone 
largely unaddressed. Our aim in this paper was to determine the 
degree to which extant research is theoretically grounded and to shed 
light on what theories have been used to date. Our results indicate 
that the field is relatively under-theorised, but that this is beginning to 
change as more recent contributions attempt to anchor their studies 
in established theories. One may interpret the relatively low levels of 
theoretical application as akin to a liability of newness, and 
something that the field will surmount with age and experience. The 
same can be said of its numerous paper types and dispersed 
research foci, which may well start to coalesce with time. Significant 
strides have been made over the last decade in advancing the 
credentials of public procurement as a management sub-field. We are 
now reaching the point where it is necessary to push on if we are to 
transition from a “popularist science” to a “pragmatic science” in 
which rigour and relevance are equally balanced (Anderson et al., 
2001). The onus lies with all of us to make sure that ten-fifteen years 
from now we can look back at yet more miles covered on the road to 
disciplinary credibility.  
NOTES 
1. There are a number of other publications related to public 
procurement. However, these are either practitioner periodicals, 
such as Government Procurement, or focused on case law 
related to public procurement, such as Public Procurement Law 
Review, Procurement Lawyer, and European Procurement and 
Public Private Partnership Law Review. 
2. Volume 13 (2013) of the Journal of Public Procurement was not 
available at the time of writing and is not included as part of our 
review and analysis. 
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1. How many years experience do you have in procurement? 
  
2. In a typical week how much 
of your work time is spent on procurement-related activity? 
o 0% 
o 1-25% 
o 26-50% 
o 51-75% 
o 76-100%  
 
3. Do you hold a procurement-
related qualification? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
4. Are you familiar with the 
content of Circular 10/14: Initiatives to Assist SMEs in Public Procurement? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
5. Please state your highest 
level of qualification 
o Leaving Certificate 
o Third level certificate 
o Third level diploma 
o Bachelor degree 
o Master’s degree 
o PhD 
 
6. In what type of public sector 
organisation are you employed? 
o Central government authority 
o Local government authority 
o State agency 
o Semi-state company/utility 
o Education institution (e.g. 
school, university, institute of technology, V.E.C) 
o Other  
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7. How many employees are in 
your organisation? 
o 1-9 
o 10-49 
o 50-249 
o 250+ 
 
8. Do 
you....................................... 
Advertise all supply contracts valued above 25,000 euro and or works contracts valued 
above 50,000 euro on eTenders 
o Yes  
o No 
 
Enable firms to submit their tenders online through eTenders 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Publish Prior Information Notices (PIN) on eTenders 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Publish contract award notices on eTenders 
o Yes  
o No 
 
 
9. Do you carry out market analysis prior to issuing a request for tender? 
o Yes  
o No 
 
10. Which tendering procedure 
do you use in the case of supply contracts worth up to 134,000 euro and/or work 
contracts worth up to 250,000? 
o Restricted procedure (i.e. 
pre-qualification of candidates) 
o Open procedure 
 
11. Do you allow tenderers to do 
the following at the initial phase of any competition………….. 
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Self-declare their financial capacity 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Self-declare their insurance cover 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
 
 
12. Which option best describes purchasing in your organisation? 
o Purchasing is reactive and uses ‘quick fixes’ to solve problems 
o Our purchasing techniques and practices are the best available 
o Purchasing techniques and practices strengthen our competitive position 
o Purchasing informs and helps to implement our strategy  
 
13. Do you indicate in requests for tender that you are prepared to consider 
reasonable variants to the specifications? 
o Yes  
o No 
 
14. Is it the case that you……………. 
Accept alternative proof of financial capacity if tenderers are having difficulty meeting the 
original requirements 
o Yes 
o No   
 
Use broadly defined qualification criteria so as to maximise the number of eligible tenderers 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Provide written feedback to unsuccessful tenderers 
o Yes  
o No 
 
15. At what level do you set the ‘company turnover-to-turnover value’ ratio for 
routine supply contracts? 
o Not more than twice the estimated contract value 
o More than twice the estimated contract value 
 
16. Do you use model tender and contract documents issued by the Office of 
Government Procurement (OGP)? 
o Yes  
o No 
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17.  How is procurement managed in your organisation? 
o On a centralised basis 
o On a decentralised basis  
 
 
 
18.  At what level do you set insurance requirements for routine supply contracts? 
o Employer’s Liability of 12.7 million euro and Public Liability of 6.5 million euro 
o At levels higher than the above 
 
19.  Do you evaluate life-cycle costs of products/services when making a 
procurement decision? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
20. Do you manage contract competitions by taking any of the following 
actions……………… 
Divide contracts into lots 
o Yes  
o No 
 
Encourage consortium bids by, for example, highlighting this possibility in the request for 
tenders 
o Yes  
o No 
 
Devise framework agreements so as to allow for the inclusion of small firms 
o Yes  
o No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Please give your opinion on the following statements. 
 
 Stro
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ly 
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is
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N
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e
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tro
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g
ly 
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g
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Facilitating SME participation in contract competitions is 
important to my reputation as a public buyer  
     
SME participation in contract competitions results in more 
competitive bid prices for my dept./organisation 
     
Facilitating SME participation in contract competitions is 
compatible with optimising value for money and complying with 
EU law  
     
A procurement goal of my dept./organisation is to facilitate the 
broadest participation of suppliers in contract competitions 
     
SME-friendly policy limits my discretion as a buyer      
There are consequences for me from not following ‘SME-friendly’ 
policy 
     
The majority of buyers I know take steps to facilitate SME 
participation in contract competitions 
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Appendix C 
 
Qualitative instrument used in the peer review process of the predictive model, its 
constructs and associated measures 
Details of the peer review panel  
48 
 
Investigating public buyer compliance with SME-friendly policy  
 
Research overview 
The focus of the research is on public buyers’ compliance with policies aimed at 
facilitating SMEs in public contract competitions. It intends to shed light on how SME-
friendly procurement policy is working out in practice. Specifically, the research seeks 
to answer two broad questions: 
 
1. To what extent are public buyers complying with SME-friendly procurement policy? 
2. How do institutional pressures affect public buyers’ compliance with SME-friendly 
procurement policy? 
 
Model testing 
A theoretically-informed model to explain and predict public buyers’ compliance with 
SME-friendly policy will be tested as part of this study (see pg. 2). The independent 
variables (predictors) in the model are derived from institutional theory and include such 
factors as social legitimacy and economic gain. The dependent variable is compliance 
with SME-friendly procurement policy. The model also controls for a number of 
characteristics related to public buyers and their organisations. The independent, 
dependent and control variables are also listed on pages 3-5.  
 
Your input 
I would be grateful if you could review the operationalisation and measurement of each 
variable and comment on them as you feel appropriate. I would also appreciate your 
assessment of the predictive model and the overall design of the study.    
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Predictive model of SME-friendly policy compliance 
50 
 
Independent variables and their operationalisation (draft form) 
51 
 
Controls and their operationalisation (draft 
form)
52 
 
Dependent variable: policy compliance index  
53 
 
Peer review panel (academics and practitioners) 
No. Name Institute/Employer  Title Area of research expertise 
Academics 
1 Professor 
Christine Oliver
32
 
York University, Canada Professor of Organization Studies Henry J. 
Knowles Chair in Organizational Strategy 
Institutional theory and organisation 
studies 
2 Kim Loader University of York, UK Lecturer in Public Finance SMEs and public procurement 
3 Professor Cliff 
McCue 
Florida Atlantic University, US Associate Professor, School of Public 
Administration 
Public administration and 
procurement 
4 Dr 
Gordon Murray 
Tata Consultancy Services, UK  Strategic Procurement Specialist and 
Academic  
Public procurement/sustainable 
procurement 
5 Dr David 
McKevitt 
University College Cork, 
Ireland 
Lecturer in Management and Marketing Public procurement; mentoring in 
public sector contexts 
Practitioners 
6 Eileen O’Keefe Dublin City University, Ireland Procurement and Contracts Manager  - 
7 Martin Kilbane
33
 
and OGP staff  
Office of Government 
Procurement (OGP), Ireland 
Tender Operations Manager - 
 
 
 
                                                            
32 The predictive factors tested in the model were derived from an institutional compliance framework put forward by Professor Christine Oliver (1991).   
33 The questionnaire was circulated among procurement professionals employed by the OGP. Martin Kilbane acted as the contact point before, during and after the survey 
was conducted.  
 
